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ABSTRACT
This study is concerned with the problem of Situating* lower paid 
workers within the political economy of an African state when these are 
workers in a public corporation which is in turn an integral part of a 
patron cHentelist political and economic system. It is also a study 
of the responses of one of the largest groups of wage earners in Sierra 
Leone to their employment by a parastatal organisation* -,Two perspectives 
are considered: whether lower paid workers in African parastatals are 
employed (and exploited) in a capitalist mode of production (like Marx*s 
proletariat) or, whether they are a part of a labour aristocracy (even 
a kleptocratic elite) which is parasitic on the peasantry* Neither of 
these perspectives seems fully appropriate. It is far from clear that 
parastatals (even in societies developing in the direction of capitalism) 
operate in the manner or by the criteria of capitalist enterprises, and 
consequently that the ideal or natural reponse of workers should conform 
to the classic Marxist model* On the other hand, it*is far from dear 
that all public sector employees are non-productive, unexploited, or 
purely parasitic on the peasantry* A public corporation like the Sierra 
Leone Port Authority has, in the post-colonial state, been less geared 
to profit-making than to providing jobs for political clients* The 
provision of such political benefits via the public sector after 
independence has been limited less by financial than by political 
constraints and IMF pressure to reduce public spending on over-extended 
public bureaucracies* There is therefore a strong element of parasitism 
in the collective operation of such organisations and one from which 
lower paid workers might be considered in some ways to benefit. And, as 
we shall see, this does affect their attitudes* These factors are most 
accurately seen, however, as merely mitigating their exploitation since 
they do largely perform the labour entailed in providing a genuine 
service for commerce at low rates of renumeration (even' when some graft 
is included)* Moreover, there can be no doubt from socio-economic 
indices and from sociological observation of their way of life that 
they are very much a part of the urban poor. There are immediate 
differences between them and the peasantry over such issues as the level 
of official food prices but these are really subsidiary to the major 
conflicts between the interests of the political and administrative 
elite together with some capitalist business on the one hand and the low 
income rural and urban workforce on the other. This helps to explain 
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A NOTE ON CURRENCY
In Section 1 of this study, monetary values are expressed in 
sterling* From Section 2, however, monetary values are expressed in 
sterling and in Leones and cents, the latter being Sierra Leone's 
national currency which was first introduced in August 1964*
Le2 = £1 sterling, a fixed rate of exchange until 1977, when the Leone 
was 'floated* and now fluctuates (officially) between Le2*15 and 
Le2*50 to £1 sterling*
- M  -
INTRODUCTION
In most of the post-colonial states of sub-Saharan Africa, both 
the size and functions of the state bureaucracy has proliferated. This 
has allegedly (according to official rhetoric) been for the purpose 
of promoting economic development and social change. The centrality 
of the role of the state was, during the period of decolonisation 
and independence, lent intellectual respectability by fashionable 
progressive* economic thinking. This required that in order to 
transcend structural *neo-colonial dependency*, the direct participation 
of the state in the modem sector to the progressive exclusion of 
foreign capital was paramount. Much emphasis was therefore to be 
laid on developing import substitutive industry so as to increase 
national autonomy and lay the basis for ‘independent* development.
This strategy also involved the extension of state control over 
extractive industries and over rural economic activities so as to 
facilitate the appropriation of a large part of the value of the 
peasant farm produce*^ As a result of the pervasiveness of the role' 
of the state in social and economic life, the majority of wage earners 
in most African countries, including Sierra Leone, are employed by 
government or parastatal organisations.
1 An economic appraisal of the strategy with regard to Ghana has 
been provided by Tony Killick in his Development Economics in 
Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana* London, 1978.
A recent World Bank document, Accelerated Development in Sub- 
Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action* Washington D.G., 1981, 
is emphatic that the poliferation of public bureaucracies since 
independence has positively hindered the meeting of ‘basic needs*. 
For an assessment of the consequences of such policies under 
successive post-colonial .regimes in Ghana, cf. Richard Jeffries, 
‘Rawlings and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Ghana*, 
African Affairs* (forthcoming), July 1982.
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Whatever the economic rationale of these organisations, they do 
not exist and operate in a social and political vacuum. They are 
typically an integral part of a patron clientelist political and 
economic system on which the very foundations of government sometimes 
depend.^ * This is not simply or even necessarily to say that African 
governments preside over a 'spoils system* in which dictators give 
handouts to supporters and kinsmen from the treasury till. In the 
post independence era of inter-communal competition and growing 
inter-class cleavage which constantly expose the institutional fragility 
of the new nation-states, political stability can' greatly depend on 
the extent to which governments can underwrite the competing claims 
of different sections of the populace. More particularly, there has 
been (and there is) a pressure for employment opportunities from a 
growing urban population which has generated the response from 
governments of providing jobs for political clients in public 
bureaucracies. It is against this background that government and 
parastatal organisations typically operate in the new African states.
In the now considerable literature on African labour studies, 
the problem of .'situating* lower paid workers within the political 
economy when these are workers in a public corporation,- which is in 
turn an integral part of a system of political clientelism, has not 
received sufficiently detailed attention. Most studies of African 
workers have tended either to focus on workers in capitalist 
industries, or to treat the situation of workers in the employ of
1 Gf., e.g., Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa:
The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley. 1981. 
for a penetrating analysis of the socio-political context of 
policy-making in agriculture in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa.
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public sector organisations as equivalent to employment in capitalist 
industries. In the latter case, there has been a tendency to apply 
a theoretical model which implies that such organisations are, like 
capitalist industries, geared to profit-making via surplus appropriation, 
and that the proper or ideal response of their employment is therefore 
one of anti-capitalist protest* On the other hand, there has also
been a tendency to treat all employees of government and parastatals
2
as ’parasitic1 on the peasantry. It is far from clear that parastatals 
(even in societies developing in the direction of capitalism) operate 
in the manner or by the criteria of capitalist enterprises* On the 
other hand, it is far from clear that all public sector employees 
are non-productive, unexploited, or purely parasitic on the peasantry 
and/or on the surplus appropriated from the extractive industries*
Even less clear is it that, even if - by virtue of their employment - 
in a relatively favoured economic position, they are hon-antagonistic 
towards the political and bureaucratic elite* The idea that as a 
’labour aristocracy* all wage earners except the unskilled are 
closely allied to, or even part of, this elite has been effectively 
refuted by Peace for the case of Southern Nigerian industrial workers 
and by Jeffries for the case of Ghanaian railwaymen*^ This study is
1 Cf#, e*g*, the editorial sections in Richard Sandbrook and Robin
Cohen (eds.), The Development of an African Working Class. London, 
1975; or Peter Waterman, Division and Unity amongst Nigerian 
Workers; Lagos Port Unionism* 1910*3-1960*8* The Hague, 1982*
2 The most important influences here have been Frans Fanon (cf*
The Wretched of the Earth* London, 1965) and John Saul (ef* 
Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, Essays in the Political Economy 
of Africa. New York, 1973)* In a more recent reply to critics,
Saul accepts the ’danger of prematurely labelling the African 
working class* (cf* John Saul, The State and Revolution'in East 
Africa* New York, 1979, p*345)*
3 Cf* Adrian Peace, Choice* Class and Conflict; A Study of Southern
Nigerian Factory Workers* Brighton, 1979*
4 Cf* Richard Jeffries, Class* Power and Ideology; The Railwavmen
of Sekondi-Takoradi* Cambridge, 1978.
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designed to examine the same question for the case of the Sierra 
Leone dock workers but also, hopefully, to make some theoretical 
advance.
The central concern is therefore to identify on the one hand
the-main features of the ’mode of appropriation and distribution*
in post-colonial Sierra Leone (the political and sociological
processes which are involved as well as the pattern of income
distribution which has emerged) and on the other, to show how these
influence the attitudes and political behaviour of the dockers in
the employ of the SLPA. The first concern belongs to the realm of
so-called ’objective analysis of class relations’ and largely 
1
follows Kitching. The second is sometimes deni gratingly said by 
Marxists to belong to so-called ’bourgeois stratification theory* 
but seems worth the effort as attitudes are crucial for the 
understanding of past and (probably) future political behaviour. 
Moreover, Marx’s concept of the dialectic surely emphasises the 
immense usefulness of understanding social and political change as 
the product of a continuous interplay between consciousness and 
’objective’ economic reality. .
This study focuses, then, on the responses of one of the 
largest groups of wage earners in Sierra Leone to their employment 
by a parastatal organisation. Amongst the more important questions 
which are raised are the following: what are the economic and political 
dynamics, or rules of operation, of a public corporation such as the 
SLPA? How have these been affected by the development of a system 
of political clientelism (and associated corruption) in post-colonial
1 Cf. Gavin Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya. Boston, 
19S0, especially pp.438-4*61.
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Sierra Leone? To the extent that these rules of operation are not 
those of efficiency in profit maximisation, such as characterises 
capitalist enterprises, can the employees in such a corporation (or 
certain sections of them) be said to be (in a Marxist sense) exploited, 
and by what criteria? If lower paid workers, at least, can 
collectively be so described, what influence is exerted-on their 
political perceptions and behaviour by the role of patron-clientelism 
in labour recruitment and managerial strategies of labour control?
More especially, what have been the most notable features of their 
trade union organisation and action? And to what degree has their 
trade union activity led them into a conscious (or unconscious) 
confrontation with government over major policy issues?
As already stated, it is an assumption of this study that the 
economic position and political behaviour of parastatal employees 
need to be seen in relation to the role and nature of the Sierra 
Leone state* The latter issue has received inadequate and/or 
unsatisfactory treatment at the levels both of Sierra Leone politics 
specifically and of sub-Saharan politics generally* Despite a 
number of useful studies of various aspects of Sierra Leone politics, 
none of them has addressed itself directly to this question*^ At 
the more general level, the issue has tended to be dominated by
1 One student of Sierra Leone politics has observed that the
available literature leaves the impression that *..*the state 
is non-existent in Sierra Leone*. Cf. Steve Riley, ’New 
Directions in Political Research on Sierra Leone’, paper read 
at the 2nd Symposium on Sierra Leone Studies, Birmingham, 17-19 
July, 1981* Topicality has evidently influenced the choice of 
research subjects to which this researcher also pleads guilty* 
Thus Martin Kilson focused on modernisation and political 
change in his Political Change in a West African State. New 
York, 1969; John Cartwright examined the phenomenon of party 
competition in Politics in Sierra Leone 1917-67. Toronto, 1971; 
Victor King also examined this phenomenon as well as the 
authoritarian trends in Sierra Leone politics in ’The Search 
for Political Stability in Sierra Leone 1960-72’, PhD thesis,
P.T.O.
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Marxists or neo-Marxists, whose general conclusion has been that the 
post-colonial state is manned by a petty bourgeoisie and its role, 
in most instances, determined by metropolitan capital. The weakness 
of this characterisation is not only that ’petty bourgeoisie* is 
here used in a very different sense from that of Marx’s classic usage 
or even that it is used as a somewhat residual category to include 
the political and bureaucratic (and military) elite with local 
entrepreneurs and school teachers, whose interests are by no means 
obviously identical. It is also that it implies an economic rationale 
(the development of capitalism or whatever) to the treatment of 
various economic groups of classes by this ruling class when it is 
far from clear, judging from the post-colonial expression of most 
African states, that there is any such developmental rationale or 
dynamic to their actions and decisions. As this objection implies, 
it is equally far from clear that the interest of metropolitan (or 
international) capital has predominantly determined such actions and 
decisions. The position taken in this study is rather that firstly, 
the treatment of various economic groups (or the process of class- 
formation and exploitation) needs to be understood as the product 
of relatively autonomous decision-making by the local state; and, 
secondly, that, to the degree to which there is a rationale to such
University of Manchester, 1975; Victor Minikin examined the 
communal culture and politics of the Konos in ’Local Level 
Politics in Kono District, Sierra Leone’, PhD thesis, University 
of'Birmingham, 1971; Abner Cohen applied a similar perspective 
to the culture and politics of the Krios in The Politics of Elite 
Culture. London, 1981; the military has been studied by Thomas 
Cox in Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone. Cambridge (Mass.), 
1976; the relationship between political competition at the local 
and national levels has been examined by John Barrows in 
Grassroots Politics in a West African State. London, 1976.
Chris Clapham’s comparative study of Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
however, does, implicitly at least, rest on an understanding of 
the fundamentally ’clientelist’ nature of Sierra Leone politics 
superior to that of the above-mentioned case studies (cf. Liberia 
and Sierra Leone: An Essay in Comparative Politics. Cambridge,
1975^
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decisions, it is political rather than economic.
This is not to deny that it is of the greatest importance to 
understand the role of the state in a country such as Sierra Leone 
in terms of its favouring and disfavouring what might he broadly 
termed various ‘classes*, but it is to suggest that the political 
considerations influencing this process has not been very, well 
understood in the neo-Marxist literature. It is also to draw attention 
to the fact that such political considerations, and indeed the 
political process as a whole, centrally involve the preferment of 
certain individuals and communal groups rather than (or as well as) 
economic classes. There would seem a great deal to be said, indeed, 
for characterising the Sierra Leonean state (as those of many other 
African countries) as a ’neo-patrimonal* regime, its derivation
p
stemming from Max Weber*s concept of patrimonal authority. In its 
application to contemporary African states, neo-patrimonalism _ 
captures the reality of the on-going struggle for power to control 
the appropriative mechanism of the state (and the consolidation of 
such power), a struggle in which the interests cemented by patron- 
clientelist relationships provide the foundations.
The resources of the neo-patrimonal regime are derived from 
control over trade and the regulation of the economy, political 
relationships and patterns of political behaviour are highly 
personalised. Where loyalty to the dominant political figure or 
ruler is not directly based on ethnic and kinship ties, or piety to 
his person, they are based on a network of patron-clientelist
1 Cf. Robert Bates op. cit.. especially the introduction. •
2 Cf. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays
in Sociology, London and Boston, 1948 (repr. 1977), p.299.
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relationships in which those involved agree to serve the ruler-in 
exchange for a variety of rewards. This network, within and across
communal groups, permeates all levels of society with the ruler being
the most prominent patron of all. While recruitment in neo-patrimonal
regimes is often through ability and professional expertise, the
highest offices depend on the ability of the individual to gain the
confidence of the ruler.'**
The post-colonial state's central role in development planning,
making provisions for manpower training, building infrastructures,
administering commodity exports, determining policy toward foreign '
businesses, allocating mining licenses, import licenses, foreign
exchange, etc., has made access to its decision-making mechanisms a
2fundamental aspiration of the literate and educated elite spearheaded
1 For descriptions of the sociological characteristics of neo- 
patrimonal regimes, cf., e.g., S. Gellar, ’State-Building and 
Nation-Building in West Africa', in S. N. Eisenstadt and
S. Rokkan (eds.), Building States and Nations. Beverly Hills 
and London, 1973, pp.348-426. For studies of neo-patiimonal 
regimes, cf. Chris dapham (ed.), Private Patronage and Public 
Power; Political dientelism in the Modem State. London, 1982; 
Donal Cruise O'brien, Saints and Politicians. Cambridge, 1975, 
.especially pp.14-9 ff*; and J. C. Will am e, Fatrimonalism and 
Political Change in the Congo. Stanford, 1972.
2 The term 'literate and educated elite1 (in contradistinction to
notions of the 'ruling class', the 'bourgeoisie', or 'petty 
bourgeoisie') seems justified because a crucial characteristic 
of the modem state in African societies is that it operates in 
a language, and according to procedures, which are largely alien 
and incomprehensible to the majority of the population. Hence
a description of the elite in this way identifies their initial 
and most essential qualifications. There is a futher justification 
in the use of this description precisely because it is the state 
(i.e. political power) which largely determines class relations, 
both vertically and between different communities, rather than 
political power being merely a reflection of economic power or 
of the 'mode of production'. For an elaboration of this argument, 
cf. Colin Leys, 'The "Overdeveloped" Post Colonial State; A 
Re-evaluation', in The Review of African Political Economy. No. 3, 
January-April 1976, pp.39-48*
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by its more politically committed members. Such people develop
patron-clientelist followings in their competition for, and use of,
state power because they do generally (and perhaps genuinely) feel
a sense of obligation to their ethnic commitments and original
’backers' both in the educational as well as in the political stakes
and also because of a need to consolidate support by making available
tangible 'rewards'. Moreover, where different regions, areas, or
locations (populated by culturally distfinct groups) are competing
for the same resources within the same nation-state (the availability
of which does make a difference-to the prospect for individual life
chances), competitive communalism is likely to become the basis of
political action*^ " Thus 'tribalism', far from being an index of an
African's state fragility, may well be an index of its strength
2
precisely because what the state has to offer is so important.
1 Gf. E. Melson and H. Wolpe (eds.), Nigeria; Modernisation and 
the Politics of Communalism, Michigan, 1971, p. 6.
2 Cf* J. Lonsdale, 'The State and Social Processes in Africa', 
paper presented to the 24-th annual meeting of the African Studies 
Association, Bloomington, 21 October 1981, typescript, pp.57-8. 
Nonetheless, alliances may be made between communal groups 
(cemented via clientelism) and much energy expended on the 
assertion of platitudes relating to the desirability of national 
unity. Or, indeed, a nationwide organisation of political 
mobilisation may be maintained. (Cf. Richard Jeffries, 'The 
Ghanaian Elections of 1979' in. African Affairs. 79, July 1980,
pp. 397-414, p.412-3)* For an account of the political fragmentation 
that results when there is an erosion of the means of preventing 
the destabilisation of the nation state, cf. Cherry Gerzel,
'Uganda after Amin' in African Affairs. 79, October 1980, pp. 4-61- 
4-89. This, of course, underlines the fact that the legitimacy 
of a neo-patrimonal regime is, at best, doubtful, and procedures 
for maintaining accountability, tenuous. For an elaboration of 
this theme, cf. Chris Clapham, 'The Politics of Failure; Political 
Instability and National Integration in Liberia and Sierra Leone', 
in Chris Clapham (ed.), op. cit.« pp.76-92.
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An aspect of the operational logic of a neo-patrimonal regime
is the use of the public sector to accommodate political clients. Not
only does the state finance the salaries, wages, and perquisites of
public sector personnel, over and above this, such personnel might
quite literally dip their hands into the till* The diversion of
resources from public and parastatal organisations to private
consumption and investment, the deliberate overmanning of the
corporation to accommodate political clients or, the failure of such
organisations to operate like typical capitalist enterprises, might
more usefully be viewed as the inherent operational logic of the
1neo-patrimonal regime#
One of the most thorny and inadequately answered questions in 
the study of the political economy of African societies is that of 
the relationship between the patron-clientelist operations of 
government and the process of class formation. To what degree does 
the former necessarily inhibit the latter? There is perhaps no 
adequate answer at a general level; but it is the aim of this study 
to begin providing an answer at the level of the relations between 
the state .and lower paid workers in Sierra Leone*
A note on the organisation of the study and the primary sources 
This work falls into three sections and seven chapters. The
1 Thus a legal and moral definition of corruption is avoided. For 
a moralistic appraisal of corruption in West Africa, cf.
M. McMullen, 'A Theory of Corruption' in Sociological Review.
IX, June 1961, pp.181-200. Furthermore, while it must be 
acknowledged that Riggs' model of the operation of the 'sala' 
in 'prismatic* society is illuminating, it was however largely 
anticipated by Weber's description of patrimonal authority. 
Moreover, it does not seem helpful, in the interest of clarity, 
to adopt Riggs' neologisms (cf* Fred Riggs, Administration in 
Developing Societies: The Theory of Prismatic Society. Boston, 
1964, especially Chapters 1, 7, and 8).
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first section (and first two chapters) provide an historical background 
essential for locating the study in its proper perspective. Chapter 1 
discusses the influence of laissez-faire economic doctrines on British 
colonial public administration and the consequent reluctance of the 
authorities to undertake responsibility for the development of the 
port or to bring the management of port services within the scope of 
its bureaucratic apparatus. The historical background to the 
development of a workforce at the port is narrated; the labour control 
strategies adopted by the colonial authorites and the sociological 
effects of changing labour market’ conditions are analysed. Chapter 2 
takes this analysis of labour in the colonial state further, beginning 
with a narrative on the origins of modern trade unionism in Sierra 
Leone. Developments during the period of decolonisation, and in 
particular, the beginning of party politics and the reliance of 
aspiring politicians on kinship and clientelist relations to mobilise 
and secure support are discussed and analysed.
The case study of the political economy of labour in the Sierra 
Leone port organisation effectively begins with the two chapters in 
the second section* A public corporation such as the Port Authority, 
providing what might be tenably construed as a public service1, should 
not perhaps be assessed as regards either its Efficiency1 or its 
Exploitation1 of its employees, by the strict capitalist criteria of 
relative profit. In the case of a quasi-monopolist organisation 
extracting fees and rent from commercial enterprises, however, the 
level of loss-making should obviously not be large, in the absense 
of strong countervailing economic arguments, in order to be regarded 
as permissible by either capitalist or 1 socialist1 criteria. It is 
extremely difficult in practice, and perhaps impossible even in 
theory, to decide precisely how to measure Efficiency1 or Exploitation1
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in such a context* But some light might betgained from a comparative 
consideration of the performance of the Port Authority (and its 
equivalent) over various historical periods. It is partly with this 
in mind that these two chapters examine and contrast the administrative 
and economic operations of the port organisation between 1954 and 
1965 (Chapter 3) and between 1965 and 1976 (Chapter*4)* For much of 
the first period when the port organisation operated under the colonial 
state, the authorities continued to exhibit some reluctance to expand 
the public sector and create an autonomous public corporation* The 
commercial viability of the port enterprise was- the most important 
aspect of managerial policy* In the face of these constraints, the 
port management deliberately adopted an illiberal employment policy*
This created the conditions for the formation of the Dock Workers'
Union in 1963 as the means to present an effective challenge to 
this aspect of managerial policy* During the second period, and in 
the post-colonial state, the Dock Workers' Union was not only able 
to reverse some aspects of the employment policy of the port 
management, but was also able (via the channels of political clientelism) 
to secure for its secretary a seat on the Board of a new autonomous 
Port Authority public corporation* The commercial viability of the 
port enterprise, previously the cornerstone of managerial policy, 
increasingly assumed secondary importance* The involvement of the 
management and lower paid dockers in corruption and graft informs 
the argument that there is a strong element of parasitism in the 
collective operation of the corporation* This of course also casts 
serious doubt on the extent to which the principles of capitalist 
organisation was maintained.
The third section (and last three chapters) attempts to resolve 
the theoretical problem* In developing a 'sociological profile* of
the dockers, Chapter 5 follows Kitching in identifying the 'exploiting' 
and 'exploited' classes by indices of national income distribution.
While it is not suggested that the involvement of the dockers in 
corrupt practices is sufficient to make them a part of the 'exploiters', 
the ambiguity reflected in their attitudes to elite corruption (and 
hence their 'class consciousness') can be related to this* This 
involvement however, is most accurately seen as merely mitigating 
their exploitation since they do largely perform the labour entailed 
in providing a genuine service for commerce (cargo handling and 
related functions) at what are pretty low rates of renumeration (even 
when some graft is included). Moreoever, there can be no doubt from 
socio-economic indices and from sociological observation of their way 
of life that they are very much a part of the urban poor. This helps 
to explain the vitality of their trade unionism (Chapter 6). They 
have not in the past engaged in frequent strike action primarily 
because of their awareness of their 'dependence' on a government 
much stronger than themselves alone. The pervasive tentacles of 
the political clientelist system has attempted to 'capture* their 
trade union leadership but with only limited success in. the face 
of their solidarity over maintaining an accountable and responsive 
leadership. The union leadership of the dock workers, however, has 
inevitably been influenced and constrained in its strategy and 
decisions by the policy and orientation of the Sierra Leone trade 
union movement as a whole. It is therefore necessary to situate 
their trade union behaviour in the context and orientation of the 
trade union movement in post-colonial Siera Leone (Chapter 7). An 
important aspect of this has been the use of the channels of- political 
clientelism in order to secure and defend gains made through the
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formal processes of collective bargaining. However, it is also clear 
that the national trade union leadership has failed - as a result of 
their co-optation (in part at least) into the ruling elite - to 
consistently assert their right and duty to criticise government 
policy and performance publicly. More recently, however, the steady 
erosion in the real value of wages, coupled with ah increasing trend 
in the scale and magnitude of elite corruption, created the conditions 
which made possible, in September 1981, the first general strike in 
the country's history in which dock workers played a leading part.
The latter episode also illustrates the dynamising potential of a 
more truly expressive labour leadership as well as the limits of 
government tolerance. A conclusion summarises the main concerns of 
this work*
A variety of primary sources form the basis of this study. These 
include material from the archives of the London Chamber of Commerce; 
Ocean Transport Limited (the parent organisation of Elder Dempster 
Lines); the National Workshop Corporation (formerly the Sierra Leone 
Railway Administration); the Sierra Leone Port Authority; the Sierra 
Leone Dock Workers' Union*; the Sierra Leone Labour Congress; the 
Sierra Leone Teachers' Union; the Artisans, Ministry of Works. Employees' 
Union; and the Sierra Leone House of Representatives. Material from 
the Sierra Leone National Archive is also used* Newspapers, official 
reports, formal interviews, informal extended conversation with the 
dockers themselves and the results of a questionnaire survey of a 






The early organisation of the port of Freetown and the emergence of 
a workforce before 1954
The influence of laissez-faire economic doctrines in the theory 
and practice of the administration of British colonial possessions 
was as pervasive as it was profound. The primary concern of colonial 
administrators was the establishment of a seemingly reasonable 
infrastructure and administrative services, and the raising of 
sufficient revenue to maintain them. The involvement of the colonial 
authorities in Sierra Leone in large-scale ventures was therefore 
effectively precluded. Even by the standards of adherence to this 
policy, the colonial authorities were extremely cautious. The modest 
Government Wharf, built between 1870 and 1873, is an example of such 
fiscal caution. Several proposals to develop the port to meet the 
requirements of the increasing trade in produce failed to materialise 
as successive colonial administrations felt unable either to put up 
a part of the capital required or to guarantee loans. For instance, 
a scheme (strongly supported by the major 'merchant* firms which 
•complained of congestion at Government Wharf) to move the site of 
the port to its present location remained on the drawing board of 
the engineer who had been sent out from Britain to make the preliminary 
surveys in the early part of 1911.^ *
Early organisation
This principle of restricting the colonial administration1s
1 London Chamber of Commerce Archive, File No. 16597 2, Minutes of 
the Joint West African Committee of the London, Liverpool, and 
Manchester Chambers of Commerce, 19 July 1911.
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involvement in the economic life of the dependency to the barest 
minimum was reflected in the early organisation of the port. Its 
functional areas were separated between government departments and 
the local representatives of the shipping companies, the most important 
being Elder Dempster, Since successive colonial administrations were 
reluctant to extend the public sector more than appeared, necessary, 
a fully integrated port organisation was slow to emerge.
This meant that the workforce at the port was for many years 
fragmented between different employers* The Customs Department, the 
main source of government revenue until it was replaced by receipts 
from the mining industry in the 193Q!s, was responsible for the 
coordination of the activities of the various port users* It 
maintained a prominent presence and its warehouses became the clearing 
centres for both imports and exports. The Port and the Marine 
Department, also formerly an important source of government revenue 
through harbour dues and fees collected for pilotage, was responsible 
for the regulation of shipping traffic in the harbour and the 
maintenance of navigational aids* The Railway Administration 
maintained the cranes and other cargo handling equipment at the 
wharf which were first introduced in 1909.^ The Public Works 
Department (formerly-known as the Royal Engineers) undertook 
maintenance work on the sea wall and jetties* While the government 
departments provided the services ancilliary to cargo handling, 
the shipping companies and large trading firms were directly involved 
in the latter activity. Consignees and consignors - especially the 
large trading firms - also undertook some shore cargo handling 
and porterage in clearing and forwarding their consignments,-
1 Cf. R, Best, A History of the Sierra Leone Railway 1899-1919* 
Freetown, 1949, p*35*
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In addition to its cargo handling activities, Elder Dempster,
as part of its corporate strategy of establishing itself as the
leading organisation in West African shipping, had since the early
1900*s provided a ’feeder1 and lighterage service in the more important
trading areas along the West African Coast under British influence#
A wholly owned Elder Dempster subsidiary, the West African Lighterage
and Transport Company, was eventually formed in 1910 to manage this
area of its corporate activity#^ In Freetown, this company had a
virtual monopoly over the provision of a lighterage service between
the jetties at Government Wharf and the ships anchored at mid-stream
in the harbour, until the 1930's when the United Africa Company group
(UAC) introduced their own fleet of lighters to service their own
ships# Elder Dempster also owned and operated a dry dock at King
Tom which was for many years the only site along the Freetown
Waterfront where repairs on lighters and small crafts could be _
undertaken. Another firm, the Sierra Leone Coaling Company, formerly
a subsidiary of Elder Dempster, provided a bunkering service to
2
ships calling at the port*
The data provided in Table 1*1 shows that for the selected years 
before and after the First World War, the British shipping companies, 
and among them Elder Dempster in particular, were the major users of 
the port* The country of origin of these shipping companies also 
gives some indication of the direction of trade before and after the 
First World War as is evident in Table 1.2* The most important exports 
by value and volume between the turn of the century and the development
1 Cf. P* N* Davies, The Trade Makers; Elder Dempster in West Africa
1852-1972* London, 1973, pp. 114.-116.
2 Cf• Laurens van der Laan, European Commercial Enterprise in
Colonial Sierra Leone 1896-1961; A Preliminary Survey* Leiden* 
1978, p.8.
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of the mining industry in the 1930’s were oil palm produce and kola 
1nuts. In 192$, Henry Goddard, an official of the colonial 
administration, wrote in his encyclopaedic Handbook of Sierra Leone 
that
’the trade...exists and has for many years 
existed on the exploitation of forest products.
Sierra Leone has no industries capable of 
assisting in the stabilisation of its 
prosperity...The main, almost the sole prop, 
of the country’s financial existence is, and 
has long been the oil palm.’ 2
The biggest export markets before the war were Germany and other
West African territories which took in the bulk-of the oil palm
produce and kola nuts respectively. During the war, trading with
Germany ceased. The oil palm trade was diverted to Britain where
3
Lever Brothers swiftly occupied the vacuum left by the German firms. 
Imports mostly came from Britain.
During the years before the Second World War, therefore, the 
shipping companies and trading firms were directly involved in the 
movement of cargo at the wharf, while the government departments 
maintained the port infrastructure and collected the tariffs 
associated with the use of* the port and the import and export trade. 
The private firms for the most part employed the labour required 
as and when needed. Of the government departments, only Customs 
and Port and Marine maintained a small number of permanent workers; 
the Railway Administration and the Public Works Department deployed 
workmen to the wharf to undertake specific projects. Developments
1 Cf. N. A. Cox-George, Finance and Development in West Africa;
The Sierra Leone Experience. Oxford, 1959, pp.171-179;
M. H. Y. Kaniki, ’Economic and Social History of Sierra Leone 
1929-391, PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 1972, Ch. 2.
2 Cf. J. N. Goddard, The Handbook of Sierra Leone. London, 1925* p.35.
3 London Chamber of Commerce Archive, File No. 16506 2, Annual 
Report of Chairman Sir Owen Philips, 7 July 1916; Annual Report 
of Chairman Sir Owen Philips, 19 April 1919.
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TABLE 1.1
Frequency distribution of the country of origin of steam ships engaged 






United States - 32
Holland - - 56
Miscellaneous 5a 89
TOTAL 702 617
SOURCE: Compiled from T. N. Goddard, A Handbook of
Sierra Leone« p.151.
during the war fundamentally changed these arrangements. In . 
particular, the system of recruitment of dock labour was formalised. 
These developments are discussed later in this chapter. The following 
section examines the emergence of a workforce at the port during the 
years before the Second World War.
- 34 -
TABLE 1.2





1913 1923 1913 1923 1913 1923
U.K. 65.06 74.71 13.29 71.15 39.31 73.10
British 
West Africa 9.32 0.85 14.65 8.87 11.98 4.47
France 1.04 2.32 0.01 0.18 0.53 1.35
Germany 9.95 3.14 47.49 2.46 28.62 2.83
Holland 5.12 2.07 - - 2.57 1.14
United States 3.09 9.52 - 3.28 1.55 6.70
Foreign 
West Africa 1.81 6.00 18.74 3.92 10.23 5.06
Others 4.61 1.39 5.80 10.14 5.21 4.47
SOURCE: T. N. Goddard, op. cit.. p.147.
The development of a workforce at the port before 1939
It is clear that, before the development of the mining industry
in the 1930’s when the Sierra Leone economy took its present structure,
the port, railway and public works were the only areas of relatively
large-scale employment,'1' The early produce trade did not provide much
employment as ^ddle men1 traders bought directly from-the peasant
farmers in the interior in order to sell to the large trading firms
2
established in Freetown and other main towns* No plantations were 
established* It did not even appear necessary to the colonial 
authorities to create a specialised agency for the regulation of . 
labour* It was not until 194-0* following.two years of Youth League 
labour unrest and the promulgation of war-time emergency legislation 
associated with the use of Freetown as a naval base, that a Labour 
Department was formed. The first figures it published on employment 
trends show that the demand for labour in Freetown among the larger 
employers hovered around a monthly average of 10,000 during the first 
few months of 194-°*^
The agents of the shipping companies and the larger firms have 
traditionally employed men from the Kroo tribe from the- southern 
coast of Liberia in stevedoring, cargo handling and porterage.
According to Fyfe,^ the Kroos, renowned for their ability in
1 Cf. the annual Blue Book for the years between 1900 and 1939*
2 Cf* Laurens van der Laan, European Commercial Enterprises* pp.3-4;
M. H* I* Kaniki, Economic and Social History of Sierra Leone1,
Ch* 2; M. J. H. Sibanda, Colonial Policy and Development in 
North-West Sierra Leone, PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 1978, 
Ch, 4*
3 Labour Department, Labour Report 1939-40, p*l*
4 Cf. Chris Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, London 1962, p.78;
the word ^roo1 is also spelt |Krul* In this study the former 
spelling which is used by the people themselves in Freetown will 
be adopted. For a survey of the involvement of Kroos in West 
African shipping, cf. G. E. Brooks, The Kru Mariner in the
P.T.0.
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undertaking arduous tasks, first came to Freetown in 1793, a few 
years after its founding as a settlement for liberated slaves*
Originally a transient people who only sought a few material 
possessions to take back to their villages, an area was reserved 
(by a special ordinance of 1816) in order to encourage them to 
settle in Freetown* This area, in central Freetown, has come to be 
known as Kroo Town* By 1819 an informal system of political and 
administrative leadership, the headmanship, had developed among them* 
Over the years, Kroo labour was recruited through these headmen who 
trained, supervised, and regulated the men on behalf of the employers* 
Headmen also adjudicated disputes within the community* In 1905, 
at the time of the consolidation of colonial rule over the whole 
country, the institution of headmanship, which had had a parallel 
development among other ethnic groups in Freetown, was given formal 
recognition by legislation. While headmen were not formally 
recognised as labour contractors as such, it was intended that, in 
addition to adjudicating disputes within their communities and acting 
as the general mouthpiece of the government vis a vis their communities, 
•they would also act as a-two-way channel of communication between 
employers and workmen. Furthermore, under the Vagrancy Ordinance of 
the same year, they had the power to recommend the deportation of
2*idle and disorderly* persons back to the areas from which they came. 
The position of ’tribal headmen* in Freetown was thus a very 
powerful one, and they effectively occupied an intermediary position 
between the government, employers, and their communities. These
Nineteenth Century; A Historical Compendium*. Newark, 1972; for 
accounts of Kroo society in Freetown, cf. Michael Banton, West 
African City; A Study of Tribal Life in Freetown. London, 1957; 
and Barbara Harrel-Bond et al* Community, Leadership* and the 
Transformation of Freetown (1801-1976), London, 1979*
1 Michael Banton, on. cit*. p. 14.
2 Ibid, p.15.
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arrangements constituted a classic case of the * cheap government*
practice and 'divide and rule* strategy of British colonial
administration. Moreover, in the absence of a specialised labour
department, effective responsibility for the recruitment and regulation
of labour was delegated to the headmen.
These arrangements may have also delayed a more pervasive
development of trade unionism until the Youth League years. As a
part of the colonial government, the headmen had a vested interest
in maintaining the status quo. As a contemporary writer observed,
1
*the headmen had many opportunities of making money1. Given the
long association of the Kroos with the shipping industry, these
measures, and in particular, the provision that headmen could assist
in recruitment and investigate disputes between workmen and their
employers, created the conditions for them to monopolise employment
opportunities therein. The shipping companies and large tradings
firms, with an overriding interest in preventing delays in the loading
and unloading of ships at the port, preferred to deal with the Kroos
with whom they already had a long association. Indeed, as early as
1893, a Captain Walsh, commander of the Matadi. (a ship belonging to
the British and African Steam Navigation Company, one of the shipping
companies out of whicfcrthe Elder Dempster group was formed), wrote
to the Sierra Leone Weekly News to suggest the formalisation of the
recruitment of Kroo labour by the formation of a 1 committee of
influential Kroo men with King Peter as president* to fix hours and 
2
rates of work. The Kroos for their part also had a vested interest
1 Cf. F. W. H. Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, London, 1926^ p.13.
2 The Sierra Leone Weekly News. 4- March, 1893; King Peter was then 
recognised as the leader of the Kroos in Freetown.
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in reaching some form of arrangement with the shipping companies. 
Employment opportunities in cargo handling depended on the number of 
ships calling at the port. It was casual work. Casual work meant 
lower earnings and low contributions to their community social 
insurance fund. Whatever work was available at the port, therefore, 
the Kroos strove to keep within their own community. This they could 
only achieve by cooperating fully with the employers. The tight grip 
which the Kroos maintained on employment opportunities in the docks 
has been a constant source of friction with labourers from other 
ethnic groups. It was not until the Second World War, when the demand 
for dock labour dramatically increased, that labourers in the latter 
category were employed in significant numbers.
It is difficult to estimate the number of Kroos who have been
employed in cargo handling in Freetown. However, the Kroo population
in Freetown grew from 1,234 in 1891 to 4,460 in 1931 (see Table 1.3)•
Kroo workers maintain that the able-bodied men among them have worked
almost exclusively in the shipping industry. This suggests that
about a third, over 1,100 Kroo men in 1931, might have been available
for casual work. Indeed, some- contemporary travellers arriving at
the port leave the impression that stevedores, lightermen and other
2dock labourers were almost exclusively Kroo.
While the Kroo monopolised employment in cargo handling at the 
port, the clerks, artisans and other labourers employed by the 
shipping companies, commercial firms, and government departments
1 Interview of a small group of Kroo stevedores, 3 March 1980.
In this group were two Kroo men who had worked at the port 
since 1942 and 1945.
2 Cf., e.g., Graham Greene, Journey Without Maps, London, 1937, p.37
Katherine Fowler-Lunn, The Gold Missus: Journal of a Woman Gold 
Prospector in Sierra Leone. New York, 1938.
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invariably came from other ethnic groups* Again, it is difficult to 
estimate the number of workers who were involved in these functions*
It is certain, however, that the figure was well below the 10,000 
estimated as the total wage-earning population of Freetown by the 
Labour Department in 1939 at a time of increasing opportunities for 
wage employment. It is also clear that the Krios, who -had ready 
access to the long-established schools in Freetown and who had long 
experience as skilled workmen, at first dominated the subordinate 
positions in government departments and commercial firms* With the 
introduction of modern education into the interior of the country,.
and with more workmen of indigenous origins acquiring skills over
2
the years, this situation had by the 1920!s begun to change*
Towards the re-organisation of the port
During the First World War, Freetown had been used as a naval 
base by the British colonial authorities* Given the uncertainties 
and anxieties surrounding the defence of the Suez Canal in time of . 
war, Freetown, lying on the alternative route to the Cape, India, 
and the Far East, was chosen to provide water, provisions, bunkers 
and repairs for the-Royal Navy engaged in maneuvres in the South 
Atlantic* In-his autobiography, Kossoh Town Boy, Robert Wellesly Cole
1 Throughout this study, the word Krio, which is also spelt Creole* 
will be used to describe the descendants of liberated slaves who 
settled in Freetown during the latter part of the eighteenth 
century* The former spelling which emphasises the pronunciation 
of the word by the people themselves in Sierra Leone, carries 
the connotation that Krio culture is essentially rooted in 
African traditional experience* For an elaboration of this theme, 
cf. Akintola Wyse, Searchlight on the Krio of Sierra Leone: An 
Ethnographical Study of a West African People* Institute of African 
Studies, Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, Occasional 
Paper No* 3, 1980.
2 Cf* M. Kilson, op* cit*. Ch. $; F* H. W. Migeof, op* cit** pp*13-14*
- 40 -
TABLE 1.3
The Kroo population in Freetown 1891-1931
1891 1901 1911 1921 1931
Kroos 1,234 1,903 1,551 4j744 4,460
Total Freetown 
Population 30,033 34,463 34,090 44,142 55,358
SOURCE: M# Banton, op, cit#, p#24#
has described the contribution of Freetown to the war effort:
'Throughout the war, Freetown was an important 
watering station for the British Royal Navy, 
and an important station for the Atlantic 
Fleet, The water was obtained from the Freetown 
Water Works for which my father was responsible#
It was about this time that I first heard the 
statement that this our Bay on which Freetown 
stands was large enough to contain the entire 
British fleet at anchor#'1
Indeed, the use of Freetown as a naval base generated much economic
activity and created severe problems after the reduction of the
war-related public expenditure at the end of the hostilities#
Freetown's ideal location also acquired it the status of 'the
headquarters of the African Station of His Majesty's Navy and a 
2
Defended Port1# During the inter-war years, before the discovery 
of minerals and the development of the mining industry, the port 
was regarded by the Colonial Office as the country's most important
1 Cf# R# W# Cole, Kossoh Town Boy, London, 1962, p#113»
2 British Parliamentary Papers, CMND 274*4-, Report by the Hon#
W. G# A. Qrmsby-Gore MP (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
for the Colonies) on his visit to West Africa during the year 1926t 
HMSQ, 1926, p#55; cf* Allister MacMillan, The Red Book of West 
Africa, London, 1920, pp*233-4#
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natural resource.
With the outbreak of hostilities again in 1939, measures were 
taken to secure the defense of the port and to provide facilities for 
visiting convoys engaged in the protection of British trade in the 
South Atlantic. The wide estuary of the River Rokel (see Map 1), and 
the docks at Government Wharf once again presented the scenery of an 
extremely busy port. W. H. Salkied, at the time an official of the 
Railway Administration, recalls that 1 whereas in normal times our 
average number of ships in the port was five, during convoy periods, 
together with base ships, we had well over three hundred. I believe 
our maximum number was around the 380 mark. I well remember one 
occasion when my office which was on the river front seemed to be 
blacked out by the passage in line of the 'Queen Mary', 'Mauretania',
'Andes', and 'Empress of Britain', followed by smaller crafts of
1about 25,000 tons each*-'
This phenomenal increase in shipping and port activity during 
the war set in train a series of events which eventually led to the 
re-organisation of the port and the centralisation of the employment 
of dock labour. As an emergency measure, a Port Executive Committee 
was formed in May 1942 as the ultimate Port Authority. Under the 
chairmanship of the General Manager of the Railway Administration, 
its membership included the Comptroller of Customs, the Harbour
Master, and representatives of the commercial firms, shipping companies,
2
and the Admiralty. The committee was primarily a policy-making
1 Ocean Transport Archive, Item 740, W* H. Salkied, 'Sierra Leone's 
Important Role During World War II', Sea. Journal of Elder 
Demoster Lines Ltd.. Vol. 4, No* 4, Winter 1961-62, p•4*-
2 National Workshop Archive, 'Public Notice No. 62 (The Defence 
and Control of Traffic in the Port of Freetown)', 5 May, 1942.
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body, but was also charged with the responsibility for administration 
of the port for the duration of the war. The significance of the 
formation of this committee was that the existing decentralised 
system of port administration - stemming from the reluctance of the 
colonial authorities to extend the public sector - was greatly 
modified. With the formation of a Port Authority, official recognition 
of the status of the port as a public utility was implied, and the 
responsibility of the state for the port - beyond the collection of 
dues and tariffs - was affirmed.
As a result of the frequent congestion and delays to ships 
calling at the port, the war also demonstrated the impraticality of 
the long-standing practice of using lighters to load and unload 
ships lying at anchor in the estuary. Accordingly, one of the most 
important policy decisions reached by the Port Executive Committee 
was its recommendations of the need for a deep-water quay, alongside 
which ships could be berthed, thus facilitating an easier and more 
modem method of taking supplies and of cargo handling. This was 
recognised as of vital importance for the speedy turn-around of ships 
and for the future development of the trade of the country. It was 
further recognised that, as a public utility, the colonial 
administration was best placed to make the necessary investments in 
quay construction - at the port* This proposal was neither new nor 
novel, but it had a much better chance of implementation than ever 
before. Shortly before the outbreak of World War I, a British 
engineering firm had undertaken preliminary surveys of the Freetown 
waterfront with a view to the construction of a deep water quay. The 
project was eventually abandoned in 1921 as a result of lack of 
interest on the part of the colonial administration and inadequate 
finance.^ The evolution of colonial economic policy during the
1 Captain C. Wilson Brown, *Historical Notes on Freetown Harbour*,
P.T.O.
inter-war years, however, had created the conditions in which the 
colonial authorities in Sierra Leone could now undertake this kind 
of investment in capital formation.
A Colonial Development Act was passed in 1929* during the Great 
Depression. It provided a fund of £1 million a year for the use of 
colonial governments to stimulate economic development in their areas*
At first a direct linkage was established between development in the 
colonies and the U.K. economic crisis. In the debate in the Commons 
over the Bill, it was repeatedly stressed that investment in the 
dependencies could stimulate commerce with the U.K. and help solve 
the domestic unemployment problem. The slump, however, proved far 
more severe than had been anticipated - by the end of 1931 some 2.6 
million people were out of work - and removed this strategy from the 
centre of the attempts to create an economic upturn. It was evident 
that more direct measures had to be applied. Thus ’colonial - 
development as a solution for unemployment was irrelevant and the 
cabinet committee on employment no longer referred to it from 1931 
Nonetheless, the Act of 1929 qualitatively changed the official 
ideology on the economics of imperialism. As Keynesian economic 
thought became more ’respectable’ and influential during the ’thirties, 
laissez-faire economic orthodoxy was undermined. The Act also created 
a body, the Colonial Development Advisory Committee (CDAC), to administer 
the fund. Throughout the 'thirties, CDAC channelled some £6.5 million 
to the colonies. British West Africa’s share amounted to £500,000, 
of which the largest single sum, about £250,000, was given to the
Sierra Leone Studies (Old Series), Vol. XX, Dec. 1936, pp.96-122.
1 Cf. D. Meredith, 'The British Government and Colonial Economic 
History 1919-1939% Economic History Review. Vol. 28, 1975, 
pp.449-437, p.484.
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colonial administration in Sierra Leone to invest in the mining of 
iron ore in partnership with a British Firm,'*' During the war, a 
further £5 million a year was set aside for colonial development, 
under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940* Malcolm 
MacDonald, the Secretary for the Colonies, in piloting this Bill 
through the Commons, emphasised the need to replace the assumptions 
surrounding the 1929 Act with an unadulterated ideology of colonial 
welfare and development. With a victorious conclusion to the war 
in sight during the early months of 1945, and with plans for the 
reconstruction of Europe - to be financed partly by American aid - 
on the agenda of the Allies, the 1940 Act was amended to increase
o
the fund to £120 million over a ten-year period ending in March 1956* 
It was against this background that the colonial administration 
in Sierra Leone committed itself to the construction of a deep-water 
quay at the end of the war* David Carney, the Sierra Leonean 
economist, has identified two important considerations for this 
radical change in the traditional policy of Britain towards her 
colonies. Not only had the colonies made important contributions 
to the war effort in material and manpower, he has argued, but the 
events in French North African Territories subsequent to the fall 
of France on 13 June 194°> had brought home the realisation of the 
possibility of a colony going neutral, if not actively hostile to 
the imperial power, in the event of an invasion of the former by 
another power.
1 Cf. A. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa. 1973, p.261;
cf. M. H. Y. Kaniki, * Economic History of Sierra Leone1, Ch. 3-4.
2 Cf. B. Niculescu, Colonial Planning: A Comparative Study. London,
1958, pp.60-63.
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’The British government as a result was 
spurred to promises of eventual self 
government and economic development.•• 
and hacked up these promises with an 
appropriation of £120 million.••The 
active role of the colonial government 
in economic development was stressed for 
the first time, as each government was 
asked to produce a ten-year plan of 
economic and social development.*^
Accordingly, the construction of a deep-water quay was to he financed
out of the country’s grant from the CD & W Fund featured in the
Sierra Leone Plan which was drawn up in 194-6. The plan contained no
strategy or consistent philosophy of economic development and merely
listed items deserving of government finance.
With the revocation of the emergency measures at the end of the 
war, the Port Executive Committee was dissolved and the administration 
of the port re-organised. The concept of the Port Authority was 
retained and vested in the office of the General Manager of the 
Railway Administration. A Wharf Superintendent was appointed as 
head of a specialised port department within the Railway organisation, 
to be responsible for the day-to-day management of the port, and to
3
report directly to the General Manager. His principal functions 
were to act in liaison with consignees and consignors, government 
departments and the shipping companies. He was to be in charge of
1 Cf* D. C. Carney, Government and Economy in British West Africa,
New York, 1961, p.93.
2 Sierra Leone, An Outline of the Ten Year Development Plan of 
Sierra Leone. Sessional Paper No. 4, 1946. For criticisms of the 
Plan, see H. H. Gaffney, ’Administration and the Administrative 
Service in Sierra Leone’, PhD thesis, University of Columbia,
1967, Ch. 12; for more general criticisms of the attempts at 
’planning’ in the years immediately after the war, cf., e.g.,
D. Dosser, ’The Formulation of Development Plans in the British 
Colonies', Economic Journal. June 1959, pp.255-266, and 
W. E. H. Stanner, 'Observation on Colonial Planning', International 
Affairs. July 1949, pp.318-328.
3 National Workshop Archive, Government Notice No. 385, Sierra Leone 
Royal Gazette. 31 May 1945.
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the allocation of cranes, the coordination of rail and road
transportation to and from the docks, and the enforcement of all
rates, orders, and directives relating to the use of the port, A
new advisory body, the Port Advisory Committee, made up of largely
the same membership as the former Port Executive Committee, was
appointed on January 1, 1946.1 Its terms of reference were to advise
the government ’on matters relating to the future development of
the port...on recommendations submitted for the improvement of its
facilities.• .on the best use to which existing facilities may be
put...and as to the best methods to be adopted for the sound and
o
economic use of the port*. (See diagramatic representation of the 
re-organisation in Diagrams .1 and .2). Parallelling these 
developments, work had begun towards the end of 194-6 on the 
construction of a deep-water quay at the waterfront of the Cline 
Town area in the east end of Freetown and was scheduled for
3
completion in 19 54-*
The re-organisation of the port stopped short of the creation of 
an autonomous public corporation with full responsilibity for its 
management and organisation. The colonial government continued to 
utilise existing administrative machinery (in this case the Railway 
Administration) to manage the port. However, the principle of the 
responsibility of the state for the provision of port services had 
been recognised, and it was envisaged that the role of the port 
department would be enlarged after the opening of the new quay.
1 National Workshop Archive, Sierra Leone Royal Gazette, 31 Dec. 
194-5, 'Dissolution of Port Executive committee and appointment 
of Port Advisory Council’.
2 Ibid.
3 Colonial Office, Ma.ior Capital Works in the Colonial Territories, 
Colonial No. 285, HMSO, 1952.
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A port is primarily a service organisation; a public utility*
As a commodity, the service a port provides cannot practically be sold
like any other commodity. Moreover, a port has tremendous monopoly
potential* Because of these complexities, the finance, development,
management, and pricing policy of a port is normally undertaken by
government and typically through a public corporation* A* G. Pigou,
whose Economics of Welfare is the locus classicus of the economic case
for government intervention to improve the market-determined allocation
of resources, argued that ‘the main part of a modern governments
activities* **is dominated by services of a general sort which cannot
1be practically sold against fees to individuals1* After the opening 
of the new quay, it was made clear that, while revenue derived from 
the users of the port was not expected to be paid back to tHe 
government for the initial capital outlay, the port was nonetheless 
expected to operate along sound commercial lines and cover its 
operating and recurrent costs* It was also envisaged that any 
remaining surplus would be paid into the Treasury as a contribution 
to the development fund.
Following the opening of the new Deep Water Quay in 1954-, 
responsibility for the handling of cargo from shore to ship and 
vice versa was transferred from the Shipping Companies, consignors, 
and consignees to the port department. This development was 
precipitated by a fast rising trend in cargo pilferage associated 
with the unemployment situation in Freetown at the end of the war
1 A. C. Pigou, ‘The Range of Government Expenditure', in R. W*
Houghton (ed.), Public Finance* London, 1970, pp.176-180, p*176; 
other useful general works on public finance include, Usurla 
Hicks, Public Finance* London, 194-7; Alan Prest, Public Finance 
in Developing Countries* London, 1973; A. H. Hanson, Public • 
Enterprise and Economic Development* 1959; and Alan Prest, 
Transport Economics in Developing Countries* London, 1969*
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and by a need to provide an integrated system of master porterage at 
the new quay* The following section discusses this centralisation 
of the employment of dock labour.
The centralisation of the employment of dock labour
In the years before World War II,. Sierra Leone did not have a 
large wage-earning population* Before the development of the mining 
industry, the largest employers of labour had been the railway, public 
works, and the port* Even as late as 194°» when more comprehensive 
figures on employment trends became available (see Tables 1*4 and 1«5)» 
the total wage-earning population excluding the security forces was 
only about 30,000* The population itself had been estimated in 1931 
at just over 1.7 million, and that of Freetown at 96,422. (See Tables 
1.6 and 1*7). The 1931 census established that 66,962 persons (about 
65% of the population of the city) living in Freetown were between 
the ages of 16 and 6$ and may therefore be said to constitute the • 
labour force. (The age composition of the population of the whole 
country was not provided by the census but it can be reasonably 
assumed that at least 60% of the population were between the ages of 
16 and 65) • The availability of this huge supply of labour had 
effectively weakened the bargaining power of wage labour. Indeed, 
the railway men, who were employed in a key sector of the economy, 
and who had, in the years following World War I, exhibited a strong 
trade union consciousness, could not sustain their union organisation. 
By 1927, following several stoppages, the union had been disbanded 
and its leaders dismissed or posted to the more remote parts of the 
country. So confident had the colonial authorities become in dealing 
with labour unrest that they had perceived no need to create a 
separate labour department to secure the regulation and control of
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TABLE 1,4














+ Excludes workers employed by commercial 
firms, shipping companies, and the 
Security Forces.
SOURCE: British Parlimentary Papers, CMND 6277,
G. St. J. Orde Broun, Labour Conditions 
in West Africa* 1941? PP* 136-139•
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TABLE 1*5
Estimate of wage earners employed by commercial firms and shipping 





SOURCE: Estimate is based on size of the sectors# 
TABLE 1#6




SOURCE: R. R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey of









SOURCE: R* R* Kuczynski, op# cit*t p*175*
lower paid workers* It was not until after the arrival of Wallace 
Johnson in Freetown in 1938, and the formation of the Youth League 
out of which modern trade unionism in Sierra Leone evolved, that the 
colonial authorities responded by creating institutions to channel 
labour grievances*
In adopting this strategy, the colonial administration 
implemented a host of labour policy measures which had gradually 
been developed over the years by the Colonial Office at Whitehall*
These measures themselves had been stimulated by the need to conform 
to International Labour Office (ILO) conventions, and by the experience 
of considerable and often violent labour protests in various parts of 
the empire during the inter-war years* Furthermore, the Fabian 
Society, the intellectual conscience of the Labour Party, was also 
a driving force for change in its criticisms of colonial labour 
policies, and in its suggestions - often originating from detailed 
research - for reformist policy measures* The Society also often 
acted in close cooperation with the British TUC, another important
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pressure group in the colonial lobby. The colonial administration 
in Freetown could therefore draw on the experience available at 
Whitehall.1 In July 1939, legislation was passed giving legal 
recognition to the trade unions which had been set up under the 
auspices of the Youth League, and establishing procedures for the 
arbitration of disputes. Two years later, on the recommendations 
of Major Orde-Brown, the Labour Advisor at the Colonial Office 
(following a visit to Sierra Leone to study labour problems), the
administration established a fully-fledged Labour Department to
2
implement its new labour policy. The war itself, and the Tdefended
port* status of Freetown initiated a phenomenal increase in the labour
force'and added some urgency to the development of a coherent labour
policy* The unprecedented demand for labour, both skilled and
unskilled, was due to the special work undertaken in connection with
the defence of Freetown and its significance as a convoy port (see
Tables 1.8 and 1.9). Demand for unskilled labour was very easily
met by recruitment from the provinces, but a severe strain was imposed
on the available supply of skilled labour. Thus the newly established
-Labour Department in its-first annual report stated that;
1 ...in normal times, facilities for training . 
tradesmen in Sierra Leone were meagre, 
consisting only of those afforded by the 
Railway workshops, the Public Works 
Department, and the mining companies... 
there is no doubt that many of the so-called 
artisans now employed have really no claim 
to term themselves tradesmen as their 
qualifications are of the most amateurish 
kind. It is certain that the ranks of the
1 For the evolution of Colonial Office labour policy, see, e.g., 
B. C. Roberts, Labour in the Tropical Territories of the 
Commonwealth. 19^2; and M. Amolo, 1 Sierra Leone and British 
Colonial Labour Policy, 1930-451, PhD thesis, Dalhousie 
University, 1977.
2 M. Amolo, op. cit.. Ch. 5*
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small number of competent artisans in Sisrra 
Leone have been heavily diluted with ordinary 
labourers who profess to have technical 
knowledge, though in most cases, they have 
none at all.
As the fortification works were completed, retrenchments were
made. The number of people in wage employment in Freetown fell by
almost fifty per cent between 1942 and 1945 (see Table 1.8),. The
unemployment created was partly offset by the availability of jobs
in road-building, construction, and other projects financed by the
colonial administration at the end of the war. The competition,
however, was extremely keen as the Labour Department reserved several
2
of these vacancies^for returning ex-servicemen. Freetown therefore 
acquired a legacy of unemployment from the war, a condition which it 
has since not been able to overcome. It was around this time that 
a class of destitute urban wage labourers (and unemployed) became a 
permanent and visible part of the Freetown social scene. Recent^ 
research has revealed a continuing trend in the proletarianisation of 
the lower paid in Freetown. For instance, a sociological survey of 
dock workers undertaken by the researcher in May 1980 provided details 
on migration to Freetown from the rural areas among their numbers, 
and revealed the existence of severe overcrowding in their households,
3
most of which were without electricity or running water. Other 
researchers have drawn attention to the phenomenal increase in the 
size of the informal sector over the years as the unemployed and 
underemployed of the city have attempted to generate means of self-
1 Sierra Leone, Labour Report 1939-40. p.l.
2 Cf. N. A. Gox-George, ’An Essay on Employment and Unemployment1, 
Typescript, Freetown, 1950.
3 See Ch. 5 of this study which develops a ’sociological profile1 
of the dockers using the material from this survey.
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TABLE 1.8









...................... -  ...
SOURCE: N. A. Cox-George, Finance and Development in
West Africa* p.223. (These figures have been 
compiled from Annual Labour Department Reports).
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TABLE I.9














SOURCE: N. A* Cox-George, op. cit., p.224* (These
figures have been compiled from the Annual 
Labour Department Report for 1942).
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1employment. However, the position of the authorities at the end of
the war towards the growing urban misery was unequivocal:
>Sierra Leone had not a large wage earning 
population before the war, though the men 
engaged in subsistence fanning constituted 
a potential supply of skilled and unskilled 
labour. This supply was prodigally tapped 
during the war, and when wholescale 
retrenchments were made after the war, the 
larger centres of employment remained 
flooded with surplus labour not yet 
convinced that they should return to their 
former occupations.*2
Freetown by the end of the war had become a remarkably transformed 
city. Its population had increased by a third from about 90,000 to
3
just over 120,000. The cost of living had soared as landlords 
inflated rents charged to the arriving wage earners. Following the 
withdrawal of peasant labour from the farms, rice, the staple food, 
was in short supply and this was to become a perennial problem in 
the post-war years* Faced with pressure from the trade unions (see 
the next chapter), the Labour Department ordered annual wage increases 
through cost of living allowances (COLA) following the results of
1 -Cf., e.g., Central Statistics Office, Household Sipvey of the 
Western Province. Economic and Expenditure. 1966-68. Final Report. 
Freetown, 1969; Central Statistics Office, Household Survey of the 
Western Province, Household Characteristics and Housing Conditions. 
1965-69. Freetown. 1969; David Fowler. *The Urban Informal Sector 
in Sierra Leone*, Africana Research Bulletin. Vol. 6, No. 3> 1976, 
pp.4-34? Katherine Moseley, ‘Work, Class and Community: The 
Safroko Limba of Freetown* (forthcoming, 1982). I am grateful to 
Dr. Moseley for sending me a typescript copy of this article.
For a general overview of the sociological characteristics of 
urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa, cf. Josef Gugler and William 
Flanagan, Urbanisation and Social change in West Africa.
Cambridge, 1978.
2 Sierra Leone, Labour Department Annual. Report 1946. p.2,
Freetown, 1947*
3 Cf. R. R, Kuczynski, op. cit.
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studies which revealed the inflationary impact of the war. Rent
assessment committees were also set up to examine the fairness of
rents charged by Freetown landlords. Between 1941 and 1948? these
committees decided 1,364 cases in favour of tenants, and 216 in favour
of landlords.^ Furthermore, the disorganisation brought about by the
war resulted in a great increase in crime, delinquency, and other
forms of anti-social behaviour. A report on penal administration
and welfare services prepared just before the end of the war noted:
* There are in the colony a considerable 
number of boys and a certain number of girls 
who are' either homeless or living in an 
undesirable environment...the great majority 
of boys and girls are not receiving the 
education, recreation, and 'employment 
essential to their training as sound and 
stable citezens. These conditions may. 
rightly be said to constitute a grave 
social problem. *2
Many of the older dockers could recollect in informal conversations
held with the researcher (during the first fieldwork in Freetown in
1979/80) that the area around the port especially was one of a high
crime rate. The presence of visiting sailors in the vicinity attracted
prostitutes and pimps. Two additions were made to the Krio language
associated with war-time prostitution: man o1 war pickin. meaning a
child bom out of a liaison between a prostitute and a visiting
sailor; and longstep. meaning a brothel, after the old Portuguese
steps to the east of Government Wharf; but perhaps more important was
the fact that, as the older dock workers could remember, Freetown
before the war was a relatively well laid-out city with few pockets
of ghettoes and shanty towns. During the war, Freetown landlords,
1 Cf. M. Banton, West African City, pp.34-35.
2 Sir Alexander Patterson, Report on Penal Administration and
Welfare Services in Sierra Leone. Sessional Paper No. 3> Freetown, 
1944.
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anxious to exploit the arriving labourers, quickly put up tin shacks 
of various sizes, particularly in the East End at the Kinke, Mountain 
Gut, Ginger Hall, and Fula Town areas, and at Grassfields in the west 
central part of the city. Over the years, these ghettoes have been 
considerably enlarged, have become more numerous, and are now a 
permanent part of the Freetown scenario. It was against this 
background that the centralisation of employment at the port took 
place. One of the pressing problems which faced the new port 
department, which became responsible for the coordination of the 
activities of port users following the re-organisation at the end of 
the war, and the newly appointed Port Advisory Committee, was cargo 
pilferage. The attempts made at the solving of the problem, and the 
steps taken inter alia towards the creation of a semi-autonomous port 
organisation, created the conditions that made possible the 
centralisation of the employment of dock labour*
The problem of cargo pilferage first surfaced at a meeting of 
the advisory committee in September 1946, to which the Commissioner 
of Police was invited. The meeting noted the presence of a large 
number of 'undesirables' within the vicinity of the port and concluded 
that security arrangements must be stepped up. The police were 
invited to oversee workers engaged in cargo handling. A 24-hour 
watch was also to be kept in the docks and plans were outlined for 
the formation of a special unit of the police force, the Harbour 
Division, who were to use launches to patrol the sea front of the 
wharf. Representatives of the shipping companies and the commercial 
firms also agreed to use members of their senior staff as 'detectives' 
to observe the cargo handling process. The docks were made a 
'restricted access area', and the Customs Department was given the 
responsibility of issuing special security passes only to individuals
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with legitimate business at the port*'1' After almost two years it
became clear that these measures were hopelessly inadequate. In May
194-S, the representatives of the shipping companies on the advisory
committee reported that ’pilferage was on the increase, and in some
2cases, whole consignments were stolen*. During the discussions, 
attention was drawn to the system of recruitment of dock labour which 
was felt to be too informal and subjected to many abuses. Under the 
decentralised system of port organisation - which was even then in 
transition - the shipping companies, the larger consignees and 
consignors provided their own stevedore and shore cargo handling . ,
labour. They traditionally selected Kroo foremen or 'gang* leaders 
who were given a free hand to select other labourers to make up the 
gang. This system was open to much abuse, as Kroo gang leaders 
invariably selected members of their own community or labourers from 
other ethnic groups who were prepared to pay a small bribe (or dash). 
The payment of a dash had the same effect as a tax on wages which some 
workers tried to make up for by stealing from cargo consignments. 
Moreover, the cargo sheds were a natural target for burglaries by 
the unemployed of Freetown, attracted to the vicinity of the port in 
search of casual work. This same system of recruitment had been 
used for the employment of ’coastwise* and articled seamen, but had 
recently been reformed by the Labour Department, which brought into 
operation a Maritime Labour Pool at the beginning of 194&* The pool 
was essentially a labour exchange at which all persons available for
1 National Workshop Archives, ’Minutes of Extra-ordinary Meeting 
of the Port Advisory Committee, 23 September 1946,
2 National Workshop Archives, Minutes of Meeting of Port Advisory 
Committee, 11 May 194-8,
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work as coastwise or articled seamen were required to register.
Foremen or headmen nominated by the shipping companies were still
permitted to lead gangs, but the men were chosen in strict rotation
from the register, thus giving everyone a fair chance of recruitment.
The advisory committee meeting of May 1948 decided that a similar
system should be introduced for the recruitment of stevedore and
shore cargo handlers,^ The pool eventually came into operation in
1952, The tone of the Labour Department in its report for that year
was self-congratulatory:
•A separate Pool was opened early in the 
year to recruit, on behalf of shipping 
companies and commercial firms, wharf and 
stevedoring labour. The purpose of this 
additional pool was primarily to control 
the entry into "Government Wharf of 
undersirables who in the haphazard system 
of recruitment which prevailed, easily 
gained entrance under the pretext of
being in search of employment. It is
gratifying to state that since the 
establishment of this new pool not only 
has recruitment been put on a sound basis 
but the incidence of pilfering which it 
was designed to check has fallen 
considerably. '2
By the time the new quay came into operation in 1954* the 
employment of dock labour had therefore been centralised, parallelling 
the centralisation of the management of the port. This was 
facilitated by the impact of war and the gradual abandonment of
laissez-faire economic doctrines by the Colonial Office during the
inter-war years. The port department and the shipping and commercial 
firms were assured, moreover, of a cheap and reliable source of 
labour supply drawn from the mass of the urban unemployed created by 
the upheavals of the war. The chapter which follows examines the
1 Ibid.
2 Sierra Leone, Labour Department Annual Report 1952^ Freetown, 
1953, p.4*
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organisation of lower-paid workers in Freetown into trade unions and, 




The development of modem trade unionism in Sierra Leone
• Origins and Dynamics of Labour Protest Action before 1938
Before the development of the mining industry in the 19301s, the 
Sierra Leone economy was dependent on the produce trade. While many 
Krios and, after they increasingly began to turn to the professions 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, the newly arriving 
‘Syrians* or Lebanese had made fortunes as ‘middle men* in the trade, 
opportunities for wage employment as such were severely limited.
Labour requirements at the port, railway, and public works were met 
with little difficulty and, indeed, throughout the period of colonial 
rule, professional, skilled, and unskilled labour left the territory 
to work in other West African colonies.'*' This ’slack* demand for 
labour was reflected in wage rates which greatly fluctuated with 
prevailing economic conditions (see Table 2.1). The ‘first systematic 
strike of the labouring classes in the history of the colony* took 
place in November 1892 over one such reduction of wage rates.
1 Cf. R. L. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa. Vol. 1, New York, 
1928, Ch. 54.
2 A. B. C. Sibthorpe, The History of Sierra Leone. 3rd edition, 
London, 1906, p.115; Conway and Lisk (cf. H. E. Conway, ‘Industrial 
Relations in Sierra Leone with special reference to the 
development and functioning of the bargaining machinery since 
1945*, PhD thesis, University of London, 1968, Ch. 1;
F. A. N. Lisk, industrial Relations in Sierra Leone*, M.Sc. 
dissertation, Queens University, Belfast, 1970, Ch. 4) both 
mention that a strike of Kroo seamen took place in 1874 and a 
photograph of the strikers was featured in the London Illustrated 
Evening News of 10 January, 1974* This event is curiously not 
mentioned by Chris Fyfe in his authoritative A History of Sierra 
Leone, or by the contemporary historian, A. B. C. Sibthorpe. 
Nonetheless, modem trade unionism did not develop in Sierra 
Leone until after World War I in the sense that early labour 
protest activity was sporadic and took place on an ad hoc basis. 
This, however, does not negate the political significance of 
such activity as a growing manifestation of a developing 
consciousness of the inequities of the mode of appropriation in 
the colonial state among lower paid workers. For comparable 
accounts of early protest activity, cf., e.g., A. G. Hopkins,
P.T.O.
During the 1880's, skilled labour received between ls.6d. and
2s.6d, per diem, while unskilled labour received between Is. and ls.6d. 
1
per diem. These rates, which were reduced during the world
depression of the 1880’s, remained at the reduced levels well into
the 1890's even though there had been an economic upturn. In
November 1892, workers in the colony, led by workmen at the Public
Works Department (or Royal Engineers1 Department as it was then
known), went on strike over demands for the restoration of the pre- 
2
slump wage levels. The Sierra Leone Weekly News in its leader on 
the issue observed that it was ’not surprised that the reduction of 
wages should have been keenly felt by various classes of labourers 
as to cause this universal general strike’. The strike brought the 
whole colony to a standstill. The governor declared an emergency 
and special constables were appointed among ’loyal’ citizens to help 
keep the peace. The strikers returned to work only after they had 
been promised that the falling wage rates would be stabilised,^
The action taken by Freetown workers in 1892 was spontaneous.
It was a reaction to a specific situation. No organisation of workers 
was sustained after the strike; indeed, the workers of Freetown had 
not shown much interest in attempts to organise them into a union by
’The Lagos Strike of 1897: An Exploration in Nigerian Labour 
History’, Past and Present, 35, 1966, pp.135-155; J. Illife,
’The Creation of Group Consciousness Among Dock Workers of Dar 
es Salaam 1929-50*, in R. Sandbrook and R. Cohen (eds.), op. cit., 
pp.49-72.
The Artisan. 24 September 1884; see also Table 2.1.
2 The Sierra Leone Weekly News. 26 November 1892.
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TABLE 2.1
Wage rates 1880 to 1935
YEAR SKILLED LABOUR UNSKILLED LABOUR
1880 to 1885 ls.6d. to 2s.6d . ^ Is* to ls.6d/^)
1886 to 1891 ls.Od. to ls.6d.^2) lOd. to Is/2)
1892 to 1897 ls.6d. to 2s*0d / 2) 9d. to Is/2)
1898 to 1918 ls.Od. to ls.6d / 2) 9d, to Is/2)
'1919 to 1929 ls.3d. to 2s.0d / 3) Is. to ls.3d / 3)
1930 to 1935 9d. to ls.Od/4-) (4)6d. to 9d.
SOURCES: (1) The Artisan, 24 September 1884-
(2) N. A. Cox-George, Finance and Development, p.123'
(3) British Parliamentary Papers, CMND 2744* Report
, by the Hon. W.‘G. A. Ormsby-Gore, HMSO 1926, p.53
(4) M. H, I. Kaniki, ’Economic Change in Sierra Leone • 
During the 1930’s1, TransAfrican Journal of History, 
3, 1973, pp*72-95, p.83.
the gifted, if demagogic, S. H. A. Case, himself at one point in his 
colourful career an artisan at the Public Works Department. Fully 
aware of the low social esteem in which artisans were held in status­
conscious Krio society,^ Case had in the early 1880’s formed a 
Mechanics Alliance, which was in all essentials a craft union. Its 
main objectives were to encourage the ’self improvement’aof its 
members in the quality of their work, and to introduce them to the 
appreciation of literature, music, and art. Between 1881 and 1888,
Case occasionally produced a newspaper, The Artisan, which he filled 
with platitudes and homilies urging the self improvement of tradesmen. 
Membership of the Alliance grew from 176 at its auguration in 1881
to reach a peak of 190 a few months later. Thereafter it dwindled 
2
to 51 and was dissolved a few years later.
In 1896 work began on the construction of a railway linking 
Freetown with the main“market centres of the interior of the cpuntry. 
By the end of 1906, some 227 miles of railway had been completed, by 
which time the Railway Administration provided employment for just
3
under 200 artisans and labourers. Before the outbreak of World War 
I, railway workers undertook strike action on two separate occasions. 
The first was in 1898 during the Hut Tax War of resistance to the 
imposition of ’hut taxes’ on the people of the interior of the 
country by the colonial authorities who had declared a Protectorate
1 Cf. A. T. Porter, Creoledom: A Study of the development of 
Freetown Society. Oxford, 1963.
2 The Artisan. 29 July 1885*
3 J. Best, A History of the Sierra Leone Railway, p.30* (This 
monograph was commissioned as the official history of the railway 
to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the inauguration of the 
first train service in Sierra Leone. A thorough and detailed 
work, based on railway administration documents, this study will 
draw on its account of action taken by the railway men.)
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over the area two years earlier.^ At issue was a general dissatisfaction 
with working conditions at the time of the hut tax hostilities and with
p
the level of wages* Again, in 1911, railway workers took action over 
wages and working conditions* It appears that this strike was 
brutally suppressed. According to Best, 'when a riot seemed inevitable, 
firearms were discharged and two of the strikers were slightly wounded. 
The Railway men resumed work the next day and no further trouble was 
experienced* A grant of 13/6d. was made to Thomas Hero and others
3
as a regard for remaining loyal during the strike, 1 After the war, 
railway workers again took the lead in undertaking protest action and 
in forming the first modem trade union in Sierra Leone, That various 
sections of the Freetown community rallied round the railway men 
during periods of strike action is the basis of the argument that 
these workers provided an early lead for the development of nationalist 
protestations at colonial domination. In view of the fact that 
nationalism in Sierra Leone never took the form of a coherent protest 
movement - given the strength of various cleavages within the society - 
action taken by the railway men provided almost the only opportunity 
for a concentrated focus of nationalist sentiments.
During the years before World War I, certain events of subsequent 
political significance occurred. Following the accusation leveled at 
the Krios of complicity in the hut tax hostilities, it had become the 
policy of the colonial authorities to exclude them from positions of 
trust. Krios were no longer appointed to senior positions in the 




U Cf. M. J. Bennie, ’Government and Politics of Sierra Leone with 
special reference to the Creole Community1, M.Phil. thesis,
P.T.O.
traders who had replaced them as middle men in the produce trade had 
begun to become apparent."^ " The main allies of the colonial 
administration had become the traditional chiefs of the interior 
who facilitated the system of indirect rule. In return for their 
cooperation they were allowed to keep five per cent of all taxes 
collected from their peasant subjects (which was also an-incentive
2
for them to collect the taxes) and paid a salary and other allowances.
In Freetown itself tribal headmen were appointed and paid by the
3
authorities to maintain order within their communities. It was 
against this new trend of collaboration between the interior chiefs, 
tribal headmen, and the British authorities, increasing Lebanese 
prosperity, and Krio disaffection, that the 1919 railway strike and 
anti-Syrian riots occurred.
At the heart of the railway dispute lay the familiar problem 
of wage rates lagging behind the cost of living. During WorlcLWar I, 
the War Office spent over £175,000 in strengthening the defence 
establishments in the colony. Furthermore, naval and merchant vessels 
calling at the port to take bunkers added to the internal spending 
boom through purchases of food supplies and other necesseties from 
the colony.The net effect of these developments was that the internal
Nottingham University, 1970, Gh. 4; and Leo Spi.tzer, The Creoles 
of Sierra Leone: Responses to Colonialism 1870-1945, Wisconsin,
1974.
1 Cf. N. 0, Leighton, TThe Lebanese Middleman in Sierra Leone: The 
Case of a non-indigenous trading minority and their role in 
Political Development1, PhD thesis, Indiana University, 1971; 
Laurens van der Laan, The Lebanese Traders in Sierra Leone, The 
Hague, 1975; E. F. WhiteJ ’Creole Women Traders (1792-1945)’,
PhD thesis, Boston University, 1978.
2 Cf. M. Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, pp.59-60.
3 M. Banton, TThe Origins of Tribal Administration in Freetown1, 
Sierra Leone Studies (New Series), No. 2, June 1954* pp.109-121.
4 For an account of economic conditions during the war,
cf. N. A. Cox-George, Finance and Development, pp.179-195.
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market failed to satisfy the growing demand and an inflationary spiral 
was set in motion. Between 1914- and. 1919# prices rose by 300 per cent 
while wages generally remained at the pre-war levels. At the end of 
the war, imperial spending was sharply cut, retrenchment followed, 
leaving the workmen who had been temporarily employed, jobless. This 
combination of rising prices and unemployment, together with the 
growing polarisation of the administration, the chiefs, the tribal 
headmen, and the Syrian or Lebanese traders on the one hand, and the 
Krio educated elite on the other, created an explosive situation* The 
Freetown press owned by this elite thundered about the rising prices 
of food, the unemployment situation, and the growing prosperity of 
the Lebanese who were accused of profiteering. When daily wage 
workers at the Railway Department took strike action on 15 July 1919 
to protest against the delay in the payment of the War Bonus, which 
had already been paid to European Officials, the press took up their 
case. The strike, which lasted a week, soon turned into a populist 
riot directed against the Lebanese. Within a few days, however, the 
riot had been suppressed and, as a punitive measure, the colonial 
authorities ordered that £37,000 be paid as compensation for damages 
inflicted on Lebanese property during the riots. The Freetown press 
vigorously opposed this order and the figure was reduced to £5#000*
The railway and other workers who had not received the bonus were paid 
in full.
The strike was evidently well organised and action throughout 
the railway system properly coordinated. It was not just a spontaneous 
outburst as plenty of advance notice had been given to the authorities* 
It is clear from Best’s account that the strike was a calculated 
attempt to force the authorities to meet the strikers1 demands.
Those workmen who remained loyal were ’prevented from working, engines
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under steam were stopped, the fires drawn by the strikers, and two 
coaches and a wagon were derailed,•.attempts were made to stop 
Europeans attending the offices and to disorganise the railway as 
much as possible; in consequence all operations including the train 
service on the whole system were suspended from the 16th to the 22nd, 
The men resumed work on the 23rd July on the understanding that the 
bonus would be paid as soon as possible. The loss of revenue...was 
approximately £3,500. ' 1 The success of the strike drove home to 
the railwaymen the advantages that could be derived from proper 
organisation. In August, a group of railway artisans formed the 
Railway Skilled Artisans* Union declaring their objective to be *to
act as a medium between the employers and the employee and to protect
2its members*. Within a year the union had been able to secure
3
recognition by the railway management. In 1925, the union was
re-organised and the title Railway Workers* Union adopted in order to
emphasise that membership was drawn from all grades of railway
workers.^ It was clearly the case, however, that the artisans were
the driving force behind the union, officials such as A. E. Richards,
•W. D. Leigh, and J. B. Hington, being drawn from among their ranks.
Members of the clerical grades were 'sleeping partners' while
unskilled workers and labourers were regarded as no more than 
5»infantry men'.




5 Interview *Pa! E. B. Hamilton, 31 March 1982; Pa Hamilton's 
father, an artisan at the railway, was a member of the union.
He joined the railway himself as a clerk in 1937,. and became a 
union official when the Railway Workers' Union was reconstituted 
during the Youth League years. He is now a part-time official of 
the Labour Congress.
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The support of the Krio elite for the strikers in 1919 was 
essentially opportunistic* Although a Civil Service Association 
drawing its membership largely from Krio officials had been formed in 
1909, it adopted a non-militant approach (sending 'memorials*, as 
memoranda were wrongly termed, to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies at Whitehall) in order not to jeopardise their-position even 
further. 1 The 1919 strike therefore provided the opportunity for this 
elite to vent nationalist sentiments reflecting their increasing 
frustration at the colonial state.
During the 1920's, the position of the Krio elite improved 
considerably, and as a result their political loyalty to the colonial 
state was strengthened. Following the enactment of the 1924. 
constitution which provided for a legislative council at which the 
Krio community had half of the unofficial membership, a total 
representation of five' members (two nominated by the governor^ and 
three elected by a franchise limited by property qualifications), 
this elite, through its political organisation, the National Congress 
of British West Africa (Sierra Leone branch) adopted a more conservative 
posture vis a vis the colonial authorities* The era of 'constructive 
criticism* and 'progress through partnership' had begun. Nonetheless, 
this new era of partnership was rudely shattered two years later 
when most sections of the Freetown community felt obliged to support 
striking railway men subjected to high-handed treatment by the 
railway management and the colonial administration. As before, the 
action taken by the railway men reminded the community of some of the 
unsavoury aspects of colonial domination and the day-to-day
1 Cf. M. J. Bennie, 'The Government and Politics of Sierra Leone
with special reference to the influence of the Creole Community', 
Ch. 4-«
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manifestation of the supremacy of the .jombul.^  The strike therefore 
became a temporary but concentrated focus of nationalist sentiments.
The railway strike of 1926 was not over a wage dispute as such. Wages 
during the 1920's remained at post-war levels of between Is.3d. and 2s. 
per diem for skilled and Is. and Is.3d. for unskilled workers (Table 
2.1) and may be said to have been relatively buoyant. The 1926 
strike was a racial conflict between the railway and the railway 
management. The strike, which began on January 14, 1926, involved 
'nearly the whole of the African staff of the locomotive, engineering,
3
and traffic branches, and practically all telegraph operators1 - over 
1,000 railway men. The dispute embraced two separate issues, involving 
clerical workers of the traffic and operating sections on the one 
hand, and artisans of the engineering and locomotive sections on the 
other. The former objected to, and refused to be subjected to the 
successful completion of examinations as a precondition for promotion. 
These examinations, from which European personnel were exempted, had 
been introduced the previous year by the management in the 'interest 
of more efficient working'The artisans complained that their
1 Jombul is the Krio word for a white man or European but has the 
connotation that such a person is in authority. This researcher 
was reminded- by Pa Hamilton that this word is now almost extinct 
in present day Krio vocabulary. (Interview with Pa Hamilton, 31 
March 19S2).
2 During the depression years of the 'thirties by contrast, wage 
rates dropped to between 6d. and 9d. per diem for unskilled and 
skilled labour respectively. Assuming 25 working days a month, 
this becomes 12s.6d. and lBs.Tgd. At the end of that decade 
Orde-Browne opined that '...the conclusion...is that for the 
plainest adequate living and poor accommodation, 30s. monthly 
is the minimum figure...! accordingly recommend the adoption of 
a basic figure of 30s. monthly as the minimum wage. 1 (cf. Orde- 
Browne, G. St. J., Labour Conditions in West Africa, p.120).
3 J. Best, A History of the Sierra Leone Railway. p.6l.
4 Ibid.
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request for a grading system similar to those obtaining elsewhere had
1
been refused and that in consequence their progress was being impeded.
According to Best, 'the strike was obviously pre-meditated and well
organised with the intention of paralysing all telegraph and rail 
2
communication*. The re-organisation of the union during the previous 
year was apparently the first stage of the strategy, for '-*..it is 
evident from what transpired later that the expansion of membership 
and the renewal of union activity were the result of growing
dissatisfaction on the part of the workmen at their conditions of
3service and had an obvious .underlying motive1* The railway management
and the government were resolute in their determination to break the
strike. 'It was considered that the men had ceased work in an
unauthorised manner and they were made to understand that no discussion
could take place until they returned to work. His excellency the
governor maintained a very adamant attitude in this respect and ^declined
all offers of mediation...The railway men were repeatedly instructed
to return to work and this they refused to do even though some of
their members were dismissed and replaced.
The Freetown community were united in their support for the
strikers. This '•••deadlock was by no means eased by the clear
expression of public opinion made in favour of the strikers and which
■ 5
culminated in a Strikers' Relief Fund being inaugurated'. That the 






and solidarity of the railway men sustained by the support - fuelled
by nationalist sentiments - of the local community and indeed branches
of the National Congress of British West Africa in other colonial
territories. The British government was equally determined that the
colonial administration should resist the demands of the strikers.
The strike was viewed as nothing more than an attempt at blackmail*
'A number of telegrams were addressed to the Secretary of State by
the strikers and certain public bodies in Freetown, and questions
were asked in the House of Commons, but to all approaches, the
Secretary of State intimated that he saw no reason to intervene and
he made it known that the Under Secretary (W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore),
then about to make a visit to West Africa, would be instructed not 
1to intervene. 1
The colonial administration simply bided time. As the weeks
went by, the nationalist euphoria subsided. The hardship of a
protracted struggle began to bite. The Railway WorkersT Union
reconsidered its position. 1Following a further unsuccessful appeal
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in which they asked that
a special commissioner should be appointed (to inquire into the
dispute), and that the status quo ante January 14-th be restored -
but with loss of pay for the strike period - the men returned to
work on February 26th, 1926, on the conditions laid down by the 
2government. ' Fully aware of the demoralised mood of the men at the 
end of the strike, the colonial administration lost no time in 
breaking the union. It was outlawed, and some of its influential 
leaders re-deployed to the more remote parts of the railway system. 
Following this experience, there was little trade union activity in
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Sierra Leone for more than a decade,^ Demoralised and dejected, 
railway and other lower paid workers in the territory entered the 
depression years in a sullen mood. Living standards were shortly to 
drop dramatically. As the volume of freight carried by the railway 
decreased, following the reduction in the demand for Sierra Leone 
produce in the world markets, retrenchments were made at the railway 
administration, ’A thorough investigation was made at the beginning 
of the year into the staff position in all branches with the result 
that the number of men employed was reduced by 159 or 8,6% of the 
total number employed at the end-of 1932,,*The filling of vacancies
in all branches, including those caused by normal wastage, were
2
suspended1. When Wallace-Johnson returned to Freetown in 1938, be 
found lower paid workers in the colony sullen and demoralised and 
forced to bear these hardships.
The influence of Wallace-Johnson 1938-50^
Sierra Leone entered the depression years with the colonial
1 Interview with Pa Hamilton, 31 March 1982,
2 J. Best, A History of the Sierra Leone Railway, p,79*
3 For a full biography of Wallace-Johnson, cf. La Ray Denzer,
>1, T, A, Wallace.-Johnson and the West African Youth League: A 
Case Study in West African Radicalism1, PhD thesis,. Birmingham 
University, 1977, I am very grateful to Dr, Denzer for generously 
allowing me to read this work which is temporarily on restricted 
access. Dr, Denzer also shared with me, during conversations at 
the Sierra Leone Studies Symposium, Birmingham, 17-19 July 1981, 
her personal recollections of Wallace-Johnson whom she had met in 
Ghana and in Sierra Leone, She has also collaborated with a 
scholar of Krio society, Dr, Leo Spitzer, in the writing of an 
important two-part biographical article of Wallace-Johnson, (Cf, 
L, Denzer and L, Spitzer, 'I, T, A, Wallace-Johnson and the West 
African Youth League', Part 1, International Jr, of African 
Historical Studies, Vol, 6, No, 3, 1973; part 2 ibid. Vol., 6,
No, 1973,) This account of the influence of Wallace-Johnson on 
the development of trade unionism in Sierra Leone is indebted 
to these studies.
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authorities in firm control and receiving the cooperation of the
Krio and chiefly elite. The depression years also coincided with
the diversification of the economy, the beginning of the exploitation
of small deposits of gold, platinum and chrome, as well as the larger
deposits of diamonds and iron ore.^ " It was in general an era of
rising expectations but hopes were quickly and cruelly dashed.
Prevailing labour market conditions - the availability of a huge
supply of labour - created a situation in which lower paid workers
2
were, in practice, in a weak bargaining position. Moreover, the 
politics of the rivalry between the Krio and chiefly elites for 
influence in the colonial administration, and the virtual exclusion 
of the' ’masses’ from the electorate in Freetown by property 
qualifications, created a situation in which the cultivation of a 
clientele by these elites among the lower paid workers brought the 
former virtually no immediate or direct benefits. Nonetheless lower 
paid workers at the mines upcountry and in establishments in Freetown 
took strike action on several occasions between 1932 and 1938 to
3
register their discontent with falling living standards. These
1 Cf. M. H. I. Kaniki, ’Economic and Social History of Sierra Leone,
1929-39*.
2 Interview with Marcus Grant, 10 February 1982. .
3 This ground has been extensively covered by previous researchers
and a rehash of the details is not necessary. Cf* F. A. N. Lisk, 
’Industrial Relations in Sierra Leone, with Special Reference to 
the Development and Functioning of Bargaining Machinery since 
1945’, Ch. 2; M. Amolo, ’Sierra Leone and British Colonial Labour 
Policy 1930-45’, Ch. 2; M. H. Y. Kaniki, ’Economic and Social 
History of Sierra Leone 1 9 2 9 - 3 9 5 ;  M. J. M. Sibanda, 
'Colonial Policy and Development in North West Sierra Leone 1896- 
1939', PhD thesis, Birmingham University, 1978, Ch. 5; and
M. Kilson, Political Change in a West African State. Only those 
facts that are relevant to the influence of Wallace-Johnson on
the labour movement and the structure of conflict within the
movement are discussed.
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strikes, like the pre-1914- protest action, were sporadic and short­
lived, The mines also became notorious for a high labour turnover as 
workers periodically and seasonally - voting with their feet - moved 
in and out of peasant subsistence farming.***
There had emerged during the inter-war years a growing number 
of young locally and foreign educated professionals of upcountry and 
Krio origins. Although these men and women had kinship relations 
with individuals of the Freetown and rural elite, they were beginning 
(unlike the latter) to develop a solidly based nationalist consciousness, 
Newspapers of this period contain many letters signed by upcountry and 
Krio names drawing attention particularly to^  the exploitation of 
minerals by imperial and foreign capital - a very early precursor to 
the 1 growth without development* debate. This group of doctors, 
lawyers, teachers, civil servants, etc., was, moreover, willing and 
ready to create a clientele among the urban and rural masses. What 
they needed was coherent political organisation and the organisational 
skills of a leader experienced in the art of demagoguery. Wallace- 
Johnson perfectly fitted the bill, and arrived in Freetown at a most ' 
opportune time. His biographers maintain that, since his political
activities in the Gold Coast had ended badly, Wallace-Johnson was
2probably at the point of withdrawal from active politics. The 
colonial authorities unwittingly catapulted him into the lime-light, 
however, by seizing some of his books, documents, and papers at the 
Customs examination centre on the day of his arrival.
An indignant Wallace-Johnson gave this event the widest and
/
1 Cf. Ken Swindel, ’Labour Migration and Mining in Sierra Leone’,
PhD thesis, London University, 1973* Ch. 1.
2 Cf. M. H. I. Kaniki, ’Economic and Social History’, Ch. 5; for 
glimpses of working conditions in the mines, cf. Katherine Fowler- 
Lunn, op. cit.
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loudest publicity. 1 His charismatic personality 'drew people to him
2like pins to a magnet*. He wasted no time in denouncing the inter­
war trends in elitist politics and 'large sections of the community, 
the unemployed and employed, rich and poor, the educated and the
uneducated, men and women, Muslims, Christians, and pagans, Creoles 
3
and upcountrymen* were an enthusiastic audience for his fiery 
rhetoric* Within weeks of his arrival, Wallace-Johnson*s strategy 
for handling the situation quickly unfolded. First, he proposed to 
create a political organisation, the Youth League, to challenge the 
elitism of the Freetown-based National Council of British West Africa* 
Second, he proposed to organise workers in the mines and in 
establishments throughout the country into trade unions to provide 
the Youth League with a strong grass roots base. By the end of 193S, 
Wallace-Johnson had achieved both objectives. An adherent of the 
Leninist theory of revolution, he believed in the use of strikes as 
a means of developing the consciousness of workers and in bringing 
about the destruction of imperialism. Overnight, Youth League 
activists, the ‘verandah boys* of the Sierra Leone nationalist 
<movement, became trade union leaders. Some of them were to use these 
positions to launch careers for themselves in national politics during 
the post-war years of decolonisation.
The months before the outbreak of war in Sierra Leone were 
especially turbulent as strikes shook the colonial state at its 
foundations. With the exception of a handful of Youth League 
activists, however, Wallace-Johnson *s supporters among the ’middle
1 Interview with Marcus Grant, 10 February 1982.
2 Ibid.
3 L. Denzer and L. Spitzer, op. cit., part 2.
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class' professionals"*" and among lower paid workers were not adherents
of the Leninist theory of revolution. The former wished to bring about
an end to the elitism in political representation and to hasten the
devolution of power* The latter wished to effect improvements in
living standards. With the outbreak of war, Wallace-Johnson was
incarcerated at Bonth Island off the coast of Southern Sierra Leone,
as it was thought by the colonial authorities that he posed a security
risk to the territory.
During the war, colonial labour policy was based on a strategy
of guiding the trade union movement through the channels of industrial 
2
unionism*. Following the passage of legislation giving legal
recognition to trade unions in 1939, and the establishment of a
Labour Department two years later, a Trade Union adviser was sent
out from Britain in 194-2# He was Edgar Parry, himself a union
official in the British trade union movement. Local unionists^who
knew and worked with Parry are all agreed that he has left an indelible
3 *mark on the practice of trade unionism in Sierra Leone# While Parry 
was without any doubt very sympathetic to the aspirations of the 
fast growing group of wage earners in the territory, he saw his 
role, quite unambiguously, as attempting to put into effect the 
policies on labour administration which had been developed over the 
years at the Colonial Office, Very simply, this meant turning the 
local trade union leadership away from the 'political unionism* of
1 Cf# L. Denzer, op# cit.» Appendix 2; the composition of the Youth 
League*s central committee in 1938 was as follows: four lawyers, 
eight businessmen, seven senior clerks, three teachers, one 
surveyor, one clergyman, and two accountants including a Muslim 
Imam.
2 For the details relating to the reform of labour policies, cf.
especially M. Amolo, 'Sierra Leone and British Colonial Labour 
Policy 1930-4.5'.
3 Interviews with Marcus Grant, 16 January 1980; H. N. Georgestone,
P.T.O.
- 82 -
the Youth League and its destabilising tactics of agitation, to the 
institutionalised and more 'respectable1 protest of 'industrial 
unionism'. It could not have been otherwise* Parry had himself 
obtained his industrial relations experience by working his way up 
through the ranks of the British trade union movement; the ideology 
of industrial unionism and institutionalised protest must have seemed 
only too natural. Indeed, writing in the colonial office journal, 
Corona* shortly after completing his tour in Sierra Leone, Parry 
maintained:
'The creation of.trade unions is itself a 
fairly simple matter. To fit them into a 
comprehensive system of industrial relations 
is a much more exacting task...Since we have 
always encouraged the colonies to follow our 
example, we can only hope that workers there
will eventually arrive at a more orderly
method of running their affairs.'1
It was to this 'exacting task' that Parry devoted himself, but 
not before careful study of the pattern of trade unionism thatf was 
emerging. He was aware of the conditions obtaining in the territory 
at the time of the arrival of Wallace-Johnson. The seething discontent 
of workers in the mines and in other establishments was swiftly given 
organisational expression in the formation of trade unions. By 194-2* 
the year of Parry1 s arrival, eleven unions had been registered, 
claiming between them a total membership of 5*000 (see .Table 2.2).
The Labour Department was quick to point out that a 'bare 15 per cent'
of this membership .was fully paid up, while the number of wage earners 
in the whole country had risen to a figure between 70,000 and 80,000.
A former Youth League activist and trade union leader has pointed
23 January 1980; President Siaka Stevens, 11 July 1980; and Pa 
Hamilton, 31 March 1982.
1 Sdgar Parry, 'Colonial Trade Unions', Corona. August 1949*
pp.19-21, p.21.
2 Sierra Leone, Labour Department Annual Report 1941-2. p.3.
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TABLE 2.2
Registered trade unions 194-2
1. The All Seamen's Union
2. The Freetown Maritime Workers' Union
3. The Mining Employees’ Union
4. The African Commercial Workers' Union 
5* The Yengema Diamond Workers' Union
6. The Sierra Leone Building and Constructional Workers' Union
7. The Sierra Leone Mason's Union
8. The Sierra Leone Washerwomens' Union
9. The Sierra Leone Waterfront Workers' Union
10. The Railway Workers' Union
11. The Mercantile Workers' Union
SOURCE: Sierra Leone, Annual Labour Department Reports 
1939-4-0, 194-0-41.
out that, in those early days of trade union organisation, many of 
the activists leading the unions 'lacked the administrative skills to 
compile the type of reports showing the returns demanded.by the Labour 
Department'.^  Moreover, the trade union movement was at the time 
a populist organisation. Membership was spontaneous and informal.
The movement grew out of the vacuum left by the orientation of the 
elites in Freetown and the provinces towards seeking greater
2representation for themselves in the colonial administration. The 
momentum of the movement was maintained by the particular conditions
1 Interview with H. N. Georgestone, 23 January 1980; see also
M. Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, pp. 144-14-9•
2 Sierra Leone, Labour Department Annual Report 1941-42.~p.3*
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obtaining during the war: a tight labour market, war-time emergency,
and considerable hardship caused by war-time inflation*
A trade union centre, the Sierra Leone Trade Union Congress
(SLTUC), was formed to coordinate the activities of the unions in
194-2. During the war, the unions were for the most part adversarial
in bargaining tactics, generally adopting a hostile posture towards
employers and officials of the Labour Department. In its 1942 Report,
the department maintained:
’It is regrettable*.#that no progress has 
been made in the development of trade unionism 
during 1941-42.• •This is due to the fact that
real trade union leaders are conspicuous by
their absence; that the so-called trade union 
leaders are very loath to take the advice of 
the Labour Department, including that of 
Mr. Parry who is an expert on trade unionism 
and even of the TUC at home*’1
This was only to be expected. The colonial administration had
incarcerated Wallace-Johnson - in the eyes of the activists, a-hero -
while appointing two members of the Krio and upcountry elite,
J. Fowell Boston (an eminent barrister) and Paramount Chief George
Caulker, as members of the Executive Council in 1942.^ " Inspite of'
the emergency measures in force, a total of thirty-four stoppages
took place between 1940 and 1945* With the exception of two in 1945,
which were over disputes relating to terms and conditions of
redundancies, all were in respect of wage demands. This unprecedented
increase in strike activity can be directly related to the internal
2condition of the economy during the war. The state of the labour 
market (the increase in the demand for skilled labour relative to the
1 Cf. M. Kilson, op. cit.* p.143*
2 For details relating to the strikes, cf. M. Amolo, op. cit..
Ch. 5; for details relating to the economy, cf. M. A. Cox-George,
Finance and Development* p.225 ff.
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supply), an inflationary spiral, and trade union hostility, all fuelled 
the series of stoppages* In most of these disputes, the Labour 
Department worked assiduously to effect negotiated settlements as was 
required under the 1939 Trade Union Ordinance* The government itself 
granted an annual cost of living allowance between 194-0 and 194-5, as 
its own statistics on the movement of prices had registered a 
considerable upward trend (see Tables 2*3 and 2*4-) •
By the end of the war, Parry had developed a sound grasp of the 
pattern of trade unionism emerging in the country. He had not only 
seen instances of militant and aggressive wage -bargaining, but also 
the strains in the solidarity of the labour movement. The union 
leaders, deprived of the inspiring leadership of Wallace-Johnson, were ■ 
soon at odds with each other over demarcation disputes and personality 
rivalries*'*’ Ethnic problems also surfaced. For instance, Kroo dock 
labourers, who had a virtual monopoly over the employment opportunities 
at the port, maintained a separate union organisation from that of 
non-Kroo dockers* Even after the two unions were merged in 194-6, the 
system of recruitment of dock workers remained open to abuse until 
the centralisation of the .employment of dock labour In 1952. Parry 
had also become acquainted with most of the union leaders and had 
developed a 'soft spot* for Siaka Stevens, Secretary of the Mining 
Employees' Union, who had by the end of the war emerged as a shrewd 
but moderate union negotiator* Parry singled out Stevens as a 
unionist of great promise and was instrumental in obtaining a 
scholarship for him to study industrial relations at Ruskin College, 
Oxford, and arranging a brief attachment for him with the British TUC
1 Interview with Marcus Grant, 16 January 1980.
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TABLE 2.3









SOURCE: N, A* Cox-George, Finance and Development, p*228*
(N.B.: An estimation of rent paid on housing was excluded
from the compilation of the index*)
- 87 -
TABLBJkib
Movement of real wages 1939-54
YEAR COST OF LIVING 
INDEX
MINIMUM WAGES INDEX OF 
REAL WAGES
1939 100 Is.Od. 100
1945 233.7 ls.6d. 64.2
1949 242 2s.6d. 103
1952 398 3s.9d. 94.2
1954 417 3s.9d. 90
SOURCE: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the
Strikes and Riots in Freetown during February 
1955# p.7. (This document will henceforth be 
referred to as The Shaw Report.)
at the end of his course in 1947/48.^
Parry’s strategy for re-organising the pattern of trade 
unionism in Sierra Leone involved three important phases* First, he 
aimed to reduce the number of trade unions so that only one union 
could exist in any one industry or sector; second, he wished to create 
institutions for collective bargaining at industry wide I-evel; and 
third, he hoped to eliminate the hostile posture of the majority of 
union leaders and to replace it with a spirit of cooperation. By 
the time he left Sierra Leone at the end of his tour in 1947, Parry 
had achieved all three of these objectives. The eleven unions in 
existence in 1942 were reduced to eight in.the streamlining phase of 
the strategy (see Table 2.5). The mining Employees’ Union and the 
Yengema Diamond Workers’ Union were amalgamated to form the United 
Mine Workers’ Union, while the Masons’ Union and the Building and 
Construction Workers' Union became the Artisan ’Workers’ Union.-The 
Maritime Workers' Union (Kroo stevedores) and the Waterfront Workers' 
Union (non-Kroo stevedores) became the Maritime and Waterfront 
Workers’ Union. With the achievement of one union in each sector, 
Parry next turned his attention to the introduction of institutions
1 Interview,President Siaka Stevens, 11 July 1980; while in the
U.K. in 1947/48, Stevens wrote: ’...experience has'shown us... 
that Labour Advisers and officials of the right type can be of 
inestimable value to colonial trade union movements. Not by 
dictating to, or unnecessarily interfering with the unions, but 
by tactful guidance, pointing out pitfalls in trade union work, 
recommending suitable material to read - above all by straight 
dealing with the unions - can Labour Advisers and officers from 
the U.K. be of help to the colonies.’ (Siaka Stevens, 'Trade 
Unionism in Sierra Leone’, Empire. A Socialist Commentary on 
Colonial Affairs. Journal of the Fabian Colonial Bureau. Vol. 
II, No. 3, September 1948, p.5.)
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for collective bargaining. Bargaining machinery of two types were 
introduced: Wages Boards and Joint Industrial Councils (JICs). The 
former, introduced In 194-6, was a more paternalistic arrangement. A 
Board was formed in the cargo handling, mining, and agricultural 
(plantations) sectors, each with representation from the unions and 
employers in these sectors, but under the chairmanship of a government 
appointee, who was only obliged to consult'these representatives in 
fixing the minimum rates of pay which were statutorily enforceable in 
each sector* If ’bargaining1 was severely restricted at the Wages 
Boards, it was more openly permitted at the JICs* Two JICs were 
created in 194-7 for the Artisan and Transport workers. Each had an 
equal number of representatives of the employers and the unions, with 
the Labour Department providing only administrative services. It was 
envisaged that these would meet periodically to review and agree on 
wage rates applicable throughout each of the two sectors. Conway has 
suspected that these institutions were deliberately designed so that 
the Labour Department would be directly involved in the fixing of 
wage levels in both the private and public sectors.^ A communication 
received from Edgar Parry during his research confirmed his suspicions. 
According to Parry, Wages Boards were created to insure government 
influence:
’The creation of Wages Boards in the mining 
and maritime sectors allowed for government 
influence through the appointment of independent 
members. On the other hand, the designation 
of JICs in the transport and construction 
industries allowed equal representation for 
labour and employers without any independent 
appointees. Since government as an employer
H. A. Conway, ’Industrial Relations in Sierra Leone with Special 
Reference to the Functioning of the Bargaining Machinery since 
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was represented, there was no need for a 
third party.*1
The third phase of Parry's strategy involved the elimination of 
the aggressive posture of the trade union leadership. This very 
simply meant seeking their 'incorporation' into the establishment.
Parry resorted to the use of a corporatist strategy by setting up 
a Joint Consultative Committee made up of union leaders and government 
officials, with terms of reference to advise government on its economic, 
social, and labour policies. A building, Trade Union House, was 
provided in central Freetown as the administrative headquarters of 
the trade union movement, providing offices for the TUC and several 
individual unions. Trade union leaders were also promised scholarships 
to study in the U.K., and were invited to sit on the national 
institutions of political power. J. Akinola Wright of the reconstituted 
Railway Workers' Union was nominated by the governor to sit on the 
Legislative Council and represent labour interests in 194-6, while 
Siaka Stevens became a member of the Protectorate Assembly in 194-9 
and thus began a remarkable political career. The speeches of the • 
union leaders were relayed over the rediffusion network, and reported 
in the press. In this way, the trade union leaders, most of whom 
had achieved prominence through being activists in the Youth League, 
became gradually 'respectable* with a corresponding obligation to be 
’responsible*. (Cf. Table 2.5 for the occupational background of 
trade union leaders in 1946.) The union leaders welcomed these
2
arrangements, as the unions were given recognition and security.
Even Marcus Grant, one of the strongest supporters of Wallace-Johnson
1 Communication from Parry to Hugh Conway, 3 March, 1967, quoted in 
Conway, op. cit.. Ch. 3.
2 Conway, ibid. Ch. 4«
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in the Youth League, appeared well pleased in a speech made at the 
inauguration of the JICs in March 1947:
'...today marks one of the happiest days 
concerning the workers in this colony for 
which we are glad. We can assure the council 
of our cooperation and best relations to 
bring this our attempt to success. I should 
not omit to extend our thanks to the Commissioner 
of Labour and the officers of the Labour 
Department who are responsible for bringing 
about the formation of these bodies.'•**
Nonetheless, the reforms had fundamental implications for solidarity
within the labour movement. Towards the end of the war, Wallace-
Johnson was released from confinement at Bonthe Island and allowed
to return to Freetown. A clash with Parry, whose work was directed
at undermining his militant style of leadership, was inevitable.
The reforms were severely criticised in the Youth League Press.
Deeply resenting Wallace-Johnson's influence, Parry's letters to
his friends in Britain" were indicative of his increasing exasperation.
In a letter to Rita Hinden of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (which is
worth quoting at length, not least for its entertainment value) Parry
made it clear that he had had enough:
'I consider him to be the most1 objectionable . 
and unscrupulous person I have met in 
political life...All this I would abide if 
. he did not interfere with my work...It is 
necessary for me to do a fair amount of 
reorganisation of the trade unions. They 
are in a sad state of health and require 
a lot of assistance. In spite of his loud 
protestations to the contrary, Wallace- 
Johnson seems to me as if he does not want 
them to be any different than they are.
1 Marcus Grant, 6 March 1947, quoted in The Shaw Report, p.4.
Marcus Grant however fully realised the implications of Parry's 
reforms. He has written, 'It was of course easier for the 
government to keep a check on the development of the unions in 
.Sierra Leone'. (Marcus Grant, 'Research on Trade Unionism in 
Sierra Leone', Freetown, typescript, n.d.; copy given to this 
researcher by Grant on 16 January 1980).
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I believe this is because he meddles with 
the finances of one of them and also because 
he is a megalomaniac who cannot stand to see 
anyone trying to help his beloved ’toiling 
masses’. (He is full of pseudo-Marxist clap­
trap) •••In the first place I think he ought 
not to be encouraged by anyone in the labour 
movement at home. It would be neither fair to 
the Africans here who want to do something 
decent nor to me*♦•My job here is difficult 
enough without having to deal with a man of 
this sort...There is no doubt that this 
country would have made far more progress 
without him. There are a few enlightened 
men here who can easily fill his place with 
advantage, but will not make any effort 
while he is about*’-L
Wallace-Johnson, on the other hand, believed that labour reform
was only one aspect of the more important question of imperialism,
and that- it was idle to argue about the details of the system while
the system itself remained unchanged* In a speech before the World
Federation of Labour in Paris in 1945 as the delegate from Sierra
Leone, he argued this thesis forcefully:
’...in countries where the people are ruled 
by a foreign race, whose economic exploitation 
is supported by the political forces of 
imperialism, politics and economics are 
inseparable* * 2
Parry,. however, continued- to work through the moderate union leaders 
and, by so doing, was able to precipitate a split between those 
leaders who subscribed to the ideology of political unionism and 
those who subscribed to the ideology of industrial unionism. In 
1946, two moderates, Akinola Wright and Siaka Stevens, were elected 
as President and General Secretary respectively of the TUG, by virtue
1 Rhodes House, Oxford, Parry to Hinden, Fabian Colonial Bureau 
86/2/173-115» 23 September, 1945; also quoted in M. Amolo, 
•Sierra Leone and British Colonial Labour Policy 1930-45’•
2 The New Leader. 13 October, ’What Colonial Workers demanded at 
the WFTU Conference’; also quoted in M. Amolo, ibid*
- 94 -
of the fact that the moderates, having a greater proportion of the 
membership between them, could muster more votes. Marcus Grant and 
H. N« Georgestone immediately disaffiliated their unions from the 
TUC. In a statement on the crisis signed by Wright, Stevensj George 
Thomas (Maritime and Waterfront Workers' Union), D. A. Lottman 
(Railway Workers), and C. S. Pratt (Clerical and Mercantile Workers), 
the moderates were unequivocal about their split with the Youth 
League:
’Shorn of all its fanciful trimmings, the 
real reason for the conflict is that the .
Minority Section want to see the Trade Union 
Congress as part and parcel of the Youth 
League, and the Majority Section, whilst 
some of its members are Youth Leaguers and 
others have held prominent positions in the 
League in the past, maintain that it -would 
be highly improper for the SLTUC to be 
hog-tied and controlled by the Youth League, 
a political organisation which is in no way 
accountable to the trade union movement.'1
Delighted as it must have been with these developments, the 
Labour Department nevertheless made several attempts to bring the 
two factions back together on terms compatible with its strategies 
of labour administration. Parry himself made several approaches to
Grant and Georgestone, who recall that he painstakingly lectured them
on the development of trade unionism in Britain - drawing parallels 
with Sierra Leone - and on the achievement of the pioneers of the 
British labour movement. 'Parry often suggested that the greatest 
service we could do to the nation would be to cooperate with the
department and the new JICs and Wages Boards. For this we would be
remembered in history as the founding fathers of trade unionism in
1 SLTUC, 'Statement on the Present Situation in Congress', Freetown, 
circa. June 194&. (Copy in this researcher's possession). The 
emphasis is in the original. The statement also went on to accuse 
Wallace-Johnson of dishonesty and misuse of union funds.
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this c o u n t r y . B y  the time Parry left Freetown in November 1947, a
new trade union centre had been formed with its membership drawn from 
2
the two factions. Increasingly isolated, Wallace-Johnson turned 
his energies and talents to the national political scene where 
arrangements for the devolution of power by the British were well 
underway.
Parry was therefore remarkably successful'in achieving the 
objectives he set himself at the beginning of his tour. The effect 
of his reforms was that there was relative industrial peace for almost 
a decade. Between 194& and. 1955» there were no more than five 
stoppages in the whole country, and these were resolved by negotiated 
settlements. As Marcus Grant points out in his article on the 
recent history of the labour movement, '...up to the 1955 strikes, 
industrial relations was presented as something of a model of close 
cooperation between unions, the Labour Department, and employers; 
the existence of the Wages Boards, and Joint Industrial Councils, 
and the national joint consultative advisory body on labour legislation
3
and policy, and the mature role of the Council of Labour'. One of 
the effects of union cooperation during this first post-war decade 
was that real wages soon lagged behind the cost of living. The gains 
which had been made during the years after the war had by 1952 begun 
to be eroded (see Table 2.4)* This era of 'corporatism*, coinciding 
with the incorporation of Africans into key positions in the colonial
1 Interview with Marcus Grant, 16 January 1980; Marcus Grant has
also said that the idea for the formation of a labour party in
Sierra Leone came from Parry's remarks on British trade union 
history. (Interview with Marcus Grant, 10 February 1982).
2 Sierra Leone, Labour Department Annual Report 1946. p.6.
3 M. Grant, 'Research on Trade Unionism in Sierra Leone1, (mimeo).
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state, was perhaps not too surprisingly, if somewhat rudely, shattered 
by the 'general' strike1 of 1955. This was led by the two radicals 
in the 194-6 dispute within the old TUC, Marcus Grant and H. N. 
Georgestone.
The responses of organised labour to the politics of decolonisation 
By the end of World War II the social structure of Sierra Leone 
had altered considerably and noticeably. Not only had the number of 
wage earners increased significantly, but more and more peasants were 
being drawn into the market economy as the measures taken by the 
Agricultural Department to promote the cultivation of cash crops were 
beginning to mature. At the other end of the socio-economic scale, 
the educated professional Krios, while constituting an elite (but 
disunited over questions of constitutional reforms and, more 
specifically, questions of the extension of the voting franchise 
and of the type of accommodation to be sought with the provincial 
elite) had been witnessing the enlargement of the latter elite. 
Several outstanding professional people with provincial origins had 
emerged. These included Dr. Milton Margai, Dr. John Karefa-Smart, 
Siaka Stevens, Albert Margai, I. B. Taylor-Kamara, and Dr. V. H. 
Fitzjohn. These elites, taken together, were 'moderate1 in their 
political orientation. It was left to Wallace-Johnson and some of 
his anti-imperialist ideologues to keep nationalism as an issue on 
the political agenda. But the support he had received during those 
heady days of 1933 was on the decline by the end of the war as the 
colonial authorities had responded by creating institutions for
1 To term the 1955 strike a 'general' strike is in fact a misnomer. 
Although workers throughout the country took part in it 
unofficially, the action was taken by members of the Artisan and 
Transport unions.
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collective bargaining, and had committed themselves to the introduction
of constitutional reforms leading to the transfer of power.1
These conditions made decolonisation in Sierra Leone a smooth
and gradual devolution of power. A small degree of acrimony came
from conservative Krio opinion which resented the growing (and
inevitable) political influence of the provincial elite. By 1951,
two political parties had emerged: the National Council of the Colony
of Sierra Leone (NCSL), representing conservative Krio opinion, and
the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) representing a coalition of
liberal Krio, the provincial educated elite, and the chiefs. Neither
of these parties were ’mass’ parties - sustained by nationalist
sentiments - like the CPP in Ghana or the NCNC in southern Nigeria.
Each relied on kinship and patron-clientelist relationships to secure
support among a franchise limited by property qualifications. After
elections in 1951, the SLPP, whose network of support covered parts of
Freetown and the whole of the provinces, emerged as the winner. Some
of its leading members were appointed to the Executive Council or
cabinet with Dr. Margai as Chief Minister and Leader of Government
Business. The leader of the NCSL, Dr. Bankole Bright, became head
of the Opposition where he was joined by Wallace-Johnson who had won
2a seat on the Legislative Council as an independent candidate.
1 The literature on decolonisation in Sierra Leone is extensive; 
cf., e.g., M. Kilson, op. cit.; J. Cartwright, op. cit.; Dennis 
Austin, ’People and Constitution in Sierra Leone' (a five-part 
article in the weekly, West Africa. 13 September 1952-11 October 
1952); W. H. Fitzjohn, Ambassador of Christ and Caesar. Ibadan, 
1975; P. R. Kaim-Caudle, 'Review of Economic Changes in Sierra 
Leone-1930-55’, Durham University Journal, December 1957, pp.34-41; 
and H. H. Gaffney, op. cit.
2 This researcher has tacked Dr. LaRay Denzer, Wallace-Johnson's 
biographer, over the question of the irony of his support for 
Dr. Bankole Bright's parochial NCSL. She insisted that Wallace- 
Johnson could have only been an effective critic of the 
government from the Opposition benches and drew attention to the
P.T.O.
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The conduct of the affairs of state within this formal Westminster- 
style institutional framework should not obscure the broader 
sociological processes at work. Dr, Milton Margai emerged as the 
dominant political figure during this period by mobilising the support 
of the chiefs in return for the maintenance of their privileges at 
the local level. This was facilitated in certain cases by communal 
and kinship ties, especially in the south and south-eastern areas of 
the country, and in others, by certain shared experiences such as 
originating from the protectorate, or belonging to the old boys’ 
network of the Bo school (which had been established in 1906 by the 
colonial authorities to provide education for the sons and nominees 
of the chiefs). Access to the state was required to help redress the 
historical imbalance in development resources expended in the colony 
vis a vis the provinces, and by so doing, to assist the improvement 
of life chances in the latter area. Leading members of the educated 
elite were represented in the SLPP including Krio politicians inclined 
towards national integration and reconciliation. These networks of 
support were based on informal clientelist relationships which were 
cemented by the location of schools, hospitals, and other projects 
or infrastructural development in particular areas, appointments to 
the civil service, the allocation of diamond mining licenses, produce 
and other purchasing contracts, etc. During these years of 
decolonisation, however, the African politicians in government were 
not given complete discretionary powers by the British colonial 
authorities to formulate the priorities for the distribution of the 
resources of the state. The ethos of British colonial administration
fact that his collaboration with Bankole Bright was short-lived. 
(Conversation with Dr. Denzer, 18 July 1981).
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had been, and continued to be, strict bureaucratic accountability.
These administrative procedures restrained and constrained the full
manifestation of the characteristics of neo-patrimonal political
leadership. Nonetheless, the African politicians had some considerable
room in which to maneuvre* This was evidenced by the increasing
prosperity of the politicians themselves, the award of substantial
salary increases to senior civil servants-following the publication
of the Sinker Report in 1953 - many of whom were now Sierra Leoneans
as the policy of Africanisation was pursued (see Table 2*6) - and
the introduction of mortgages on very concessionary terms to this
1
cadre of public servants. The re-negotiation of the terms of 
diamond-mining agreements between Selection Trust and the Margai 
administration in 1954-/55 created other opportunities for the 
dispensation of patronage* In return for a £1.5 million ‘compensation1, 
Selection Trust was required to surrender its 99-year exclusive 
rights to mine diamonds throughout the country, with the exception 
of some 4-50 square miles - containing the most promising deposits - 
in Kenema and Kono* The rest of the country (in practice parts of
■the -south and south-east)* therefore became available to miners who
2
were required to be licensed by government. The main beneficiaries 
of the increased access of Africans to the colonial state in Sierra 
Leone were the politicians in government themselves, and their 
clientele among senior public servants, businessmen, and other members
1 In pursuance of the policy of parity in the conditions of service 
of British and Sierra Leonean senior civil servants, the latter 
and their families were also allowed a few months leave in Britain 
every three years, with mail boat passages being paid by the 
government,
2 Cf, Laurens van der Laan, The Sierra Leone Diamonds; An Economic 
Study covering the Years 1952-1961, Oxford, 1965.
in the countryside were not direct beneficiaries of the arrangements 
of the transfer to African political control. Moreover, the existence 
of the institutions of collective bargaining introduced just after the 
war, and the willingness of most trade union leaders (whose status 
had been significantly increased by the measures taken by P.arry) 
created the conditions for effecting only very moderate wage settlements* 
Nonetheless, some sections of organised labour responded by taking 
strike action in 1955 in protest at the gradual decrease in real wages 
since the early ‘fifties.
TABLE 2.6
Africanisation of the senior public service during the period of 
decolonisation
TEARS OVERSEAS AFRICAN TOTAL AFRICAN % OF TOTAL
1953... 315 166 4.81 24.
1959... 297 381 67.8 56
SOURCE: Sierra Leone, Sessional Paper No. 4. of 1959.
Government Statement on Africanisation. p.l.
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On 9 February 1955, the members of the Artisan and Allied Workers1 
Union and the Transport and General Workers' Union were called out on 
strike by the Secretaries of the two unions, Marcus Grant and 
H. N. Georgestone respectively. The immediate cause of the strike 
was a deadlock in negotiations for periodic wage increases at the 
Artisan JIG and at the Transport JIC. The workers’’ representatives 
at these JICs refused to refer the impasse- to arbitration as was 
required under the Trades Disputes Ordinance, hundreds of workers 
in Freetown, and indeed in various parts of the provinces, joined 
spontaneously in the four-day strike - in most cases in defiance of 
official union policy - which escalated into riots, looting, and 
running street battles with security personnel. The evident popularity 
of strike action among the labour rank and file was suggestive of 
widespread disillusionment with the formal procedures of collective 
bargaining in effecting significant increases in basic wage rates at 
a time of spiralling inflation. It arguably also reflected a certain 
envy, even resentment, of the political and bureaucratic elite 
following the appointment of the first African cabinet in 1951 and 
the gradual Africanisation of the upper echelons of the civil service. 
The strike also exposed the existence of divisions among the trade 
union leadership, between the militant and moderate factions.
Following the departure of Wallace-Johnson to national politics in 
1947, Grant and Georgestone came to regard themselves as the 
custodians of the militant tradition of the labour movement. As 
such, they took an uncompromising stand in fighting for what they 
regarded as workers’ rights and in stirring workers’ consciousness.
1 Interview with Marcus Grant, 16 January 1980; interview with 
H. N. Georgestone, 23 January 1980.
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The events which came to a head in February 1955 had begun
three months earlier when Grant and Georgestone - acting in close
collaboration - submitted an application for a general increase of
2/6 per diem on behalf of the members of their respective unions to
1
the Artisans and Transport JIGs on 2 and 5 November respectively.
At the time of the application, neither Grant nor Georgestone had
much faith in the formal procedures of bargaining as a means of
effecting a ’fair’ increase in wage rates. It had become evident
over the years that the JICs and Wages Boards had been deliberately
designed to ensure that the government (through its -officials at
the Department of Labour) was involved in wage settlements in both
the private- and public sectors. As an employer of artisans and of
transport workers, the government was also directly represented on
the Artisans and Transport JIGs. A cost-conscious government was
obviously concerned to exploit these arrangements in order to effect
moderate wage settlements (see Table 2.1).
The original claim for 2s.6d. per diem by Grant and Georgestone
2
was deliberately set so as to provide a margin for bargaining.
Indeed, at a meeting of the Transport JIG on 2 December 1951? 
Georgestone indicated that he would be willing to settle for ls.6d.
3
A week later, Marcus Grant also reduced his claim to this amount.
The employers, on the other hand, initially offered 2d. at the 
Transport JIG and 3d, at the Artisans JIC, this later being increased 
to Id. for the Freetown area and 3d. elsewhere. The accuracy of 
the cost of living index was challenged by the employers. Georgestone,
1 Sierra Leone National Archive, Ministry of Labour, ’Chronological 
Summary of Events from November 1951 to February 1955’, p.l.
2 Interview with Marcus Grant, 16 January 1980.
3 ’Chronological Summary of Events*..’.
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while conceding that the index was based on the projections of the 
Labour Department and that no price survey had been undertaken since 
194.2, nonetheless argued that '...their claim was a general one, and 
not based on points, and took account of the rise in prices generally’. 
When the employers contended at the Artisan JIG that they would be 
willing to negotiate further after a review of the index, Grant
declared that ’...negotiations should be regarded as closed...the
2
workers would see how they would make their presence felt*.
Following this impasse, pressure was brought to bear on the two union 
leaders to take their claims to arbitration. Grant has since 
explained that their refusal to go to arbitration was due to the 
fact that any award made by the tribunal was legally enforceable 
and they failed to see how a ’fair’ settlement could be reached when
3
the arbitrators were Labour Department officials. No less a person 
than the member of the Margai cabinet with responsibility for the 
Labour Department, Siaka Stevens, himself a former moderate union 
leader, repeatedly urged Grant and Georgestone to allow a tribunal 
to review the impasse. His exhortations were ignored.^ A joint 
mass meeting of the Artisan and Transport unions voted overwhelmingly 
for the talcing of strike action, and accordingly a fourteen-day strike 
notice was served on. employers on 21 January. Once the decision to 
take strike action had become official, more pressure was put on the 
two union leaders to go to arbitration. The president of the 
national trade union centre, the Sierra Leone Council of Labour,
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid, p.2.
3 Interview with Marcus Grant, 16 January 1980,
4 'Chronological Summary of Events...’, p.2.
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J, Akinola Wright, wrote to Grant and Georgestone urging them to'
call off the strike:
'In thinking about strike, we must consider 
the varied repercussions and the many 
implications involved; then, as one who also 
knows the inside stuff of the trade unions 
in Sierra Leone, I wonder whether anyone 
knowing as I do would seriously think that 
there is any wisdom in calling a strike 
without first going through all the 
formalities...it is the usual course for 
such matters to be referred to a tribunal... 
this is the usual procedure even in the 
United Kingdom...As leaders of workers, I 
feel it is your duty to educate them on 
right lines and do not allow them to force 
your hands to do anything that would make 
them suffer more than they feel at present.
Then it is a fact that the trade union 
movement in Sierra Leone had always been 
acclaimed as the best throughout the British 
colonies; if that is true it could not have 
been due to anything more than the serious 
way in which matters have been dealt with 
in the past, and while I will not hesitate 
to support any steps suggested to assist 
workers where I am reasonably convinced,
I will refrain from doing anything that will 
bring discredit on the workers and make them 
suffer...but I must express my disappointment 
and disapproval of the method you are adopting 
at the present time and therefore consider it 
my duty to implore you to stop and think the 
matter all over again as it seems to me that 
up to the present time there is nothing to 
justify going on strike.'1
In addition,, the Railway Workers' Union executive wrote to Siaka
Stevens to dissociate themselves from the strike:
'Those persons who appear to have subscribed 
their signatures to the Strike Notice in 
question did so as individuals on their own 
and not as representatives of the Railway 
Workers1 Union.12
1 Ibid, Appendix B, J. Akinola Wright to Comrades Grant and
Georgestone, 21 January 1955.
2 Ibid, Appendix E, D. A. Lottman and eight others to the Hon.
S. P. Stevens, 25 January 1955*
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The Secretary of the Maritime and Waterfront Workers' Union, into 
which stevedores in the employ of the shipping companies were organised, 
reported to the Labour Department that 'he had recently tried to 
dissuade Grant from going through with his strike but that Grant 
remained intractable and even antagonistic'.^
By the end of January, it became clear that Wallace-Johnson was
a key adviser to the two unions and that he had done much work behind
2the scenes regarding the strategy to be adopted. A week before the
strike notice was due to expire, Siaka Stevens appointed a Board of
Inquiry under the chairmanship of Mr. R. B. Marke, a Freetown barrister,
to examine the causes and circumstances of the deadlock in the
negotiations at the JIGs. The other members of the Board were Reverend
Solomon Caulker, a philosophy lecturer at Fourah Bay College, and
3
Mr. H. E. T. Hodgson, a retired civil servant. The Board began to 
consider the evidence almost immediately, while Stevens and his
officials at the Labour Department made frantic efforts to persuade
the two union leaders to have the matter decided by a tribunal or to • 
reduce their claim. Following consultations with the membership of 
their unions, Grant and Georgestone agreed to reduce their claim.
At a joint meeting of the two JICs on 2 February, the notice was 
withdrawn and the two. leaders indicated that they would be prepared
to settle at lOd. per diem. The employers felt able to increase
their offer to 6d., resulting in another deadlock.^ The workers’ 






increase of l O d . T w o  days later, a joint mass meeting of the two 
unions was held and the membership informed of these developments. 
Workers again came out in favour of a stoppage. Accordingly, a three- 
day notice was served on employers on 6 February. The government 
responded by putting out a statement declaring that any action by 
government employees would be regarded as a ’break in service’ and
that long-service employees would therefore stand to lose gratuity,
2
pension rights, and other benefits.
The 6,353 members of the Artisans Union and the 1,160 members 
of the Transport Union came out on strike as planned on 9 February 
and were joined unofficially by workers in Freetown and other parts 
of the provinces. Working behind the scenes, politicians made 
desperate efforts to undermine the protest action. On the second 
day of the stoppage, Grant wrote to Siaka Stevens that ’certain 
ministers had been trying to undermine the strike through tribal
3
rulers’. On the third day of the strike, however, riots, looting, 
and running street battles with security personnel occurred. There 
were several casualties among civilians and the security forces (see 
Table 2.7). The homes of .three cabinet ministers, Siaka Stevens,
M. S. Mustapha, and Albert Margai, were ransacked and looted.^
Shaken by the violence and stunned by the determination and vehemence 
of the strikers, Grant and Georgestone agreed to call off the stoppage 
after consultations with their advisers, several politicians, and 
prominent citizens. Stevens immediately announced the setting up of 
a conciliation committee to resolve the deadlock.^
1 Ibid.





Meanwhile the Board of Inquiry under Mr. R. 3. Marke had reported
to the Ministry of Labour. The Board concluded that there were three
reasons for the initial deadlock. It agreed that there was a
necessity for a substantial increase in wage rates as a result of
the fall in the value of real wages. It criticised the Labour
Department for having failed to undertake a cost of living survey in
recent years, or to conduct adequate research on the reaction of
ordinary workers to rising prices. The report also pointed out
that, under the existing legislation, the decision to go to arbitration
was, contrary to the widespread - supposition, a voluntary one and not
a legal requirement.^ The Marke Report has never been published. In
a press statement of 18 February, the government explained that since
a commission of inquiry was being appointed which would include within
its terms of reference the same questions as the Board of Inquiry
had considered, its report would not be published ’since to do_so
2
would pre-judge part of the report of the major commission1*
At the conciliation committee, agreement could not be reached. 
Grant and Georgestone therefore opted not to pursue their claims but 
to wait until the cost of living survey had been undertaken.. The 
employers however agreed to pay an ex-gratia award of 6d. per diem* 
’which will continue--to be paid unless or until superceded by a
3
larger increase following the review of the cost of living’.
1 The Marke Report* p.19.
2 ’Chronological Summary of Events...’, p.10; on 10 July 1980,
this researcher showed Marcus Grant a copy of The Marke Report 
which had been obtained from the Sierra Leone National Archive 
at Fourah Bay College, Grant, who had never seen it but had all 
along rightly believed that the report was broadly supportive 
of his case, was visibly moved, and exclaimed, ’after 25 yearsi’









SOURCE: The Shaw Report* p.32,
A Cambridge University economist, Mr, Reddaway, was flown out to
Freetown to carry out the survey which was published as a ’movement
of retail prices’. A joint session of the two JICs was convened on
17 June 1955 at which agreement was reached for an award of Is, per
diem to be back-dated to. 1. February#The government had earlier
rescinded its decisions that all strikers in its employ were to lose
2their gratuity, pensions, and other benefits.
The commission of inquiry under Sir John Shaw, a senior official 
at Whitehall, began its sittings in March 1955 and reported in May.
The commission acknowledged that 'there is no question that there has 
been an increase in the cost of living’, and noted the Videspread
3
dissatisfaction with the official cost of living index1. Nevertheless,
1 Sierra Leone, Annual Report of the Labour Department 1955, pp.9-10.
2 The Shaw Report, p.41.
3 Ibid, p.7.
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dismissing the arguments of Grant and Georgestone against going to 
arbitration, the commission blamed them for intransigence and lack 
of good faith:
'.••it is tragic that within the youthful 
trade union movement in Sierra Leone, so 
much authority should be concentrated in 
the hands of a man as ambitious, unscrupulous, 
and worthless as Marcus Grant. So long as he 
remains where he is the interests of the 
workers, and incidentally of the community 
at large will not be well served. Mo doubt 
there are good and potentially good trade 
union leaders in Sierra Leone. Some of them 
we saw and heard... While we do not exonerate 
Georgestone altogether, we do not attribute ■ 
to him a major share of the responsibility 
of the strike and its consequences. Indeed, 
we do not exclude him from the number of 
potentially good trade union leaders.'1
Both Grant and Georgestone have said that the report was a 'whitewash'
2of the real facts of the situation. There is no doubt that the rank 
and file of both unions were solidly behind the leadership, and indeed 
precipitated the crisis. Representatives of the Labour Department 
were invited to a meeting of the Artisan Union at which the report 
was discussed, and, according to the Department, 'no doubt should be 
left in anybody's mind that the report was very bitterly received, 
and the workers strongly resented its contents and recommendations.
The overcrowded .and excited audience would not accept the adverse 
criticism contained in the report of their leader, Mr. Marcus Grant, 
and enthusiastically moved a unanimous vote of confidence in him'.
The report also considered the violence which had occurred during
1 Ibid. p.4-8.
2 Interview with Marcus Grant, 16 January 1980; interview with 
H. Mi Georgestone, 23 January 1980.
3 Department of Labour Annual Report. 1955, P«9.
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the riots. Regarding the use of firearms by the security forces 
after an emergency had been declared, it contended, perhaps 
insensitively, that 'responsibility for the consequence, fatal or 
otherwise of these savage riots rests with those who instigated, 
organised and participated in them; it does not rest with the police 
to whom the law abiding citizens of Freetown owe a debt of gratitude.
The strike was significant for several reasons. As an essentially
economistic response to declining real wages, it demonstrated the
determination of lower paid workers to defend their standard of living.
It served notice to the African heirs of state power from the British
that workers reserved the right to defend their interests as they
perceived them. Unlike the railway strikes of 1919 and 1926 and the
crisis associated with the activities of the Youth League in which
nationalist sentiments played some considerable part in fuelling the
furore, the 1955 strike was primarily a protest against the straight-
jacket into which the new institutions of collective bargaining had
constrained wage negotiations. After the introduction of Wages Boards
and the JIGs, it had become the custom and practice for wage
.settlements reached at the two JIGs for artisans and transport
workers to be taken as the minimum wage rates for skilled and
unskilled workers throughout the country. The JIGs being 'wage
leaders' in this respect, explains the profound interest of lower
paid workers not employed as artisans or in the transport industry
in the negotiations preceding the strike, and the spontaneity with
which they joined (against the advice of the leaders of their unions)
2
in the action. The events of February 1955 therefore exposed the
1 The Shaw Report, p.35.
2 Interview with Pa Hamilton, 31 March 1982; interview with
C. A. Wilton During (shop steward of the Clerical and Mercantile 
Workers' Union at the French firm, Societe Compagnie Afrique
P.T.O.
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conservatism and detachment of the majority of union leaders whose
cooperative posture had been responsible for the failure of wages to
keep pace with the cost of living,1 Anxious to preserve their newly
found 'respectability1, the trade union leadership (most of whom had
come to prominence by being Youth League activists) had worked
assiduously to maintain industrial peace during the decade following
the end of the war*
Arguably, the strike was also a demonstration of resentment at
the evident and increasing prosperity of cabinet ministers and senior
civil servants* It is significant that the homes of three ministers
were singled out for attack during the disturbances:
'An ugly feature of the events on the 11th
February was the attack on the houses of
certain Ministers which took place in the
early evening of that day* In point of time 
the first house to be attacked was that of 
the Honourable Siaka Stevens the Minister of 
Lands, Mines, and Labour* At about 4 P*m* 
two small crowds moved along Fort Street 
breaking lamps and stoning houses* They 
passed No. 33> the Minister's house, but 
on reaching the end joined forces. There 
was evidence which we accept that one man
then pointed out the Minister’s house and
they returned and singled it out for 
concentrated stoning. Some penetrated into 
the compound and subsequently stole from 
the compound some personal belongings which 
the family had collected to take to a 
neighbour’s house where they sought refuge...
At about 5 p.m. a large crowd of about 100 
attacked the house in Third Street of the 
Honourable Sanusi Mustapha, the Minister of •
Works and Transport, with sticks and stones.
On their way to the house they were overheard 
that they would kill the Minister if he could
Occidentals, SCOA, during the strike), 13 April 1982.
1 At the time of the strike, the Railway Workers1 Union was trying 
to organise dock workers at the new quay. This was aborted when 
the workers realised that the union leadership, including D. A. 
Lottman who was also president of the national union centre, 
the Council of Labour, were vehemently opposed to the strike. 
(Interview with Pa Hamilton, 31 March 1982).
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be got at. ’./hen told he was not there, the 
crowd ultimately moved off announcing that 
they were going to the house of 'Minister 
Margai1...Later, between 5 P*m, and 6 p.m., 
a crowd advanced down Bathurst Street from 
Pademba Road and proceeded to stone the house 
of the Honourable A. M. Margai, the Minister 
of education, in Westmoreland Street. All the 
windows were broken.'1
That strike action was undertaken to secure increases, in real 
wages which had been 'squeezed' at the institutions of collective 
bargaining during the post-war years is beyond dispute. It is also 
very clear, however, that lower paid workers resented the prosperity 
of prominent politicians, some of whom had been known only a few 
years before to be men of very moderate means but could now be 
distinguished by conspicuous display of the symbols and paraphernalia 
of increased wealth and status. Nonetheless, the sociological 
processes (even then only gradually unfolding) underlying the 
articulation of political interests at the national level during this 
period of decolonisation (and also indeed in the post-colonial state), 
suggest that lower paid workers (and peasants) would take action to 
defend their economic interests, and at the same time identify with '
1 The Shaw Report, p.31; that Marcus Grant was personally blamed for 
the violence during the strike by the commission is a travesty of 
grotesque proportions. The commission not only failed to perceive 
the changing social structure in Sierra Leone - stemming from the 
expansion of wage employment in the urban areas (cf. Chapter 1), 
and the expansion of commercial agricultural production- in the 
rural areas - but also failed to understand, or view with any 
sympathy, the aspirations towards a reasonable standard of living 
among urban wage earners or the peasantry. As such, the commission 
could not anticipate the peasant riots which occurred a year later 
in November 1956, when peasant farmers in several parts of the 
country, but more particularly in the no them province, engaged in 
riots during which the homes of chiefs and public buildings were 
damaged. The immediate cause of the riot was the decision of the 
Ministry of Local Government headed by Albert Margai to increase 
taxation of peasant farmers. This, coupled with the regular 
extortionate demands of some chiefs and other local 'big men', 
spurred the peasants to riot. (Cf. Report of the Commissioners of 
Enquiry into the Conduct of Certain Chiefs and Government's 
Statement Thereon, Freetown n.d., circa 1957).
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their respective communal groups in political (or electoral) competition.
Herein lies an apparent contradiction between the manifestation by
lower paid workers of resentment at the inequities of the mode of
appropriation and distribution of social wealth, and their contribution
to the maintenance, even reinforcement, of the conditions upon which
neo-patrimonal political leadership thrives, and from which they (as
a group) are not even significant beneficiaries. This contradiction
is clearly evident from analysis of the general elections of. 1957 when .
they neglected a convincing Labour Party alternative*
Six political parties contested the 1957 elections from which
the ruling SLPP emerged the winner. While the unrest in Freetown and
other centres of relatively large-scale wage employment, and in the
countryside during the last two years of Dr. Margai's first
administration of 1951-57, might have suggested that the ruling party
would receive a battering at the polls, the SLPP was in fact able to
1
increase its majority. The SLPP fielded candidates in 38 of the 
39 constituencies, winning 25 seats including 9 in the Freetown area.
The opposition NCSL which did not in any case stand a chance in the 
provinces, fielded only ten candidates in the Freetown area, all of 
whom were unsuccessful. The United People's Party (UPP) which drew 
its leadership from Krio and provincial elites, but of a more 'radical' 
orientation, especially on the question of imperialism, and included 
Wallace-Johnson among its leadership, fielded 13 candidates in 
Freetown and the provinces, five of whom were successful including 
two in provincial constituencies. The Kono Progressive Movement (KPM),
. 1 Cf. D. J. R. Scott, 'The Sierra Leone Election of May 1957', in 
W. J, M. Mackenzie and K, Robinson, (eds.), Five Elections in 
Africa, Oxford, I960, pp.181-182. The rest of this account of 
the election results is taken from this study.
-  114 -
a party confined to the diamond-rich Kono district, and whose 
leadership resented the collaboration of some members of the Kono 
elite in the exploitation of this resource from which ordinary Konos 
had not derived much benefit, won one of the two Kono seats it 
contested.1 ihe Sierra Leone Independence Movement (SLIM), under 
the leadership of Edward Blyden III (a descendant of the-,nineteenth- 
century luminary bearing the same name) which purported to be a 
nationalist party, lost all four of the Freetown seats it contested. 
The Labour Party, which had Marcus Grant among a leadership, mainly of 
Krio lawyers and intellectuals,-and which professed a reformist 
socialist ideology, lost all six Freetown seats contested. Eight 
•independent1 candidates won seats in various parts of the country.
In nearly all the cases, these candidates were members of local 
influential families*
.2
There are several-reasons for the SLPP's success. Exploiting
its advantage of incumbency to the full, the SLPP was able to present
a convincing image of its own inevitable victory to an enlarged but
3still restricted franchise. Only this party had the resources to- 
field candidates in a majority of the constituencies. By drawing 
upon its patronage relations with a network of local ’big men’ in 
various parts of the-country, the SLPP was able to mobilise support
1 Cf. V. Minikin, ’Local Level Politics in Kono District, Sierra 
Leone, 1945-70’.
2 This account of the reasons for the SLPP’s success is greatly 
indebted to William Fitzjohn’s autobiography, Ambassador of 
Christ and Caesar, which is perhaps the only memoir that has been 
written by a post-war Sierra Leonean politician. Other literature 
on politics in Sierra Leone, particularly the works of Kilson and 
Cartwright, have also been useful.
3 Property qualifications were removed but the entry to the franchise 
confined to adult males who had previously not had the vote. (Cf.
D. J. R. Scott, ’The Sierra Leone Election of May 1957’).
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as the party which had a truly national following, and therefore
contributed most to ’nation-building1. It campaigned on the theme
of ’one country, one people’, this slogan - easily translated into
other Sierra Leonean languages - having been adopted as its motto.
This particularly impressed the British administrators supervising
the devolution of power. The SLPP, however, was neither a mass party,
nor did its leadership espouse populist causes. It presented itself
as the party which can maintain law and order. ’Dr. Margai made
speeches saying that his government had taken a tough stance during
the strike and provincial riots and that he has shown the British
that the black man can rule himself’.1 During the campaign, the SLPP
leadership dismissed the other parties as not having a comparable
’ 2wide base of support. The NCSL was derided as the ’Krio man party’;
the UPP as a party of agitators; and the Labour Party as a party with
an irresponsible leadership. SLIM and the KPM were thought to be
3
too small to warrant much attention. At the constituencies, SLPP 
candidates, in most cases ’sons of the soil’, openly appealed to 
ethnic loyalties and at the same time presented an image of the 
party .as being best placed -to look after the ’national interest’.
Thus the SLPP won the 1957 elections by being able to demonstrate 
convincingly that it could win, and by mobilising communal support 
through its network of clientele at the local level. The mobilisation
1 Interview with Marcus Grant (himself a candidate of the Labour 
Party at the elections), 10 February 1982.
2 When these elections were discussed with dock workers who had 
voted in ’57, most said that they voted for the SLPP because 
*nar the party dat wey bin dae for all man’ (it was the party 
of all sections of the country). Informal conversations with 
Dock workers, February 1982*
3 Interview with Marcus Grant, 10 February 1982.
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of support along such lines cuts across what might be termed 'objective 
class interests'. Marcus Grant correctly perceives this as the 
reason for the rapid evaporation of the idealism behind the formation 
of the Labour Party and its subsequent demise (and the lost deposits) 
at the elections.1
Inspite of the manifestations of a fairly developed-,proletarian
consciousness by Freetown and other wage earners in Sierra Leone in
1955, this could not find expression in the form of a party which
stood little chance of winning. Thus the post-colonial pattern of
political competition which is quite literally a struggle (and more
often than not, a violent struggle) for access to the resources of
the state and the institutions of state power, which, in turn, are
used to maintain the system of patron clientelism, became established
2
during the period of decolonisation. In the years that lay ahead, 
the resilience of neo-patrimonal leadership - in particular its 
ability to survive periodical manifestations of factionalism by 
cliques close to the leader, and its ability to renew and extend the' 
network of clientele - was to have severe repercussions on the 
efficiency of management of the public sector, and on efforts at 
economic development. For lower paid workers in the urban areas in.
1 Ibid; but it should also be noted that the proportion of urban 
inhabitants employed as wage earners in Sierra Leone is' 
relatively small.
2 Arguably, all political and electoral competition is a struggle 
for access to the resources of the state and the institutions of 
state power. The crucial point of distinction here is that a 
victorious party in a western democracy for example, is accountable 
(in the accountant’s sense of the word) for its custody and use
of the resources of the state. Under a neo-patrimonal regime, 
institutionalised means of accountability can be shown to have 
been fragile, and moreover, access to the state is used primarily 
to maintain the system of patron-clientelism. As such, the 
legitimacy of a neo-patrimonal regime is tenuous in a way the 
legitimacy of a government in a Western democracy is not.
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general, and public enterprise in particular, patron-clientelism has 
become one of two channels that could be used to effect improvement 
in their living standards. The other has been aggressive bargaining 
at the work place through their trade union organisations. These 
two strategies are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they will be 
shown to have been complementary in this study. Modern trade 
unionism in Sierra Leone has therefore evolved over the years to be 
accommodated within a political context of neo-patrimonal leadership.
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SECTION 2
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC OPERATIONS OF THE PORT ORGANISATION 
IN THE COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL STATES
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CHAPTER 3
The development of a small-sized modem port In Freetown: The port 
organisation as a semi-autonomous public enterprise 1954-65
In May 1954* Deep Water Quay, providing berthing facilities for
ocean going vessels and modem cargo handling installations, was
officially opened. Significantly perhaps, the 'M. V. Aureol’, a 'mail
boat1 talcing its name from the beautiful mountain peak overlooking the
port, and belonging to the fleet of Elder Dempster - the shipping
organisation which had dominated the West African trade - was chosen
as the ship to be berthed alongside the quay at the official opening.1
The provision of modem port facilities had been made possible by the
gradual change in policy at the Colonial Office at Whitehall towards
investment in capital formation in the colonies which began in the
late ’twenties, and received added stimulus from the Keynesian
revolution in economic thought during the inter-war years. The
colonial authorities however, still cautious, and still reluctant to
extend the public sector, continued to utilise existing administrative
apparatus - the Railway Administration - to supervise the management
of the new port. The ethos of strict bureaucratic accountability in
the practice of British colonial administration was to be maintained.
A report commissioned by the authorities on the organisation of the
quay had recommended that:
’....the quay and its ancilliary facilities 
should be placed under and operated by one 
centrally controlled organisation. It must 
be managed on business lines...’2
1 Ocean Transport Archives 740/1* ’Queen Elizabeth II Quay, Freetown’, 
Sea. Journal of Elder Dempster Lines Ltd.. Vol I, No 2, July 1954* 
The new quay was officially named ’Queen Elizabeth II Quay1, but is 
more popularly known in Sierra Leone as ’Deep Water Quay’.
2 Sierra Leone, Sessional Paper No 1 of 1946, Report of a Committee on 
Proposals to Build a Deep Water Quay at Freetown, p.5.
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This chapter examines the performance of the port organisation 
as a semi-autonomous public enterprise between 1954 and 1965, when a 
fully autonomous public corporation was created by an indigenous 
government. It begins by discussing the administrative and organisational 
structure that emerged to provide the modem port services before going 
on to discuss the economic and commercial policy adopted '-by the port 
management. A third section examines the reactions of lower paid 
workers to their employment by the port organisation.
The provision of modem port services
A year before the opening of the new quay, a port manager was 
appointed to head the Port Management Department (as the port organisation 
was known) which had been created at the end of the war as a branch of 
the Railway Administration. He was E. P. G. Gillespie, who arrived in 
Freetown in March 1953* Some of the longer serving dock workers 
remember Gillespie as a cherry-red-faced Englishman who, during a tour 
lasting seven years, master minded the transition of the port from 
little more than a river roadstead to a small-sized modem organisation.
A retired corporation secretary who had worked with Gillespie as a 
clerical assistant remembered him. as personable, eloquent, versed in
i;
matters pertaining to port economics, and a competent administrator.
At the new quay, the Port Management Department was to be responsible 
for a system of master-porterage (receiving cargo at ship’s tackle and 
delivery to consignees, and vice versa), while the shipping companies 
and agents continued to be responsible for stevedoring (or the handling 
of cargo on board the ship itself) and lighterage (the removal of 
cargo from ship anchored at mid-stream to shore). The Railway
1 Interview with M. B. Bennett, 14 January 1980
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Administration provided maintenance and managerial services. Ministerial 
responsibility for the port resided in the Department of Works and 
Transport which was first created in 1951 at the beginning of the 
Margai ministry of 1951-57 (cf. Diagram 3*1)• The labour used in cargo 
handling was provided by the port labour pool administered by the 
Labour Department (cf. Chapter 1). It was from this pool that the 
shipping companies and the Port Management Department drew stevedore 
and dock labour respectively.
Gillespie recognised that the provision of berthing facilities at 
the new quay should be matched by an efficient system of cargo handling 
which would facilitate the speedy turn round of ships. He further 
recognised that the easy approach to the harbour provided by the 
estuary of the Rokel could be exploited if shipping traffic along the 
coast could be encouraged to call at Freetown to take bunkers, water 
and other provisions, in much the same way as Las Palmas in the Canaries 
had become a major fuelling station for shipping traffic on the Atlantic 
side^of the African Coast.1 In sum, Gillespie aimed to provide varied 
and efficient services at the port, while adopting a commercial policy 
'that would enable the Port Management Department to cover its 
operating costs. The evidence at the port archive suggests that 
the administration of the port during these early years was based on 
three principles, viz: first, the formulation of port policy was to 
be the preserve of the department; second, in a labour-intensive 
industry such as cargo handling, effective control was to be maintained 
over the labour force; and third, a variety of services were to be 
offered at the port.
1 Ibid.
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One of* the first decisions taken by Gillespie after his
appointment as port manager was to recommend the ’watering down’
of the status of the Port Advisory Committee (cf. Chapter 1) which
had since the war-time emergency become the main forum for the
formulation of port policy. While recognising the need for a forum
at which port users could make representations vis a vis port services,
Gillespie, realising that the interest of the users and the Port
Management Department were not congruent, sought to reduce its influence
on policy matters. In a memorandum to the General Manager of the
Railway Administration, the port manager argued his case forcibly:
’Now that the quay is nearing completion 
and the organisation required for its 
operation and the master porterage system 
is'being finalised, it is considered that 
the status and functions of the Port 
Advisory Committee should be reviewed...
Much of the time of the committee had been 
taken up in the past with...operating and 
maintenance matters as the inevitable 
result of the lack of central management 
of port operations and in consequence as 
the only coordinating body concerned, the 
Committee has appeared, perhaps, to have 
been usurping normal departmental functions.
This situation will not obtain with the 
establishment of the Port Management 
organisation at the Queen Elizabeth II Quay, 
when all such matters can be resolved 
directly by the port manager with 
consultation as necessary with the Port 
Authority*
In the same memorandum, Gillespie outlined a new role for the
committee as a ' consumer association1;
’It is however essential that the Port 
advisory body should assist in the framing 
of port regulations and charges, review 
port estimates and expenditure, and 
generally advise on matters concerning the 
efficiency of the port.’2
1 Port Authority Archive, Port Manager to General Manager Railway 
Administration, 9 December 1953*
2 Ibid.
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Shortly before the opening of the quay, the terms of reference of the 
committee were redefined and the Port Management Department assumed 
full responsibility for the formulation of port policy* Gillespie’s 
decision to reduce the influence of the committee was timely* Within 
a few years, port users had begun to protest against the increases in 
tariffs and other charges arising out of the department's periodic 
review* Nonetheless, a distinctive feature of the port organisation 
prior to the formation of a fully autonomous public corporation was 
that it was fully accountable to the major consumers of port services 
in addition to being accountable to the General Manager Railway, as 
Port Authority, and through that office, the Ministry of Works and 
Communications* These separate channels of accountability to consumers 
and to the civil bureaucracy were not, as we shall see, maintained in 
the post-1965 port organisation.
A second principle evident in the early years of the Fort- 
Management Department was concerned with the measures taken to secure 
the effective regulation and control of the work force* Gillespie 
recognised that in a labour intensive industry such as cargo handling, 
a considerable proportion of operating costs could be constituted by 
wages and other benefits* Accordingly, he chose to make extensive 
use of the casual labour system under which stevedore and shore cargo 
handling labourers were dram from the labour pool administered by the 
Labour Department. These labourers received no benefits and were paid 
strictly for the number of hours worked. This same principle was 
extended to the ’white collar’ workers, that is to say, the large 
number of clerks engaged in the processing of documents related to 
the movement of cargo. They were paid on a daily basis and were 
denied the benefits associated with security of employment:
’The Port Manager pointed out that Government
did not favour the use of directly employed
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labour as such employees might well come 
to regard themselves as.permanently 
Government employed and press for leave, 
pension, and other benefits in line with 
other government departments.*1
Furthermore, Gillespie sought to introduce the partial mechanisation
of cargo handling* This involved the palletisation of cargo and the
use of fork-lift trucks and electric platform trucks to move relatively
large quantities. He recognised that the introduction of mechanisation
would reduce the number of labourers required, but eloquently argued
that economy and efficiency would be achieved:
•It may perhaps be argued that the introduction 
of mechanised handling will result in 
unemployment consequent upon the reduced 
labour force required, but it is submitted 
that in view of the general economic 
situation in Sierra Leone, it is imperative 
that maximum efficiency is achieved with 
lowest possible costs. In the event, the 
introduction of mechanical appliances will 
enable a smaller force of relatively skilled 
technicians to be created, trained in modem 
operating methods, to replace the present 
large numbers of casual labourers with only 
very limited knowledge of safe working 
methods. Redundant labour can in any case 
be more usefully diverted to productive 
employment in the provinces and the various 
development projects.’2
In the event mechanised handling was introduced; road building and
other development projects never absorbed dock workers since
competition for jobs in these sectors was extremely keen. The
hardship that resulted was however mitigated by an increasing tonnage
of cargo handled at the port, so that the number of placings made
by the labour pool in fact increased over this period, (cf• Tables
3.1 and 3*2). Nonetheless, the strategies of labour control adopted
by the department, and in particular the widespread use of the casual
1 Port Authority Archive, Port Manager to Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Works and communications, 21 May 1953.
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and daily wage systems, helped to increase the solidarity of dock 
workers. It was during this period, that the ’white collar1 dockers, 
denied the benefits enjoyed by their counterparts in other government 
departments became radicalised. It was this group of workers that 
master-minded the formation of the Dock Workers1 Union in 1963 which 
also embraced the shore cargo-handling labourers. ' These developments 
are discussed in Chapter 6.
The third principle which characterised these early years was the
provision of a variety of port services. Facilities for ships to take
oil bunkers and water were created. In view of the fact that only
three large ships could be berthed at the 1200 foot quay at any one
time, it was arranged for the provision of lighterage services to be
taken from the shipping companies. Suggestions were made to government
for the possible extension of the quay. Facilities for limited repair
to ships were provided by the Port and Marine Department under the
Harbour Master. During the Suez Canal crisis of 1957, these services
provided at Freetown were greatly in demand by ships forced to take
the longer route round the West African Coast to the Cape, the Near
■East, and the Far East: •
’The installation of oil bunkering 
facilities...in addition to being of 
considerable advantage to existing port 
users, in view of the closure of the ‘
Suez Canal it is proved of inestimable 
value to international shipping...
Considerable additional revenue has 
naturally also accrued from these extra 
bunkering operations. *1
By this time, the port of Freetown had come a long way from 
the facilities it possessed during the laissez-faire years before
1 Port Authority Archive, Governor’s Annual Address, 25 January
1957; (notes on the activities of the Port Management Department 
prepared by the Port Manager for the governor’s annual review of 
the work of government at the Legislative Council)'.
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TABLE 3 a
Dock Workers registered and, total number of vacancies filled. Port 
Harbour Labour Pool










Excludes stevedore labourers who were not in the employ 
of the Port Management Department* "
N.A.: Not available (it has not been possible to locate a 
copy of the 1958 Labour Report),















SOURCE: Port Authority Archive, Annual Returns of Tonnage
of cargo handled*
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V/orld War II* One of the effects of this modernisation vas that the
Port Authority had full control over port services and the opportunity
to adopt a commercial policy to fully exploit the new facilities* The
role of the shipping companies was transformed from being providers of
port services to being consumers* Indeed this was the expectation of
the committee which reported on the organisation of the -port in 1946;
* The central operation (of the port)**.* 
ensures that a shipping firm does not 
obtain a monopoly in handling cargo and is 
thus able to charge high handling rates 
which discourage ships other than those 
owned by the firm in question, thus leading 
to a monopoly of shipping using the port, 
and consequently leading to high freight 
charges on Sierra Leone exports to the 
detriment of the trade of the country*
Only by all operations being conducted by 
the (port) management can rates on charges 
be kept to a minimum and the maximum 
encouragement be given to shipping to use 
the port.
With the provision of port services in the public sector the
shore operations of foreign shipping firms operating in West Africa
were significantly reduced and their company structures rationalised.
In the case of Elder Dempster, Davies has written;
!The net effect of these changes is that 
Elder. Dempster now has little direct business 
within West Africa, and even its subsidiary 
companies play a much smaller role than in 
the pre-war days.T2
1 Sessional Paper No 1 of 1946, Report of a Committee on Proposals
to Build a Deep Water Quay at Freetown, p*5-
2 Cf. P. N. Davies, The Trade Makers* p* 364; Dr. Davies elaborated
on this point during an interview at Liverpool on 12 February 1981. 
Since the nationalisation of stevedoring in 1971 (the provision of 
stevedore services was taken over by the government owned Sierra 
Leone National Shipping Company; in 1979 responsibility for 
stevedoring was transferred to the Port Authority - see Chapter 4) 
the shipping companies now undertake purely agency work in respect 
of ships owned by their companies* There has also been a' tendency 
for companies to pool their resources by establishing jointly 
owned agencies, as in the case of the United Africa Company-Palm 
Line and Ocean Transport-ELder Dempster which set up the Sierra 
Leone Shipping Agencies in 1965, or for one agency to represent 
several shipping companies. (Interview with Christian Cole,
General Manager Sierra Leone Shipping Agencies, 14 February 1980). 
Sierra Leone does not own any ocean-going vessels although a brief
P.T.O.
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Following the opening of the international airport at Lungi across 
the estuary in 1962, a ferry service was introduced to link the capital 
and the airport* The initial costs were borne by government while 
the department was expected to meet the operational costs."*"
The commercial policy of the Port Management department
The commercial policy set out by government for the department
was that it must operate as a T quasi-commercial• organisation* That
is to say, the port was expected to pay its way:
•The beginning of the period under review 
was a continuation of the final planning 
phase in the change-over of the port of 
Freetown from a lighterage port with 
operations performed by private commercial 
interests to a deep water berth port with 
all shore handling operations provided by 
a self-contained quasi-commercial Port 
Management Branch attached to the Railway 
Administration under the General Manager,
Railway, as Port Authority.•2
As a ’quasi-commercial1 organisation, the Port Management Department'
was expected to meet its operational costs (including depreciation of
capital - both the physical port entity as well as the mechanical
installations). The port was therefore not expected to make a return
to the government on the capital originally invested. Gillespie, the
port manager, regarded the £2 million investment in quay construction
foray into international shipping was made in the early 
•seventies without much success.
1 National Workshop Archive, Draft Gazette Notice, Opening of 
Freetown-Targrin Vehicle Ferry, January 1962.
2 Port Authority Archive, Governor’s annual address, 8 October 
1954; (notes on the activities of the Port Management Department 
prepared by the port manager for the governor’s annual review
of the work of government at the Legislative Council).
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as an investment in capital formation with benefits accruing to the
whole nation. Thus port policy was not geared towards obtaining
adequate returns on the total cost of port operations (i.e. original
investment plus depreciation plus operating costs), but the long-term
average cost of port operations (i.e. depreciation plus operating costs).
In a reply to an inquiry from the Economist Intelligence-^Unit over port
commercial policy, Gillespie made the principle quite clear:
’.♦•Government have accepted in principle 
the need for the port to be self-accounting 
with appropriate renewals and betterment 
funds. ..’I-
During these early years the principle was fully applied and
the expenditure borne by the port in the course of its operations was
covered by its revenue (see Table 3*3)• However, two problems soon
emerged with the policy. First, the authorities began to use the
profits from the port to subsidise the Railway Administration of
which the department was a branch:
’...to date, earnings in excess of ordinary 
working expenditure have actually been 
credited to general revenue and used to 
reduce the amount of subvention payable 
annually from general revenue to meet 
the working expenditure of the Railway.’*1
Second, while the whole range of port services actually included the
regulation of shipping traffic provided by the Port and Marine
Department under the Harbour Master, stevedoring provided by the
shipping companies, and storage accommodation in warehouses for which
rental was paid to the Customs Department, the Port Management
Department had jurisdiction only over shore handling operations and
1 Port Authority Archive, Gillespie to E. E. Pollock, The -Economist 




’As I feel sure you will agree, comparison 
of merely Port Management revenue and 
expenditure figures fails of course to give 
a complete picture of the economics of port 
working here and it is essential that both 
the marine and shore working be included in 
one single port account if a properly 
balanced statement of overall working is to 
be seen. Similarly, items such as Queens 
Warehouse rent at present credited to 
Customs revenue should properly accrue to 
port revenue.. .' 1
Since port operations were not fully integrated, there was a
’leakage’ of revenue away from the department, quite apart from the
deliberate, policy of the authorities of subsidising the railway out
of revenue accrued by the department. On the other hand, management
and maintenance services were provided by the Railway Administration
and no direct change made to the department. On the formation of a
public corporation ial965, all these services were integrated with
the exception of stevedoring, which continued to be provided by the
shipping companies until it was nationalised in 1971. During these
early years therefore, the Port Management Department had a narrower
range of services than later, from which it could derive its revenue.
Furthermore, the decisions taken by the department to provide a
lighterage service (to reduce the possibility of congestion at the
relatively short 1200 foot quay) financed by a £100,000 loan from the
2
Produce Marketing Board, and to mechanise cargo handling, imposed a 
considerable burden on its finances. In addition, the department, like 
all other employers, was forced to grant wage increases following the
1 Ibid.
2 Port Authority Archive, Memorandum by the Minister of Works and 
Transport and (by) the Financial Secretary (a document on the 
financing of the port lighterage service presented to the 
Executive Council) 27 July 1954*
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1955 strike. Salaries of more senior government officials were
increased following a special review by the Gorsuch Committee which
reported in 1957. These additional items of expenditure were
successfully passed on to the consumers of port services through
increased tariffs and a special levy, known as Quay Dues. At the
Port Advisory Committee, the consumers attempted to resist" the extra
levy but the monopoly position of the department made it a fait
accompli. The port manager as usual, however, was eloquent in his
defence of the increased charges:
’He (the port manager) realised of course
that the imposition of additional dues at
the present juncture would hardly be welcomed 
by the shipping companies, but it was 
imperative that the port should be economically 
self-supporting if it was to retain its* 
present virtual autonomy which was to the 
overall benefit of all port users. The port 
manager went on to explain the necessity 
for increasing the revenue of the port. Many 
factors had influenced the decision to -
impose Quay Dues such as the recent major 
wage awards to manual grades coupled with 
major increases to salaried staff consequent 
upon the Gorsuch Report; increased material 
costs. These coupled with the necessity for 
the port to operate as a self-supporting 
economic venture on strictly commercial lines, 
i.e., earnings needing to cover loan interest 
and redemption charges in addition to working 
expenditure including renewal contributions 
together with some provision for betterment, 
were such as to demand a complete re-assessment 
of existing rates.fl
During these early years of its operation as a semi-autonomous 
public enterprise, the Port Management Department successfully 
introduced modem port services while operating along ’quasi-commercial’ 
lines. The narrower range of services over which it had jurisdiction, 
stemming from the limited integration of these services, and the




Port Management Department revenue and expenditure 1933-64
YEAR REVENUE 
£ s . d
EXPENDITURE 
£ s d
1955 310,346.15. 1 205,871.16. 6
1956 385,284. 6. 4 281,144.18. 7
1957 465,793. 5. 3 354,132.10. 9
1958 478,586.10. 5 366,112. 2. 9
1959-60 486,697. 4. 5 351,333.14. 4
1960-1 532,894.12.10 344,837.13. 4
.1962^5 Lei,078,527 Le850,206
1963 Lei,045,622 LeSll, 019
1964 Lei,071,585 Le86l,321
(1) Figures for 1962-64 are given in Leones, the 
national currency, Le2 = £1 Sterling, a fixed 
rate of exchange until 1977, when the Leone was 
’floated* and now fluctuates (officially) 
between Le2,15 and Le2.50 to^£L Sterling,
SOURCE: .Port Authority Archive: Annual Financial Statements
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policy of subsidising the railway, made port revenues much lower than 
they otherwise would have been. Faced with these constraints, the 
department adopted an illiberal policy regarding wages and benefits 
of its employees, the majority of whom were employed on a daily wage 
and casual basis (see Table 3*4).
The reaction of dock workers to their employment by the Port Management 
Department: the failure of the Works Committee
Between 1959 and 1963, a Works Committee functioned at the 
department. A creation of the management, it was an attempt to 
provide a forum for continuous dialogue with workers on the routine 
and mundane issues relating to the performance of any large organisation 
(e.g. time-keeping, grievances, or productivity). As* a result of the 
chequered history of the organisational evolution of the port (c.f. 
Chapter 1), at the time of the centralisation of the management of the 
port and the centralisation of the employment of dock labour, there 
was no trade union into which dock workers in the employ of the 
department were organised* A small proportion of workers among the
artisan grades (deployed to the port to undertake civil and mechanical
\
maintenance work by the Railway Administration), had been members of 
the Railway Workers’ Union, but these withdrew their membership in
protest at the failure of the leadership of the union to support the
1 - 2 1955 strike. Another small group were members of the Artisans’ Union.
Since stevedoring had not been integrated with the other functions
of the department and continued to be undertaken by the shipping
1 Interview with Pa Karahke Limba 28 February 1980; aged about 63,
Pa Karanke had forty years behind him as a docker, and had been 
a member of the Works Committee. Gifted with a keen memory and 
great sensitivity in his perception of issues and events, as 
well as a great sense of humour, Pa Karanke offered a friendship 
which was of great value to the researcher.
2 Ibid.
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companies, the Maritime and Waterfront Workers’ Union, into which 
these workers were organised, operated outside the jurisdiction of 
the port management. Thus the 1,94-8 lower paid workers in the employ 
of the department or deployed by the Railway Administration in 1954- 
(Table 3.4-) were not organised into a central trade union. The Works 
Gommittee was therefore designed to fill the vacuum left by the 
absence of a trade union organisation to represent the dockers.
Before examining the working of the committee and its subsequent 
failure, the impact of the 1955 strike will be discussed.
Wages of shore cargo handlers in the employ of the Port Management 
Department and of stevedores in the employ of the shipping companies 
were fixed by a statutory Maritime Wages Board."*" It was the custom 
and practice for wage settlements reached at the Transport and Artisan 
JIGs to be taken as the minimum wage rates for skilled workers (and 
adjusted accordingly for unskilled workers such as port labourers)..
The fact that these bargaining bodies were 'wage leaders’ explains 
the profound interest of workers throughout the country in the 
negotiations proceeding the 1955 strike. At the Port, officials of 
the Railway Workers’ Union and the Maritime and Waterfront Workers’ 
Union dissociated themselves from the strike (c.f. Chapter 2) and in 
view of the widespread use of casual labour (and the associated job 
insecurity among the workers) sufficient dockers remained at work to 
enable the port to continue to function. Nonetheless, a significant 
number of dockers picketed the docks, causing much harassment and 
irritation to the port management. According to a report prepared by 
the port manager for the authorities:
1 The Laws of Sierra Leone. Cap. 220, ’Wages Boards', p. 1890-1.
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TABLE 3, A
Port Management Department work force 1954. and 1962
CATEGORY 1954- 1962
Salaried 4 0 ^ 76(3)
Daily wage 32q (1) 629 ^
Casual 1628^ 6052^
Total lower paid 194-8 6681
SOURCES
(1) Port Authority Archive, Governor’s Annual Address,
8 October 1954- (Notes prepared by the Port Manager 
on the activities of the Port for the governor!s_ 
annual review of the work of the administration at 
the Legislative Council).
(2) Sierra Leone, Annual Report of the Labour Department
1954- (excludes stevedores).
(3) Port Authority Archive, Work Force, March 1962.
(4-) Sierra Leone, Annual Report of the Labour Department
1962 (-this figure is the total number of dock 
labourers and stevedores registered at the labour 
pool)•
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'..•all staff were warned of the consequence 
of strike action by government employees and
1 was satisfied that sufficient men would 
remain loyal to carry on essential work...
Actual damage to port property consisted of 
broken windows at the labour recruiting 
centre and in the police box at the Main 
Gate and the cost of repair amounted to 
£12.0.Od* Owing to reduced working hours
in view of the disorders and the subsequent 
curfew, delays in the despatch of shipping 
probably amounted to a further £1,000. There 
was some loss of revenue to the port as a 
result of reduced output owing to the state 
of tension but it is impossible to calculate 
the amount of loss involved.
This experience was instructive to both the port management and
the dockers in their employ. The strike demonstrated to the
management the damage to the reputation of the port that might
result from such action among international shipping companies* This
was seen to be critical in view of recent attempts at modernisation
and reorganisation, and for the success of the strategy to make
Freetown an attractive port of call to shipping traffic on the West
2African coast. For the dockers, confidence in the leadership of the 
Railway and Maritime Unions was shaken and the necessity of a trade
3
union to represent their interest was demonstrated. The formation 
of an independent dock workers' union was a natural consequence, and 
indeed, the origins of the union have been said to lie in the lessons 
learnt from the strike*^ The management responded by seeking 
amendment to the existing labour legislation to allow the creation of
1 Port Authority Archive, The strike and subsequent disorders in
relation to the port of Freetown, n.d., circa March 1955*
2 Interview with M. B. Bennett, 14 January 1980.
3 Interview with Pa Karanke Limba, 28 February 1980.
4 Interview with Aziz Kassim, 6 March 1982.
- 139 -
an independent JIC for the port industry at which negotiations on
wages and working conditions could be undertaken. The introduction
of a Works Committee within the Port Management Department, at which
representatives of management and of the work force should deliberate
issues relating to the work process, was also planned. In his annual
Christmas message, the port manager informed workers of these plans:
’In the field of staff and labour relations, 
arrangements are well advanced for the 
establishment of a Works Committee to 
facilitate consultation between management 
and employees and for the setting up of a 
single Joint Industrial'Council to embrace . 
the whole port industry* It is also planned 
to obtain the services of an experienced 
Training Officer to draw up and supervise 
training schemes for all grades of employees***
I am confident that by continuing to work 
together as a team, we shall succeed in 
establishing a truly efficient port*..1!
2
The Works Committee held its first meeting on 27 January 1959*
Its elaborate constitution had been drawn- up to give management much
control over its deliberations* One clause made this provision:
’Ho other business than that appearing on 
the agenda shall be transacted at any 
meeting unless both sides agree to its 
introduction.T3
Another clause asserted that:
.’Workers’ representative shall hold office 
for a period of one year* At the end of the 
period, there shall be an election of 
workers’ representatives for the ensuing 
year. Any representatives leaving the 
employ of the department or resigning his 
position shall be replaced by a representative
1 Port Authority Archive, Christmas Message from the port manager, 
E. P* C. Gillespie, 24 December 1957*
2 Port Authority Archive, Port Management Works Committee,•Minutes 
of Inaugural Meeting, 27 January 1959.
3 Port Authority Archive, Port Management Works Committee, Objects 
and Constitution, n.d*
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of the section concerned, A member of the 
committee who is unable to attend any meeting 
is authorised to appoint a deputy from the 
section he represents,'1
The port management believed that by subjecting workers1 representatives
to frequent elections* 'agitators1 would have little chance of being
elected, thus ensuring a predominance of workers with moderate views 
2
on the committee. This requirement, however, was later to have the
unintended consequence of nurturing and fostering a democratic shop
stewards' movement after a dock workers' union had been formed*'
The chairmanship of the committee was to be the preserve of the
assistant port manager, as the port manager himself was to be seen
to be above bargaining between management and workers* At a rare
appearance at the.committee, Gillespie made this quite clear;
'The chairman then informed the meeting that 
he welcomed this opportunity of meeting the 
members of the Works Committee as although 
he had been responsible for initiating the 
machinery for establishing the committee, 
it had not, as they were aware, been finally 
established until after his departure on 
leave* They would appreciate that it would 
be only on rare occasions such as at present 
that he would attend such meetings and would 
normally be represented by the assistant 
port manager in order that he could deal 
with points raised by the committee as 
impartially as possible when they were 
ultimately referred to him in his official' 
capacity as port manager without being 
prejudiced by participating in the 
discussions. '3
In addition to these means of ensuring that the balance of power 
within the committee remained with management, provisions were made 
in the constitution for observers to attend meetings and witness
1 Ibid.
2 Interview with M* B. Bennett, 14 January 1980.
3 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of the Port Management Works 
Committee, 15 June 1959*
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agreements:
’Recognised officials of the Maritime and 
Waterfront Workers1 Union and the Labour 
Department may attend meetings of the Works 
Committee in an advisory capacity at the 
request of either side* *1
Anticipating the formation of a separate Joint Industrial Council
for the port industry, the constitution of the committee*, excluded
2matters ’covered by any wage negotiating body’ from its deliberations.
A careful study of the minutes of the committee reveals that the 
workers1 side was most concerned with reversing the illiberal 
employment policies of the port management and, in particular, the 
widespread use of casual and daily paid labour. At the second meeting 
of the committee, the question of the absorption of casual workers 
was raised:
’Arising from a question raised by Mr. Jalloh, 
the chairman said that employment of tally 
clerks depends on the work available and it 
was normal practice all over the world to 
have casual employees in the shipping 
industry. Mr. Ross (the chairman) observed 
that to further increase the number of 
monthly paid tally and delivery clerks would 
not be an economic proposition and held the 
view that it could not be reasonably denied 
that there were occasions when we were 
overstaffed in this section. In this 
connection, the chairman added that 
• immediately before proceeding on leave, 
the port manager took on about 30 casual 
employees on a monthly basis. After some 
further discussion it was agreed by the 
committee that the following request be 
made and forwarded to the port manager on 
his return...that a review be made of the 
number of permanent clerks. That the port 
manager give favourable consideration to 
the absorption to the permanent staff of 
some of those employees who have served
1 Port Authority Archive, Port Management Works Committee, Objects 
and Constitution.
2 Ibid.
-  142 -
1the port regularly for the past feu years,!
In resisting these demands, the port management argued that ’the Works 
Committee was not a negotiating body1, and the assistant port manager
2
’read out the relevant portions of the constitution in this connection’.
When the port manager himself eventually made an appearance at the
committee, his tone was evidently condescending:
’He regretted that his first ruling must be 
that the points raised for discussion at the 
present meeting were matters outside the 
competence of the Works Committee and could 
not therefore be officially discussed in such 
a body. However, as he appreciated that 
members of the. staff'side were as yet 
inexperienced in the interpretation of the 
constitution and the correct workings of 
such bodies as. Works Committees, and as it 
was obvious that some deep concern had given 
rise to the points raised, he was prepared 
to hear the viewpoints raised regarding the 
alleged grievances and would endeavour to 
satisfy them as far as possible. The staff 
side accepted this ruling,’3
Such demands persisted at meetings of the committee. An item on
the agenda of one meeting was headed: ’Annual absorption has been
sadly neglected for the past two years’.^ At another meeting, the
representative of the drivers was most persistent in his complaints:
'Mr. Alimamy Kamara complained that the 
platform truck drivers operate expensive 
equipment, the operation and maintenance 
of which required some techniques and that 
it was felt that such drivers should be 
offered regular employment instead of 
casual...Mr. Alimamy Kamara stated that 
the portal crane drivers addressed the
1 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of the port Management Works 
Committee, 18 February 1959*
2 Ibid.
3 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of the Port Management Works 
Committee, 15 June 1959*
4- Port Authority Archive, Minutes of the Port Management Works 
Committee, 20 October I960.
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former port manager (Gillespie) a letter 
during 1957 regarding their status and that 
no reply had been received# The chairman 
promised to enquire into the matter*#.Mr#
Alimamy Kamara informed the meeting that the 
Scamell drivers and motor drivers are 
licensed drivers and that as is practiced in 
other government departments and local firms, 
consideration should be given to the award 
of non-accident bonus to such staff. After 
full discussion the chairman undertook to ^ 
represent the matter to the port manager.*
There is some evidence that the standard of deliberation expected by
the expatriate management at the committee was beyond the reach of
some of the unskilled workers whose interests were therefore not
properly represented* In many cases, sympathetic clerks and artisans
2discussed their grievances on their behalf. For instance, casual
workers (the greatest proportion of whom were among the shore cargo
handling labourers) received no gratuity for long service. On the
death of any such worker, their families were therefore not entitled
to any claim. The possibility of setting up a ’death benefit trust1
for them was raised at one meeting and rejected:
’The port manager explained that the law 
did not permit him to make such arrangements 
but it was agreed that in the event of the 
death of' any employee of the department, 
other than casuals, a list would be circulated 
headed by senior officers of the department.’!
(The list was for financial contributions)'.
Shore cargo handling labour were represented on the committee by
Pa Karanke who, though handicapped by his illiteracy, found ways to
get round the problem:
’Headman Karanke handed the chairman a copy 
of a letter dated 8th September 1961, 
addressed to the port manager by the 
monthly paid headmen (or cargo handling 
gang foremen) to which no reply had been
1 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of the Port Management Works 
Committee 10 November I960.
2 Interview with Pa Karanke, 28 February 1980.
3 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of the Port Management Works
P*T.O.
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received. The chairman accepted a copy of 
the letter and promised to investigate.>1
The letter contained a request for an increase in wages and it was
eventually decided that this was a matter that should be dealt with
by the JIG.2
The management for its part was keen to use the committee to 
reach a consensus on issues relating to punctuality and productivity. 
At one meeting:
'The chairman asked representatives to
impress upon all members of their sections .
that they must come to work on time and
not to absent themselves without leave . .
during working hours. This was agreed to...
The chairman stressed that overtime should 
only be worked when absolutely necessary.
In this connection, Mr. Terry (representing 
accounts clerks) observed that the substantive 
port manager, Mr. Gillespie, had told him 
and others that there was no limit to overtime 
being worked. Everybody could work as much 
overtime as possible as he, Mr. Gillespie, 
would not increase their basic wages. The -
chairman said that he could not believe 
that that was what Mr. Gillespie meant when 
he authorised certain overtime to be worked.*
The meeting agreed that unnecessary overtime 
working and absence during authorised overtime 
hours should not be allowed. All members ~
promised to bring this home to their sections.‘
By the end of 1962, however, when the committee had been in 
existence for about four years, the workers' representatives had 
begun to lose their initial interest, since many issues which they 
regarded as important were being ruled outside the competence of the 
committee.^ Many of these representatives had begun to warm to the
Committee, 16 December I960.
1 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of the Port Management Works 
Committee, 17 January 1962*
2 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of the Port Management Works 
Committee, 14. February 1962.
3 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of the Port Management Works 
Committee, IS February 1959*
4. Interview with Pa Karanke, 28 February 1980.
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idea of the formation of an independent dock workers1 union which was
being canvassed by Jack Sandy, Moses Fatoma, and Amadu Jalloh (clerks
in the operations section of the department), Alimamy Kamara who had
represented drivers and maintenance workers on the committee, and by
Pa Karanke,*1' Another view which was widely held was that dock workers
in the employ of the department were not effectively represented at 
2the port JIC. Moreover, in view of the impending expansion of the 
Port Management Department into a fully autonomous public corporation, 
it was felt that a strong union organisation ought to complement that
o
development. By the end of 1962, Sandy, Fatoma, and others had 
persuaded most workers at the department of the potential of a dock 
workers* union. An application for. registration and a bargaining 
certificate was made at the Labour Department, These were granted in 
May 1963,^
Administrative responsibility and accountability within the colonial 
state: some theoretical conclusions
During the early years of its operation as a semi-autonomous 
public enterprise, the Port Management Department successfully 
introduced modern port services while operating along * quasi-commercial * 
lines. The narrower range of services over which it had jurisdictipn, 
stemming from the limited integration of these services, and the 
policy of subsidising the railway, made port revenue much lower than
1 Ibid ; the same point was made during informal conversation with 
dock workers during both periods of field work,
2 Interview with Aziz Kassim (founder member of the union),
6 March 1982,
3 Interview with Pa Karanke, 28 February 1980,
4, Gf* Labour Department, Annual Report 1963, p,7.
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it otherwise would have been. Faced with these constraints, the port 
management adopted an illiberal policy with regard to wages and benefits 
of its employees, the majority of whom were employed on a casual or 
daily paid basis. This 'exploitation* was facilitated by the state 
of the labour market in Freetown since the end of the war (cf. Chapters 
1 and 2), and raises serious questions for theorists who.have argued 
that lower paid workers in the public sector 'live off the fat* 
created by the peasants and other revenue appropriated by the state.
The Port Management Department, however, remained fully accountable 
to its consumers and to the civil service bureaucracy and there was 
apparently no suggestion of corrupt practices among its officials.
This is not to suggest that Sierra Leoneans (or Africans) are 
inherently corrupt while the British expatriates were honest and 
competent administrators. The reductionist (and racist) nature of 
this argument aside, corruption in Sierra Leone does not originate 
from the personal characteristics of individuals. It is rather related 
to political norms which place a lower premium on the accountability 
of public officials than to the loyalty and continued support of 
such officials to the regime in the post-colonial state-. For most 
of the period of its existence, the Port Management Department 
operated within the "colonial state in which the rules were made by 
the colonial authorities. One of the more easily identifiable 
characteristics of the British colonial administration was its high 
degree of bureaucratic rigidity. This was the means by which the 
British effected colonial domination over nearly a quarter of the 
earth*s surface. The tons of documents preserved at the Public 
Records Office in London - the shrine of the student of aspects of 
British imperial history - is a lasting monument to the red-tapism 
of the colonial bureaucratic apparatus with its apex at Whitehall
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and spreading out to the local peripheries. In the individual 
territories the colonial state was therefore founded on the principle 
of administrative responsibility and accountability* Sierra Leone 
and the Port Management Department were no exception. The post-colonial 
state by contrast, while adopting formal procedures of bureaucratic 
accountability inherited from the British, is founded on a different 
principle. The pattern of political competition which became 
established after independence (and indeed even during the years of 
decolonisation) is quite literally a struggle for access to the 
resources of the state. The key of understanding this form of 
political competition is first to understand the role of patronage 
in the political sociology of neo-patrimonial leadership. In the 
absence of an indigenous class of wealthy entrepreneurs, access to 
the apparatus of the state guarantees access to the most important 
resources for distribution in political competition. Before the . 
withdrawal of the British, access was restricted by the procedures 
of bureaucratic accountability; after independence (and even during
1 In the House of Commons, a Public Accounts Committee is required 
to review public expenditure ex post facto. The British 
instituted similar procedures in the colonies and in Sierra 
Leone where, a Public Accounts Committee of the Legislative 
Council was created. (Cf. N.A* Cox-Gorge, *The System of Public 
Financial Organisation and Control in Sierra Leone*, in Bank of 
Sierra Leone, Economic Review, Vol 5, No 3> 1970, pp.1-11).
The *raw material* of this committee was provided by the annual 
report of the Auditor-General, a senior treasury official, which 
like that of the committee is published* After independence, these 
procedures continued to be faithfully implemented. A Public 
Accounts Committee of the House of Representatives reviews public 
expenditure using material provided by the Auditor-General (now 
a senior official in the Ministry of Finance) • Both reports 
continue to be published* The colonial and post-colonial reports 
have been compared. These reveal a sharp increase in the incidence 
and magnitude of financial indiscretions after independence* This 
trend is more fully discussed in the chapter which follows*
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decolonisation) access became relatively unrestricted. In conditions 
where this form of political competition obtains, the public sector 
is particularly vulnerable as an instrument of political patronage. 
This vulnerability of the Port Organisation became increasingly 
evident after 1965 and contrasts sharply with the period under 
consideration here when procedures of administrative accountability 




The port organisation 1965-76: the dynamics of an African public 
enterprise
On the first of January 1965, the Sierra Leone Port Authority, 
(SLPA), a statutory public corporation with responsibility for the 
management of the port, came into being. The need for an autonomous 
port organisation had been apparent for several years. It had been 
the view of Port Management Department officials that the loss-making 
Railway Administration was ‘dragging down* the port, and the lack of 
integration of port services was thought to have denied the central 
organisation of much-needed' revenue. As the government began to 
contemplate the future of the railway, the department was made 
independent In April 1962.^ During the interim period between the 
separation of the department from the Railway Administration and the 
beginning of operations - by the SLPA, the Harbour Master’s department 
was integrated with Port Management and new sections - accounts, 
purchasing and stores, civil and mechanical maintenance - were created 
within the new organisation to provide these services previously 
provided by the Railway. Although the - Ports Act (1964) under which 
the SLPA was created stipulated that responsibility for stevedoring 
was to be one of its functions, the shipping companies which had 
provided this service successfully lobbied to retain it.
This chapter discusses the economic and administrative operations 
of the SLPA between 1965 and 1976# It begins by reviewing the 
performance of the parastatal sector in post-colonial Sierra Leone,
1 National Workshop Archive, Memorandum by the Minister of 
Communications, Establishment of separate port department 
(part 1); Establishment of a statutory Port Authority (part 
2), 20 September 1962.
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and assessing its impact on the national economy. The case study of 
the SLPA is then taken up in the second section, beginning with an 
examination of the organisation of the new corporation, its economic 
performance and its procedures for accountability* A third section 
examines the factors leading to the financial collapse of the 
corporation in 1976,
The parastatal sector in post-colonial Sierra Leone: an overview 
The expansion of the economic activities of the state in many 
African countries has been encouraged by the need to facilitate 
development and by the important role accorded to state intervention 
in this task by fashionable economic theory (Nkrumah* s Ghana being 
the most notable example). In Sierra Leone, on the other hand, there 
was no dramatic expansion in the economic activities of the state at 
the time of independence. This was partly because the financial 
resources available were much more modest, but also because the 
government of Sir Milton Margai adopted a 'gradualist' market orientated 
strategy of economic growth manifested in the so-called 'open door 
policy1 Nonetheless, the importance which the state had assumed 
(not least by being the-largest employer) in social and economic life, 
put into the hands of the politicians considerable resources (from 
mining, agriculture, etc.) for appropriation and selective-distribution. 
At the time of Sir Milton's death in April 1964-, the frontiers'of the 
parastatal sector were confined to the marketing of commodities 
(by the Produce Marketing Board, the SLPMB), the marketing of the 
staple food (by the Rice Corporation), the buying of diamonds from 
licensed alluvial 'diggers' for polishing and marketing locally and 
overseas (by the Diamond Corporation, DICOR), the broadcasting
1 Sierra Leone, The Open Door Policy, Freetown, 1961.
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services (SLBS), one national newspaper, and the public utilities 
(Railway Administration, Port Management Department, Guma Valley Water 
Company, Electricity Corporation, Road Transport Corporation, Post
]_
and Telecommunications, Cable and Wireless and Sierra Leone Airways)*
On the drawing board were plans for the creation of an autonomous 
Port Authority and a Forest Industries Corporation -for the manufacture 
of furniture from local timber resources* - Both corporations came 
into operation in January 1965* The SLPMB had since the early sixties 
ventured cautiously into plantation agriculture and the processing of 
produce* The import substitutive industries were firmly within the 
private sector where overheads were kept low by the generous 
provisions of the open door policy* Notice of Sierra Leone's 
withdrawal from participation in the West African Currency Board 
had been given and the necessary legislation for the creation of a 
national central bank had been passed the previous year. (Ghana and 
Nigeria withdrew their participation in 1957 and I960 respectively, 
leaving Sierra Leone and The Gambia as members of the Board). The 
Bank of Sierra Leone began operations in August 1964. The significance 
of the formation of a national central bank was that decisions 
relating to the regulation of money supply could be made locally*
Under the regime' of the Currency Board, managed by the colonial 
authorities, changes in the level of money supply strictly depended 
on changes in the level of income generated by foreign trade* Under
the regime of a national central bank, a whole range of fiscal and
2monetary policies could be employed in deficit financing.
1 Cf* Bank of Sierra Leone, Documents, October 1966, p.13*
2 Cf. A. B. Taylor, 'The role of financial institutions in the
economic development of Sierra Leone*, PhD thesis, University 
of Glasgow, 1973, especially Chapters 1 and 2*
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Since its first intervention in 1966, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) has been a major Influence - though it must be emphasised, 
only one among others - on the setting of objectives and criteria of 
performance of the parastatal sector in Sierra Leone* This influence 
has been particularly evident since the mid-seventies when the 
spiralling cost of imported energy began to be the source of a now 
chronic trade imbalance. The first intervention of the IMF was 
necessitated by the rapid expansion of some areas of the parastatal 
sector after the death of Sir Milton, when his more ’radical1 brother, 
Albert, became prime minister.’*' The rationale'of this expansion was 
ostensibly to diversify the economy and reduce the dependence on the 
mining sector whose share of the value of income generated by foreign 
trade had never fallen below 65 per cent during the early ’sixties 
(cf. Table 4*1). But it was also an attempt by the new prime 
minister to consolidate his political base (via the patron-clientelist 
network of the SLPP) by opening up new areas for the award of 
contracts and for appointments to positions in the new or expanded 
organisations* Consequently, the subsidiary activities of the SLPMB 
'in agricultural plantations and processing industries were expanded, 
and investment made in tourist infrastructure, the expansion -of the - 
internal services of Sierra Leone Airways, and other industrial 
ventures, necessitating considerable expenditure on imported 
technology and building materials. With export earnings in 1965 
falling below the 1964 record level (Table 4-1 again), the expansion 
of the SLPMB was financed by its accumulated trading surpluses and
1 The style of leadership of the two Margai brothers has been 
compared by John Cartwright, in Political Leadership in Sierra 
Leone. 1978, Sir Milton is described as a ’conservative ideologue’ 
and Sir Albert as a ’radical ideologue1.
2 Cf* R. J* Bhatia et al, 'Stabilisation Program in’Sierra Leone’, 
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the more direct investments by the government were financed partly by 
external short-term contractors’ credit and partly by the increased 
use of accumulated cash balances and bank credit. The result, however, 
was a substantial rise in the trade deficit from Led*6 million at the 
end of 1964. to a record Lell.6 million at the end of 1965. 
total foreign exchange reserves, including those of the Bank of Sierra 
Leone, declined from Le29.2 million at the end of 1964 Lel7.6 
million at the end of 1965 - the equivalent of three months1 imports. 
For the 1966-67 fiscal year, the budget estimates showed a deficit 
of Lel9*3 million. In these estimates, the government budgeted for
2
an increase of almost 100 per cent in its ’development* expenditures. 
By this time, the SLPMB, which had committed its liquid assets to long­
term projects in agricultural production and processing, was unable to 
meet its current liabilities to the buying agents. Farmers were 
issued with *1 owe you’ chits for their produce. Moreover, large 
repayments were falling due and it was anticipated that the trade 
deficit would deteriorate further. Given the skilful exploitation 
of the crisis by the opposition AFC (which claimed that the government 
had ’eaten* all the country’s money), and with a general election due 
by May 1967, Sir Albert called in the IMF in mid-1966.
The SLPP, quite understandably perhaps, lacked the political will 
to implement a policy of economic austerity on the eve of a general 
election* It was left to the National Reformation Council (NRC), 
which came to power following the intervention of the military after 
the election, to implement the stabilisation programme. As a study
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of the NRG argues, it was in its interest to do so, being 'faced with
the harsh economic realities and with a need to strengthen its initial
flimsy arguments for intervening'.^ In return for credits totalling
some Le9 millions over a three-year period to help meet the trade
deficit, the NRC agreed to undertake significant reforms not only in
fiscal and monetary policy, but also in policy relating to the
2management and organisation of the public sector* Accordingly, 
measures to reduce the budget deficit, to increase personal taxation 
and improve the efficiency of tax collection were implemented* The 
rate of domestic monetary expansion was made consistent with the
3
realisation of targets relating to the building up of foreign reserves#
, Organisations in the parastatal sector were required to make strict 
economies which were closely monitored by the IMF representatives and 
their local counterparts at the Department of Finance* The SLPMB 
was reorganised and its activities confined to the marketing of produce# 
Plantations which were assessed not to be viable were closed down 
resulting in over 2,000 redundancies. A loan of Lei million was 
negotiated with a London-based bank to help the Board with its 
liquidity problems#^
When the NRC was ejected from office in April 1968,- these measures 
had begun to make an- impact on the economy. The APC which then assumed 
office had campaigned on a 'radical* programme of economic nationalism
1 Cf* T# Cox, Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone. Camb.,
Mass., 1976, p*179; see also Franklyn Lisk, 'The political 
economy of Sierra Leone 1961-71, with special reference to the 
IMF stabilisation programme of 1966-69*, PhD thesis, Birmingham 
University, 1971*
2 R. J# Bhatia et al* p.507.
3 Ibid. p.508-12.
U Ibid. p#512-13; see the discussion below for an appraisal of how
the economies affected the Port Authority.
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aimed at assuming control of the 'commanding heights' of the national 
economy.^ While Sialca Stevens and his new government felt committed 
to the continued implementation of the IMF programme for the remaining 
year, a state-led programme of economic expansion was very much expected. 
Nonetheless, in his first budget, the APC Minister of Finance was 
critical of the forays of the SLPP regime into industrial and tourist 
ventures:
under the slogan of industrialisation 
abuses can flourish* In the past year or 
two, Government has borne financial losses 
as a result of the collapse of companies 
producing processed milk and shoe and 
rubber products* A construction company in 
which government has a financial interest 
has gone bankrupt and we are struggling at 
present to salvage something from the 
cement factory and the metal assembly plant*
The folly of the Cape Sierra Hotel mocks 
us every day from Aberdeen Point, We are 
determined that projects like these should 
never again be undertaken with government 
participation, and we shall make it our 
guiding principle that industrial ventures 
which have government support shall be 
undertaken only if it can be demonstrated 
beyond doubt that they will bring benefits 
not for a group of unpatriotic politicians, 
but for the common people of our country, '<
One of the first measures taken by the APC on assuming office 
was to begin negotiations for the acquisition of a 51 per cent share 
of the equity in Selection Trust (in return for commensurate compensation) 
the largest diamond mining concern in the country, A new company,
Diamond Mining Company of Sierra Leone (DIMINCO (SL) LTD) was formed 
in October 1970, The APC was also committed to the reform of banking 
and insurance practices and to the formation of state-owned financial 
institutions* Accordingly, legislation was passed requiring the (mainly 
British) commercial banks and insurance companies to be incorporated
1 APC, Election Manifesto, Freetown, 1967*
2 Sierra Leone, Budget speech delivered by the Hon, Dr* M. S, Foma, 
Minister of Finance on Monday, 8 July 1968, Freetown, 1968*
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in Sierra Leone and to maintain large deposits at the Bank of Sierra
Leone.^ In 1968 a National Development Bank had been formed to extend
credit facilities to indigenous businessmen, and this was followed by
the formation of a National Cooperative Development Bank and the Sierra
2
Leone Commercial Bank in 1971 and 1973 respectively. In 1972, a 
state-owned insurance business, the National Insurance Company, was 
formed. The rationale for the reform and the establishment of these 
financial institutions was to increase the scope for the availability 
of credit to finance indigenous businessmen* the APC having rejected 
the whole-scale nationalisation- of foreign financial institutions* 
Needless to say, these developments (and the passing of the Non-Citezens
Q
Trade and Business Act in 1969) have also had the effect of increasing 
the scope of patronage of the regime. Partly because of the competitive 
market situation in which these state-owned financial institutions 
operate, partly because the confidence of the public is an essential 
ingredient for their continued viability, and given the supervisory 
role of the Bank of Sierra Leone (in cooperation with the IMP, the 
African Development Bank, the World Bank and other international 
financial institutions which have either provided technical expertise
1 Budget speech delivered by the Hon. C. A. Kamara-Taylor, Minister 
of Finance on June 28, 1971, reproduced in Sierra- Leone, 12 years 
of Economic Achievement and Political Consolidation under the APC 
and Dr. Siaka Stevens 1968-1980, pp.101-110. This document is an 
official record of the day-to-day activities of leading members 
of the APC regime from April 1968 to March 1980.
2 Cf. Budget speeches of 1968; 1971 and 1973? reproduced in ibid.
3 Sierra Leone, Budget speech delivered by the Hon. Dr. M. S.
Foma, Minister of Finance on June 25, 1969, Freetown, 1969.
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or have provided loans to meet the capital required) each of these 
businesses have performed relatively satisfactorily. Relatively high 
standards of accountability and administrative efficiency seem to 
have been maintained. For instance, the Bank of Sierra Leone, as the 
banker of the public sector, reported in 1979 that the net profits of 
the National Insurance Company for the previous year increased by 19 
per cent.'*'
Two other parastatal organisations, the National Shipping Company
2
and the National Trading Company, created by the APC in 1971 have 
not shared the success of the financial institutions. The shipping 
company was established to give the government a foothold in the 
provision of shipping services to and from Sierra Leone. Being unable 
to meet the financial commitment required in the purchase and 
maintenance of vessels and the hiring of experienced manpower, this 
ambitious project has consequently been considerably modified. Since 
1976, the shipping company has operated as a clearing and forwarding 
agency (in competition with other whipping agencies operating in the 
private sector)• The monopoly over the provision of stevedore services 
which it has assumed at the time of its formation was transferred to 
the Port Authority in November 1979 to enable the latter organisation 
to provide a fully integrated system of cargo handling. The trading 
company was established to centralise the purchase of imported 
merchandise and thereby cut out the middle-man role of foreign 
companies such as Paterson Zochonis (PZ) and the United Africa Company 
(UAC) group. After only two years of operation, the company faced 
a cash crisis, having provided extended credit facilities to retailers
1 Bank of Sierra Leone, Annual Report 1979. p.17, Freetown, 1979.
2 Cf. 1971 Budget speech.
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typically on the strength of their connections with the ruling party,
rather than by traditional business criteria of the assessment of
risks. The company was forced to increase mark-ups on its merchandise
over which it held monopoly import rights. This contributed to the
rising trend in prices (following the substantial increase in the
price of imported energy in 1973) and brought protests from the labour
movement (see Chapter 7). The government responded by decentralising
1the importation of merchandise.
Under the APC, and in view of the ‘conditionality1 guidelines of 
the IMF, the performance of the SLPMB has been, superficially at least, 
very satisfactory. This of course means, however, that the export 
agricultural sector has been subjected to considerable exploitation.
The Bank of Sierra Leone reported in 1979 that during the previous year 
the Board purchased 48,94-3 tons of produce valued at Le46.2 million. 
Resales by the Board amounted to Le6l.9 million suggesting a profit of
9
Lel5.7 million. After the fiasco of 1966-67 when farmers were issued 
with chits for their produce, the APC has apparently been very cautious 
with regard to its management of the Board, though the relatively high 
profit margin suggests that producer prices could be increased. Indeed 
a recent study of incomes in Sierra Leone suggests that between 1968 
and 1977, agricultural taxation on coffee and cocoa has, on an average, 
been 45*6 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. Taxation on palm 
kernel during the same period has on an average been 6*3 per cent, 
this lower figure being due to lower receipts in the export markets 
in 1972-3 and in 1975-6 (see Table 4*2). As the study concludes,
1 Cf. President’s Annual Address to parliament, June 21, 1974? 
reproduced in 12 Years of Economic Achievement and
Political Consolidation under the APC and Dr. Siaka Stevens 1968-
30, pp.35-243*
2 Bank of Sierra Leone, Annual Report 1979. p. 25.
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'nobody in Sierra Loone had one-half, or even one-quarter of his income 
deducted through any form of (direct) taxes'
Following several years of relatively unsatisfactory performance, 
the Port Authority, the Electricity Corporation, Post and Telecommunications, 
and the state-owned hotels were reorganised in the late 'seventies*
With the exception of post and telecommunications and some of the 
hotels, the management of these corporations has been subcontracted 
to foreign consultants* The Minister of Finance in his 1978 budget 
speech failed to locate this poor performance in prevailing political 
practices, bitterly criticising, instead, the management of these 
corporations:
*.,.the financial performance of our public 
corporations has been dismally poor* The 
budgetary implications of this unhappy 
situation is of crucial importance and cause 
for worry in my Ministry* With the exception 
of the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board, 
which has recorded outstanding successes 
over the past four years, largely as a result 
of favourable conditions in the world market 
for our agricultural exports, all other 
public corporations have come to rely on 
government to bail them out of their 
financial difficulties* Obviously such a 
state of affairs adds to our budgetary 
difficulties and contributes to the need for 
higher levels of taxation, I would underline 
the point that public corporations are meant 
to be revenue earners for the central 
government, not revenue devourers, A large 
degree of independence is accorded them 
which, if it were exploited advantageously, 
should make it much easier to adopt sound 
business principles and thereby create the 
conditions necessary for effective 
performance***Of course*,,we do not judge 
their financial performance by the demanding 
standards of private business. However*.*
1 Cf. Ensuring Equitable Growth: A Strategy for increasing
Employment* Equity and Basic Heeds Satisfaction in Sierra Leone 
(Report to the Government of Sierra Leone by a Jobs and Skills" 
Programme for Africa Employment Advisory Mission) Addis Ababa, 
1981, p.290* This document will henceforth be referred to as 
The JASPA Report*
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public corporations were formerly 
departments from which government 
derived substantial revenue. The 
situation now is that such revenue has 
almost ceased to flow,..the bitter truth 
revealed by the evidence gathered so far 
is that the vital resources entrusted to 
public corporations are woefully misused, 
mismanaged, and misdirected...the chilling 
revelations of the Report of the Forster 
Commission of Inquiry into the Sierra 
Leone Port Authority have forcibly brought 
home to us the need for stricter measures 
of control...I would sound a warning here 
that inefficient managers and those found 
to misuse- resources will have to go. I 
would hope however that the swift action 
of government in dismissing the top 
management of the...Port Authority would 
serve as a corrective measure...
It is evident that the APC has finance'd its expansion of the 
parastatal sector by increasing receipts from indirect taxes on 
commodities, minerals, and merchandise, as well as receipts from 
foreign aid and loans, and from the system of direct taxation (Table 
4.3). The evidence further suggests that while the expansion of the 
parastatal sector has to some extent been constrained by considerations 
of profitability and viability, there has been a considerable 
expansion in general services (the system of public administration) 
and in education, health and social services (Tables 4*4(a) and 4*4(b)).
It should be clear from this review of the impact of the parastatal 
sector on the national economy, that Sierra Leone1s modest resources 
can hardly afford to absorb inefficient and unprofitable public 
corporations riddled with graft and corruption. Consequently there 
is pressure for reform from the IMF, international institutions of 
aid and development, and other creditors. In this respect, the 
parastatal sector in Sierra Leone has been more amenable to reform 
than their counterparts in Ghana under Nkrumah. Nonetheless, state-
1 Budget speech delivered by the Hon. A. B. Kamara, Minister of 
Finance, on 30 June 1978 (reproduced in 12 Years of Economic 
Achievement and Political Consolidation."... pp.445-453).
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led economic expansion primarily to ‘accommodate’ political clients 
(but ostensibly for other reasons such as to control the ’commanding 
heights' of the national economy) is the inherent logic of a neo- 
patrimonal political system. Mot only does the state finance the 
salaries, wages, and prerequisites of public sector personnel, over 
and above this, (and since loyalty to the regime is of greater 
importance than the accountability of public officials), such personnel 
might quite literally dip their hands into the public corporation till. 
The diversion of resources from public and parastatal organisations 
to private consumption and investment, the deliberate overmanning of 
these organisations to accommodate political clients or, the failure 
of such organisations to operate like typical capitalist organisations, 
might more usefully be viewed as the operational logic of a patron- 
clientelist political system. This approach also encapsulates the 
broader ’sociological processes underlying actions of political 
corruption. Even as Sierra Leone enters the 1980’s, the public sector 
is locked-in a vicious circle of unsatisfactory performance and 
international pressure for reform. This is very clearly illustrated 
by the case study of the Port Authority.
The Port Authority 1965-70: organisation, accountability, and economic 
performance
The appointment of a Board of Directors accompanied the vesting
of responsibility for the management of the port in a fully autonomous
public corporation. Under the Ports Act, a total of seventeen part-
1
time directors, including a chairman, could be appointed. The Act 
also stipulated that the Board members must include representatives
1 Sierra Leone, The Ports Act (Ho 56) 1961, Freetown, 1964, Section 
5, p. 4*
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of the Ministry of Transport and Communications and of the Ministry
of Finance, the Managing Director of the Produce Marketing Board, the
General Manager of the Railway Administration, and the head of personnel
administration in the civil service, the Establishment Secretary. The
Board was to be the main forum for the formulation of port policy.
The General Manager of the SLPA, and ex-officio member of the Board,
was to be responsible for the implementation of policies decided upon
by the Board to which he was accountable, (see Diagram 4*1)*
Manifestations of political patronage were evident in the
composition of the Board and of subsequent Boards. The chairman had
been a defeated SLPP candidate for the Waterloo constituency at the
1962 general elections, and had been an associate of the late prime
minister, Sir Milton Margai. The Establishment Secretary, the Managing
Director of the Produce Marketing Board, the General Manager of the
Railway, and the Financial Secretary who represented the Ministry of
Finance were, apparently, proteges of the new prime minister, Sir
Albert Margai. While they were fully qualified for the positions
they held, Gaffney has persuasively argued that the careers of the
incumbents of some of these offices were ’helped along’ by the
1pervasive system of political clientelism. The other directors 
appointed in 1965 were the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications, the Comptroller of Customs, three 
representatives each of the shipping companies and of commercial 
interests, and the secretary of the Dock Workers’ Union, who with 
origins in the southern province was reputed to have kinship 
connections in the hierarchy of the SLPP (see Chapter 5). All
1 Cf. H* H. Gaffney, ’Administration and the Administrative Service 
in Sierra Leone’, PhD thesis, University of Columbia, 1967, Ch. 6.
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DIAGRAM 4.1









received directors' fees# As the major consumers of port services were 
directly represented on the Board, the role of the old Port Advisory 
Committee became somewhat superfluous.
Scrutiny of the port archive leaves the impression that the Board 
worked through specialist sub-committees where policy was discussed 
and agreed upon before being ratified by the whole Board. Although 
the Board was supposed to be formally accountable to the Minister of 
Transport and Communications, the procedures for such accountability 
were never made clear-- the permanent secretary being-only a representative 
of the ministry on the Board. Neither were there clear procedures for 
the minister's own accountability to parliament. Indeed, the minister 
was never questioned in parliament about the SLPA even though its 
economic performance during its early years should have been a cause 
for concern* From reports on the proceedings and debates in parliament, 
it appears that the Produce Marketing Board was the main target of 
criticisms by the APC opposition as regards the government's management 
of the parastatal sector. There is also evidence in the port archive 
that important politicians exerted influence on the management of the 
SLPA to provide jobs or credit facilities to members of their clienteles. 
For instance, a letter signed by the then Minister of Transport and 
Communications asks specifically that the bearer of the letter, 
described as 'one of the strongest supporters in my constituency' be 
given a job as a labourer.^ The minister also intervened to modify 
penalties imposed by the Board on one of its largest debtors. At a 
meeting in May 1966, the sub-committee on finance had reported to the 
Board that the Sierra Leone Cement Works was one of the Authority's 
largest debtors, owing Le52,000. The Board decided that the company
1 Fort Authority Archive, Hon. Kandeh Bur eh, Minister of Transport 
and Communications to Acting Secretary SLPA, 16 February 1967.
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should be informed that, unless this debt was cleared, future cargoes 
of the company would not be handled by the Authority's staff* The 
management of the company made representations to the minister to 
get the Board to relax its ultimatum* The General Manager of the 
SLPA was invited to an 'informal meeting' at the minister's office, 
where he was directed 'to put the matter before the Board to relax or 
vary its decisions so that the next cement clinker arriving for the 
company could be off loaded'.^ The Board succumbed to the pressure
2but insisted that at least a third of the amount owed must be paid.
If procedures for accountability between the Board and the 
minister and between the minister and parliament were ill defined, 
there were some 'external' considerations which exerted an influence 
on the maintainance of the bureaucratic chain of accountability 
between the management and the Board, and which influenced the 
decisions of the Board. These consisted of the IMF package negotiated 
with the government in 1966 and effectively implemented by a resident 
team of officials from Washington working with counterparts in the 
Ministry of Finance over a three-year period to 1969. The package 
consisted of stand-by arrangements to save the government from further 
financial embarrassment, and at the same time ceilings were set for 
government borrowing from the banking system and for contracting new 
short- and medium-term foreign credits. The growth of public 
expenditure was to be restrained through tightened controls over 
budgetary disbursements, the credit policy of the central bank, 
curtailment of development expenditure, and the monitoring of all 
public corporations.
1 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of Meeting of the Board of the 
SLPA, 17 June 1966.
2 Ibid.
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This deflationary package and the glare of the IMF spotlight to
which the parastatal sector became subjected had a considerable
influence on procedures for accountability at the SLPA, While SLPP
politicians, ignoring the presence of the IMF, continued to make
demands on the SLPA - understandable enough in view of the approaching
general elections in March 1967; Sir Albert himself had resisted pressure
for the devaluation of the Leone - guidelines were introduced which
public corporations were expected to implement. In mid-1966, the Board
of the SLPA was advised to cut down on its huge overtime payments, and
to make a determined effort to recover the large debts owed by port
users.^ These instructions duly received the attention of the finance
and staff sub-committees of the Board. Regarding the overtime bill,
which amounted to Le250,66l, being almost a third of the total wages
and salary bill of Le701,298 for the first eleven months of 1966,^ it
3was decided that a system of shift working should be introduced. This 
also had the advantage of avoiding redundancies which would have been 
politically unacceptable. Militant action by the Bock Workers' Union 
delayed the effective implementation of these plans until they had been 
properly negotiated with the union (cf. Chapter 6).
One casualty of these austere times was the Chief Accountant of 
the Authority, Mr. C,~ B. A. Pratt. It was alleged that he had ordered 
some material used by the civil maintainance department to be taken 
from the stores at the quay to a site at which he had a building under 
construction. It was also discovered that he had requisitioned four
1 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of Joint Staff and Finance Committees 
Meeting held on Thursday 18, and Friday 19 July 1966.
2 Port Authority Archive, Acting Chief Accountant to General Manager 
SLPA, 22 February 1967.
3 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of Board Meeting held on 2 August 
1966.
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new motor car tyres on the account of the Authority for his private
car.^ The Board decided to instigate criminal proceedings. Anticipating
a dismissal after his conviction, Mr. Pratt eventually resigned his
2
position from the Authority. This incident contrasts sharply with the 
more flexible standards of managerial behaviour accepted at the SLPA 
after 1970, following the withdrawal of the IMF at the end of the 
stabilisation programme, when senior management openly plundered the 
property of the Authority with little fear of disciplinary action.
Effective accountability within the port bureaucracy continued
to be maintained under the military junta of 1967-68. Indeed, Colonel
Juxon-Smith, the NRC chairman, evidently acquired a sense of messianic
purpose vis a vis the national economy:
’Accountable to almost no civilians, the 
NRG did not particularly see fit to guage 
the political consequences of its austerity 
measures with the same degree of sensitivity 
as might a civilian government. Juxon-Smith 
stressed this view in a ’State of the Nation' 
address in February 1968. 'Never again', said 
the NRC chairman, 'must the timely 
implementation of national economic policies 
be delayed or even prevented because the 
government in power is more interested in 
party politics than in the well being and 
prosperity of the nation as a whole.*3
Juxon-Smith also acquired the habit of paying unscheduled 'surprise'
visits to government offices and corporations to examine for himself
aspects of the day-to-day administration and management. He made one
such visit to the port in July 1967.^ The junta also removed those
members of the Board, including the chairman, who had been closely
identified with the previous regime. The failure, however, of the NRC
1. Port Authority Archive, Minutes of Board Meeting held on 7 April 1966.
2 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of Board Meeting held on S Nov. 1966.
3 Thomas Cox, op. cit., p.179*
4 Interview with M. B. Bennett, 14 January 1980.
- 175 -
to resolve the political crisis, its high-handed treatment of senior
politicians of both parties, its institution of austerity measures (in
November 1967 the Leone was de facto devalued following the devaluation
of sterling to which it was 'pegged* at an exchange rate of Le2 = UK£1),
the pomp and circumstance of grotesque proportions clearly enjoyed by
the chairman and other leading members of the junta, evidently led to
their removal from office by the junior ranks of the army in April 1967,
The financial crisis of the mid-'sixties, involving most importantly
a shortage of foreign exchange, clearly affected the economic performance
of the port. Tonnage of cargo handled and revenue derived fell below.
the levels of the old Port Management Department (cf. Tables 4*5 and
4*6). During the first two years of operations under the SLPA, a
deficit of Le29*748 was incurred for the year ending 31 December 1965,'**
and Lel84,136 for the year ending 31 December 1966, Much of this
deficit was created by a sharp increase in administrative and operating
costs at a period of 'slack* business activity. In a statement for
the Board prepared by the Authority's financial manager, the reasons
for the deficit were outlined. Some of these were associated with
the increased overheads of an autonomous public corporation or beyond
the control of the Authority, Under the old Port Management Department
the Railway Administration had been responsible for the purchasing of
supplies of the port:
'We now negotiate our own stores requirements 
direct with Grown Agents and we pay to them 
an average of Lel3,000 a month as deposit for 
goods now being ordered from the United 
Kingdom, In addition we now pay customs duty.
In 1966 we spent Le37,012,,,previously we
1 Port Authority Archive, Consolidated Profit and Loss Account for 
the year ending 31st December 1965,
2 Port Authority Archive, Consolidated Profit and Loss Account for 
the year ending 31st December 1966,
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received our goods free of duty.
Furthermore:
'...insurance premiums which were not 
previously paid are now being paid and 
these amount to Le30>000 annually'.^
The statement also argued with regard to the import substitution effect
of goods manufactured in local light industries since-the early 'sixties:
'••.although...of immense'help to the 
country as a whole, yet we are robbed of
our revenue as very few of these items
are now being imported
The other reasons for the deficit, however, had their origins in the
trends in the parastatal sector in the post-colonial state. The
junior staff of the Authority had succeeded through their union in
reversing the old policy under which they were employed as daily paid
workers with no fringe benefits. While the casual labour system for
workers involved in shore cargo handling was maintained, clerks,
artisans, and other skilled or semi-skilled labour were now entitled
to paid holidays and pensions on retirement:
•Leave gratuity not previously paid to all 
members of staff is now being paid and this 
is around Lel6,000 per annum'.4
Moreover, overtime payments amounted to over a third of the total
wages and salary bill and the permanent staff of the Authority had
increased by seventeen times between 1962 and 1967 (Table 4-.7). The
Authority had also undertaken to provide accommodation for its senior
management staff at a subsidised rent:
1 Port Authority Archive, Acting Chief Accountant to General 
Manager SLPA, 22 February 1967.
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TABLE 4.5














SOURCES: Pre-1966 figures from Port Authority Archive, Annual Returns
of tonnage of cargo handled; post-1966 figures from Port 












1966 ‘ Le 642,089
SOURCES: Pre-1965 figures from Port Authority Archive,
Annual Financial Statements; 1965 and 1966 
figures from Port Authority Archive, Consolidated 
Profit and Loss Accounts, 1965 and 1966.
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’Prior to vesting day, our officers were 
occupying government quarters and rents 
were collected from their respective 
salaries; since vesting day, we have had 
cause to lease houses for each of these 
officers at an average of Lei,800 per annum; 
this is exclusive of cost of furniture 
which to my estimation is around Le900 for 
each flat; in addition we are now paying 
general and water rate charges, for each 
house, and I guess we will have to pay 
city rates as well.'1 .
The main action taken by the Board with regard to the financial 
situation was to secure cuts in overtime payments by introducing the 
shift work system* Efforts were also made to recover large outstanding 
debts from port users* The Board further decided that senior non- 
expatriate officials should not be entitled to subsidised housing but 
that they could apply for mortgages (financed by the* Authority) under 
certain conditions* The actual expenditure of each department was to 
be closely monitored against planned expenditure. By the middle of 
1967, the shift system had been fully implemented, and the cost control 
strategy applied throughout the Authority. The Accounts'department 
prepared a statement showing that the Authority was out of the red by 
the first quarter of 1968 (cf. Table A.8). The statement also asserted 
that:
. ’Prior to September 1967, much control had 
not been exercised on soaring departmental 
costs. There had been great improvement in 
this control aspect since the first quarter 
of 1968 as departmental heads were often 
requested to explain adverse variances, i.e., 
when actual costs exceeded budgeted figures*’2
Thus, complementing the IMF stabilisation programme which led to an
upturn in the national economy by 1968, there was the successful
imposition of a stringent regime of financial discipline at the level
1 Ibid*
2 Port Authority Archive, Brief comments on attached graphs and 





CATEGORY 1954 1962 1967
Permanent 4 0 ^ 76,(3) 1 3 0 3 ^  ^
Daily wage
i—1"a
6 2 9 ^ 1 0 3 ^
Casual 1 6 2 8 ^ 6 0 5 2 ^ 5 6 7 8 ^




(1) Port Authority Archive, Governor’s Annual Address, 8 October 
1954 (notes prepared by the Port Manager on the activities of 
the port for the governor’s annual review of the work of the 
administration at the Legislative Council).
(2) Sierra Leone, Annual Report of the Labour Department 1954 
(figure excludes stevedores).
(3) Port Authority Archive, Work Force, March 1962*
(4) Sierra Leone, Annual Report of the Labour Department 1962 (this 
figure is the total- number of dock labourers and stevedores 
registered at the port labour pool).
(5) Port Authority Archive, General Manager to Secretary, Sierra 
Leone Employers’ Federation, 18 July 1967.
(6) Sierra Leone, Annual Report of the Labour Department 1967 
(figure includes casual stevedore labourers).
Includes managerial staff which was 106 in 1967.
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TAELS 4.S







January 1 133,759 163,614 -29,855
February 219,535 156,992 +62,543
March 204., 032 165,854 +38,178 .
April 169,113 153,909 +15,204
May 207,353 179,093 +28,262
June 200,379 164,849 +33,730
TOTAL 134,373 984,311 150,062
SOURCE: Port Authority Archive, Graph and statistics showing the
revenue/cost position for the period January-June 1968, 
prepared by the. Management Accountant.
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of the port bureaucracy.
The SLPA 1970-76: erosion of accountability and financial collapse
With the restoration of civilian rule, the return of party
politics, and the withdrawal of the IMF, the resurgence of the old
politics of patronage soon became evident. In 1970, the chairman of
the Board of the SLPA appointed by the junta was replaced by a veteran
civil servant and businessman and a known sympathiser of the APC
during its years in opposition, Mr. 0. P. A. Macauley. The choice
of some of the other directors seems to have been influenced by their
loyalty to the regime. These included three party stalwarts and
among them the organiser of the women’s wing, Mrs. Nancy Steele. As
before, some civil servants with strong connections in the hierarchy
of the ruling party were appointed. The major port users and the
shipping companies were represented through the Chamber of Commerce.
The secretary of the Dock Workers’ Union, first elected in 1967, had
been appointed to the Board in keeping with the precedent that had
been set earlier. The report of the commission of inquiry appointed
after the financial collapse of the SLPA in 1976 was particularly
scathing as to the composition of the Board. This is worth quoting
at length as it gives an indication of the source from which the rot
began to spread within the Authority:
’The Board of the Authority is in the opinion 
of the commission not only too large but also 
ill composed. It was evident from the history 
of its activities culled from its minutes, 
that it was lacking in commercial expertise 
and overweighted needlessly by Government 
appointed members. True enough, the Authority 
is wholly owned by Government, but if it is 
to be of economic viability, it must be run 
on economic lines, implying a prerequisite of 
commercial expertise. The avowed aim of public 
officers appointed to the Board was the 
carrying out of government policy under all 
circumstances, and it is doubtful if any of 
them took back any meaningful report of the
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proceedings of meetings they attended to 
their respective Ministries..,The Board 
seemed incapable of making a firm decision 
and holding on to it; often it was vacillating 
and subject to unaccountable changes of mind.
It clearly maintained a double standard as is 
evidenced by its treatment of members of 
staff deserving of punishment for malpractices 
or grave misconduct...The Board displayed 
much weakness in failing to formulate any 
guiding policy, and worse, by not insisting 
on any laid down policy being carried out.
The chairman complained of being fettered by 
administrative directives from certain 
Ministries, Transport and Communications, and 
Finance being the two major offenders. He 
also said in his evidence to the Commission 
that he felt helpless without executive 
power. The Commission was keenly disappointed 
that a man of such commercial and administrative 
attainments could not have, during his six 
years as chairman, impressed that type of 
character on the Board. From the records he 
would not have been without support, at least 
from the representatives of the Chamber of 
Commerce whose record of service to the 
Authority is praise worthy. He adopted a 
negative attitude towards management, ’content 
to fill a little space' and let the Authority 
drift with the tide.’1
With the reassertion of the influence of patron-clientelist 
relationships in appointments to key positions in the public sector 
under the APC, it is evident that a gradual breakdown in effective 
accountability at the port occurred. As in the situation before 1970, 
the Ministry of Transport and Communications which had nominal 
responsibility for the SLPA never did impose formal procedures for 
the accountability of the Authority. In parliament,the official 
opposition, gradually undermined by APC authoritarianism, raised 
fewer questions about the government's management of the public sector
1 Sierra Leone, Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into 
all Aspects of the Affairs of the Sierra Leone Port Authority as 
a Viable Economic Revenue Making Establishment covering the 
Period 1st January 1965 to 4-th July 1976, Freetown, 1977. pp.7 "8 . 
(Throughout this study, this document will henceforth be referred 
to as The Forster Report.)
- 184 -
including the Produce Marketing Board which had traditionally attracted
the critical attention of opposition MPs. The Ministry of Transport
and the Ministry of Finance did intervene on several occasions; (this
was alluded to in the quotation from The Forster Report)• It' appears
however, that the main reason for intervention was to direct the
Board to extend credit facilities to selected individuals, companies,
and government departments* The large number of debtors and the huge
amount owed as documented by Forster (cf. Table 4*9), an important
consideration in the financial collapse of 1976, was largely a
consequence of this type of intervention. Furthermore, the Ports Act
(1964) stipulated that an annual statement of the financial accounts
of the Authority must be submitted to the Ministry of Transport for
1the minister to lay on the table of parliament. The ministry
apparently never bothered to scrutinise the accounts* It was Forster
who discovered that the accounts have been repeatedly falsified:
’The Commission was appalled at what it 
found,..Management1s Profit and Loss Accounts 
and the Balance Sheets thereon have never 
reflected the true financial operations of 
the Authority. Most of the adjustments 
necessary for this are seldom put through 
the records even though these adjustments 
are normally submitted to the Accounts 
section and discussed with them after each 
. audit.,.The deteriorating financial position 
of the Authority which became apparent in 
the past few years had been so much earlier.
The adverse financial, position was made 
much less obvious by window-dressing of the • 
accounts, coupled with faulty and inaccurate 
records - a violation of Section 33(2) of 
the Act...In 1972/3 for example, Management 
Accounts showed a record net profit of 
Le620,193. When the same account was audited 
by the External Auditors, the net profit 
was reduced to Le309,384> a net difference of 
Le310,809.’2
1 The Ports Act (1964) Sections 33-34> pp*16-17*
2 The Forster Report p.25*
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TABLE 4.9





SOURCES: (1) The Forster Report p.52-53 (Appendix 8).
(2) Ibid, p.53 (Appendix 8A)*
(3) Ibid, p. 54 (Appendix 8A).
Given the laxity with which the ministry and the Board approached
the affairs of the port, the professional management fully exploited
the resulting situation. The commission discovered several instances
of serious financial malpractices. First, foreign currency to the
.value of Le2,266 was held-in the office of the Chief Cashier for the
use of certain members of senior management named by the commission.'!*
This was in contravention of foreign exchange legislation. Second, '
cheques were exchanged for cash by the cashier, and the commission
discovered that cheques to the value of Lel96 had not been forwarded
o
to the banks of the individuals concerned for payment. Third, ’I
owe you1 chits were also exchanged for cash:
’The Commission was able to confirm that 
recovery was either delayed, slow, or 
abandoned as some chits dated back to 1971.
Lack of recovery and control over their issue 
has resulted in an outstanding balance of 
over Le9,000 as at 30th April 1976. Furthermore,
1 Ibid, Appendix 52, p.156.
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between 1975 and March 1976, a total of over 
Lel0,3o9 was approved by management as 
advances - personal, domestic, which in the 
Commission's view was meant to replace the 
chit system, but the latter was continued 
without any reason being given therefor.
And fourth, the commission discovered that the procedures governing
loans for mortgages, cars, and refrigerators were repeatedly flouted
'The Commission was satisfied that there 
was a lack of adequate supervision and 
control in the administration of salary 
advances to staff and this has resulted in 
a huge outstanding balance of Lel78,00Q...'2
Of this amount, housing loans accounted for Lel05,841, and car loans
3for Le62,150* The commission also discovered serious irregularities' 
in the purchase and administration of the Authority's stores and 
supplies,^ and in the financial returns from the Targrin-Kissy ferry
5
service as a result of which several hundred thousands of leones 
were lost to the Authority.
These malpractices appear to have spread all the way down the
line. For the lower placed employees, the system of overtime payments
was the most obvious opportunity for graft. The overtime system which
had been brought under control in 1968 was again being abused by the
early 'seventies:
'With the introduction of~the shift system, 
the Authority hoped to have helped relieve 
unemployment among dock workers and that 
working extra hours would have been kept at 
a minimum. On the contrary, it was the rule 
rather than the exception, A wide spectrum 






and though it gave the Commission cause for 
concern, yet it seemed it had the blessing of 
management itself, notwithstanding the various 
circulars issued ad hoc, since provision for 
overtime in the budget was invariably about 
50/o of the amount provided for salaries/wages#**
The annual budget was usually overspent by as
much as 70%.'1
With the workforce already artificially inflated (the permanent 
workforce had increased from 1,303 in .1967 to 2,064 in 1976, ’...in 
the opinion of the Commission much in excess of that required for 
the economic productivity of the Authority1), the abuse of the overtime
system also took its toll on the finances of the Authority.
Another concern of the commission was with the security force
operating at the port. Given the evident paranoia of the government
over officers in uniform, the security force, numbering 126 in 1976
3
and costing some Le200,000 per annum was directly recruited by the
Ministry of Transport. Thus, ’...the Authority was not in a position
to exercise adequate discipline over the force in consequence, and
the drain on its meagre finances was a constant source of irritation
to the Board Moreover, the commission implicated the force in the
notorious breaches of security at the.port:
’The Force did not distinguish itself by 
any mark of loyalty or efficient service to 
the Authority, and seemed impotent to check 
the thriving pilferage which was being 
carried on...There was also sufficient 
evidence given to the Commission of the 
fact that a good .deal of stolen and pilfered 
goods went through one or other of the many 
gates of the Controlled Area.’5
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Given the erosion of accountability within the port bureaucracy, and 
given the large scale diversion of resources, the economic viability 
of the Authority was soon in doubt. By the middle of 1975, it was 
clear that the Authority had great difficulties in meeting its ■ 
financial commitments and that it was on the brink of financial 
collapse. One of the earliest indications of the plight of, the 
Authority was its inability to finance the removal of siltation from 
the seabed of the berths - an operation routine enough and which would 
normally be provided for in budget estimates. The acting General 
Manager solicited a loan from the Oil Refinery for this purpose and 
suggested that it would be repaid by waiving future claims against 
the Refinery for port dues.'*' Ten days later, the acting General
Manager wrote to the Electricity Corporation requesting permission to
2
pay outstanding bills in monthly installments of Le5,000. By the end 
of the year the Crown Agents made it clear that the Authority’s _ 
orders would not be processed until all outstanding debts to the tune 
of Le300,000 had been settled.^ Early in 1976, the Authority had 
difficulties in meeting its own wages and salary bills. A series of ' 
sensational articles soon appeared in We Yone, the APC newspaper, 
exposing >corruption1 at the port. These served notice that the 
system of patronage could not be expected to protect the directors 
and senior officials of the Authority, A few months later, in August, 
the Forster Commission was appointed.
The management for its part argued at the commission that there
1 Port Authority Archive, Acting General Manager SLPA to General 
Manager Sierra Leone Oil Refinery, 21 August 1975*
2 Port Authority Archive, Acting General Manager SLPA to General 
Manager Sierra Leone Electricity Corporation, 31 August 1975*
3 The Forster Report, p.13.
were other reasons which equally contributed to the financial collapse.
First, it was pointed out that the government had entered into an
agreement with the mining companies exempting them from harbour dues.
Between 1968 and 1972, it was contended that revenue to the tune of
Le875,297 was lost as a result of the agreement. Indeed, the commission
accepted that ’...the Authority has been deprived of much revenue
because of government’s agreement with the raining companies concerned,
and some way should be found to make payments to the Authority for
the services rendered to these companies, or the Authority would be
1found to be subsidising the mining companies1. Second, the debtors
to the Authority apart, (a large proportion was owed by the public
sector, Table 4 .9 ), it was contended that the Produce Marketing Board
contested porterage charges to the tune of Le89,13S between 1969 and 
21971. Third, the management argued that, although the Ports Act
had stipulated that stevedoring should be one of the functions of
the Authority so that a fully integrated system of porterage would be
provided, the shipping companies had, in 1964, successfully lobbied
to retain this function. In 1971, stevedoring was nationalised and
the newly formed National Shipping Company was given monopoly rights
to provide the service. It was pointed out that stevedoring is an .
extremely profitable business (the overheads are very low) especially
where casual labour is used. The commission accepted that ’...this
is a very sore point with the Authority and justifiably so,.,.
Incredible as it may seem the Authority is wholly owned by government
3
and cutting the nose to spite the face never did anyone any good'.
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Finally it, was contended that the Dock vforkors' Union adopted
agressive bargaining tactics, and was largely responsible for the
abuse of the overtime system, The commission rejected these arguments;
'The lover grades, the daily waged, 
particularly the casual dock workers need 
encouragement to help boost productivity.
For this class, the most important factor 
is security of employment and there is, in
the opinion of the commission, no valid
reason why the Authority should not start
a social security scheme of its own, for 
the dock workers, by setting aside a modicum 
of the porterage fees collected, be it a mere 
1% thereof, for funding such a project**!
The commission however recommended that the permanent staff of the
Authority *•«.grossly in excess of present requirements*••should be
2
reduced considerably'.
The conclusion reached by the commission was that the bureaucratic
organisation of the port (including the chain of responsibility to the
Ministry of Transport ana Communications and ultimately to parliment)
was adequate to maintain effective accountability:
'The Commission is firmly of the opinion 
that the infrastructure of the Authority 
is substantially sound and, but for the 
pronounced human failings due to greed and 
selfishness of many senior officials, the 
Authority would not have been as financially 
crippled and demoralised as it was 
, immediately preceding 1th July 1976**3
Following the logic of this conclusion, the commission-recommended
the dismissal of several senior officials and the reconstitution of
the whole Board,
While Forster may have been correct in laying blame for the
financial collapse on the Board and the management of the SLPA (after





be seen to be doing something about an important or embarrassing 
problem), corruption in Sierra Leone does not originate from the 
personal characteristics of individuals. On the contrary, it 
originates from within a political system in which a low premium is 
placed on the accountability of public servants, not withstanding 
the moral indignation expressed from time to time in budget speeches 
and on other occasions of the statement of government policy. It 
cannot be overemphasised that in Sierra Leone, political competition 
is quite literally a struggle for access to the resources of the 
state. Once such access has been obtained, prominent and influential 
members of the elite are incorporated into the ruling establishment 
by the- offer of rewards for their cooperation. Those so rewarded are 
then expected to use their influence among their communal groups to 
build up loyalty to the ruling party. In this way a pervasive system 
of political clientelism becomes established. If the adage 'seek 
ye first the political kingdom and all things will be added thereafter' 
had a figurative meaning for Nkrumah, it must be taken quite literally 
in Sierra Leone. There is little idealism or vision in Sierra Leone 
politicsj nor is there a clearly discemable strategy of economic 
development. Development planning, the approach to the major issues . 
of international' affairs, or issues of political principle are all ' 
incidental to the fundamental political objectives of the control and 
expansion of the apparatus of the state. Gaffney, in his study of 
the civil service, concludes that the input to a coherent strategy 
of development came primarily from the professionals within the service 
and foreign aid administrators-(but he is also careful to point out 
. that, shopping lists of desirable projects apart, neither had the 
colonial authorities a coherent strategy).'** Perhaps no other
1 Gf. H. H. Gaffney, op. cit.. Ch. 12.
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politician has demonstrated a fundamental understanding of the structure" 
of politics and the political culture as great as that of President 
Siaka Stevens, Acutely aware of the potentialities of the patronage 
system from his frustrated years in opposition, and having seen the 
army intervene (initially at the behest of the defeated government) 
to deny him the victory he had so narrowly won in the relatively 
freely contested elections in 1967, Stevens has been better placed 
than his political rivals to manipulate the system of patronage. 
Tinkering with the Westminster style constitution bequeathed by the 
British first to create a Republic, and more recently a single party 
state to provide him with, greater control over the system, Stevens 
has also■intervened on several occasions (and external pressure has 
evidently been an influence) to restrain the kleptocratic behaviour 
of some of the elite occupying positions in public service - and who 
occupy these positions as a result of his patronage. The appointment 
of the commission of inquiry under the respected judge S. J. Forster 
to examine the affairs of the port bureaucracy is a case in point.
With regard to the problematic task of situating lower paid 
workers in a public corporation in the political economy, two 
propositions are now offered (and these will be taken up again In ' 
the chapters which follow). First, as a parastatal in the post­
colonial state, the SLPA did not operate in the manner or by the 
criteria of the typical capitalist enterprise (i.e. profit-making via 
surplus appropriation)• With the gradual erosion of accountability 
within the port bureaucracy, what emerged was the tendency of its 
employees (including lower paid workers) to plunder the resources 
of the Authority. As Forster saw it:
'There was clearly prevalent throughout the
Authority an enervating attitude of 'how for
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do?1, as is nebulously expressed in Krio,
A yet more deleterious penchant as widespread 
as the foregoing attitude is to be found in 
the satiric Krio proverb of the cow eating 
grass where it is tethered,'1
Given the prevalence of such attitudes, the notion of anti-capitalist
protest may not be very relevant. Second, (and this point will be more
fully illustrated in Chapter 5)j dock workers cannot be accurately
regarded as an aristocracy of labour. Notwithstanding a system of
patronage to which many owe their jobs, life at the bottom of the
social heap (in what is really a poor country even by third world
standards) in terms of housing, 'family access to education and medicare,
rules out such considerations. Nor can dock workers be said to be
doing work which is not essential to the market economy even if their
productivity is low as a result of overmanning. Patrons do not in
fact 'look after their.own* on a continuous basis. Help may be
given in finding jobs and at times of acute adversity but there are
no regular handouts. That casual dock labourers survive at all is
because of the resilience of the informal economy. Indeed, Forster
felt moved to recommend some kind of a social security system for
this category of docker.
1 The Forster Report, p*iii0
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SECTION 3
THE PROBLEM OF SITUATING LOWER PAID DOCKERS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF SIERRA LEONE: AN EXAMINATION
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Chapter 5
Dock workers of the port of Freetown: a sociological profile
An important dimension to the further elaboration of the problem 
of situating the dockers in the political economy of Sierra Leone is 
an appraisal of the general sociological characteristics they exhibit, 
the material conditions in which they find themselves relative to the 
other ’classes’, their 'world view’, and their relationship to processes 
of patron-clientelism• The pursuit of these empirical questions by 
the researcher in the field may be greatly affected by his. approach to 
the workers, their acceptance of him, and his own definition and 
selection of what is to be regarded as important. Nonetheless the 
research strategy was formulated with an awareness of.these problems 
in mind as will be evident from the discussion of the methodology that 
follows# While the ’objective conditions’ are the first to be 
considered, the appraisal of the social and cultural relations "of the 
dockers cannot be ignored. Glass consciousness (without which classes 
can hardly be said to exist as political entities) is expressed in, 
and conditioned by, prevailing social and cultural formations#^
Before examining the empirical evidence however, it is necessary to 
outline the methodology employed and to visit the theoretical ground.
Methodology
Four separate strategies were adopted in the attempt to reconstruct 
the world of the docker from his own standpoint. Formal interviews 
were held with certain key individuals including union officials, shop 
stewards, union activists, and a cross section of the rank and file on
1 See the writings of Antonio Gramsci for an elaboration of this
truism, e.g,, Selections from Political Writings (edited by Quentin 
Hoare), London, 1977 (2 volumes).
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issues relating to the history of their union, leadership crises, and 
union struggles* Most of these informants had been participants in 
these events or reliable observers of the growth and evolution of the 
union* Similar interviews were held with past and present officials 
of national labour centres* Second, informal conversations were held 
with many dockers covering a wide range of issues from the trivial to 
the more serious consideration of the society of which they are a 
part* These conversations took place over a five-month period from 
January to July 1980 at road-side bars in the Kanike and Cline Tbwn 
areas near the port, usually during the midday work break or in the 
evenings at the end of the day’s work, and also during the second 
period' of field work in February 1982, mostly in the evenings* Third, 
a questionnaire survey of a 1 in 96 sample of casual dockers and a 
1 in 12 sample of non-casual dockers was undertaken. The questions 
asked had been designed to tease out some of the various strands in 
the ideological beliefs held by dockers with particular regard to what 
may be termed their ’class consciousness’; to assess their knowledge 
of, and participation in the Dock Workers’ Union and to elicit 
information on their attitudes to trade unionism, trade union leadership, 
and strike action; and finally to obtain some basic sociological data 
on the dockers and their material environment (cf, annexure),
Permission had been granted by the port management to undertake 
research at the port and the secretary of the Dock Workers’
Union had asked all shop stewards to cooperate and inform workers of 
the research. The questionnaire was administered during the second 
half of May 1980 with the help of an assistant engaged only for this 
. purpose. He was Alfred Josiah, a literacy instructor in the employ of 
the Port Authority, Josiah was chosen because of his totally unassuming 
character, his sense of humour, and because - as a literacy instructor -
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he was held in high esteem by many dockers, some of whom had attended 
his classes* It was impressed upon him, as it had been impressed upon 
all others, that the researcher was wholly independent, and that the 
purpose of the research was academic and specifically for a London 
University thesis. The internal organisational politics of the Port 
Authority, the Labour Department, the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, and the government, it was repeatedly emphasised, had 
nothing to do with the research. The workers had been selected 
randomly from each of the categories of dockers (clerical, skilled 
manual, unskilled manual, and casual) after a total enumeration of . 
dockers in each category. The venue chosen for the administration of 
the questionnaire was a classroom in the training department of the 
Port Authority, The workers participating in the survey were invited 
during working hours, two at a time, to the classroom where Josiah and 
the researcher interviewed each in Krio, translating from the - 
questionnaire, and simultaneously writing down the replies in English. 
Clerks and other literate dockers were encouraged to fill in the 
questionnaire themselves with Josiah and the researcher being available 
to clarify queries.
The fourth strategy was pursued during June 1980. The research 
had until that stage been largely concerned with dockers at work and 
related issues. In order to broaden the perspective by a small degree, 
it was decided to observe some dockers in their home environment. This 
was a rather difficult task as dock workers do not live in any 
particular area of Freetown, although a significant proportion have 
residences scattered over the eastern part of Greater Freetown - an 
area covering some fifteen square miles. Twelve dockers were'selected 
from among those who had become particularly friendly with the researcher, 
and evening visits to their homes were arranged. These dockers belonged 
in equal proportions to the clerical, skilled, unskilled and casual
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groups. The conversation during such visits was trivial and informal; 
the opportunity was used however to observe living conditions and to 
assess their standard of living.
Throughout the fieldwork the researcher endeavoured to present 
himself in a manner that was intended to convey to the dockers that 
he fully identified with them and was broadly sympathetic to their 
hopes and aspirations. Complete informality was maintained in all 
encounters with dockers. Krio was the main medium of communication 
but words of greeting in Mende and Temne were expressed when appropriate 
in a conscious attempt to convey that the researcher had no ethnocentric 
illusions. Dock workers participated willingly in the project; the 
researcher was fully accepted.
Visitation to the theoretical ground: the relevance of data on social 
stratifi cation
The relevance (and importance) of Hitching1s work on class in
Kenya to the debate on class formation in contemporary African
societies lies in his contention that the ’exploiting1 and the
’exploited’ classes are not at all neatly and simply identifiable in
terms of their position in the mode of production. This is essentially
because ’socially necessary labour’ and ’surplus labour’ (or surplus
value) cannot be unambiguously identified and also because it is
generally the case that the same person occupies differing positions
(’exploiter’ and ’exploited’) in different modes of production at one
and the-same time (e.g. the urban wage earner who also employs hired
labour on his farm). On the other hand however,
’...if there was not surplus labour time 
being worked in Kenya it would not be 
possible for money to be accumulated and to 
become capital. We must look for exploitation 
then not in the direct relation of surplus 
labour appropriator to surplus labour source 
but in the capacity of various strata to- 
accumulate money in the form of capital... 
those who can accumulate money and capital
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on any scale at all must be in control of 
part of the product of Kenya’s surplus 
labour# The more and faster they can accumulate, 
the greater must be their share of surplus 
labour.T
Kitching goes on to identify the groups in control of this surplus:
’merchant capitalists proper##.both foreign- 
owned import/export firms, and on a smaller 
scale African and Asian merchant capitalists 
operating in the domestic market, and (in a 
few cases) in the international market too; 
the best-paid public sector employees, and 
especially officials in the state and 
parastatal sector*..and to a small extent, 
domestic retailers and wholesalers.##’2
Now, although Kitching does not admit as much, this amounts to a
sophisticated Marxist rationale for treating income levels or levels
of capital accumulation (normally dismissed by Marxists as the criteria
of ’bourgeois stratification theory1) as the clearest possible indicator
3
of class position to which one can aspire m  African conditions* Hie 
endemic corruption (which Kitching does not take sufficiently into 
account as a means of capital accumulation) associated with political 
clientelism in the post-colonial state is, of course, also relevant# ' 
The pattern of income distribution in Sierra Leone closely 
resembles that depicted by Kitching for Kenya.. Table 5*1 shows the 
distribution of national incomes among rural and non-rural groups in 
1968/69 and 1975/76, and in particular draws attention to a trend for 
rural (farmers1) money income to rise faster than that of urban incomes. 
Although this shows the cash incomes of urbanities to have been much 
higher, in general, than that of rural dwellers, it must be doubted 
whether the difference in total incomes, taking subsistence and 
accommodation expenses into account, is very great, certainly as far
1 Gavin Kitching, op. cit#* p.449*
2 Ibid# pp.419-50.
3 Cf* Richard Jeffries, Glass. Power and Ideology, pp.169-185, for 
the use of just such an approach#
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TABLE 5*1
Rural and non-rural per capita incomes in Sierra Leone, 1968/69 and 
1975/76 (figures in Leones)
1968/69 1975/76
+Rural per capita 56 115
Urban per capita 238 351
Non-rural per capita 
(includes mining areas) 219 376
Average income 108 186
Non-rural:rural ratio 1:1 3:1
-t,
excludes imputed income from subsistence farm 
production
SOURCE: The Jaspa Report* p. 31*
as urban manual workers are concerned. Table 5.2 shows the distribution 
of national income among aggregate groups in 1975/76 and confirms this 
view. In aggregate, farmers are better off than manual workers. This 
does not mean, however, that farmers have been given a fair deal or 
that they have been treated generously enough to stem the flow of 
rural-urban migration. Farmers* incomes depend on the type of crop 
cultivated. Farmers producing esqport crops such as coffee, cocoa, or 
ginger, would have received higher incomes relative to farmers 
producing food crops such as rice. This is because of the deliberate 
policy of successive post-colonial governments to intervene in the 
market (under pressure from urban dwellers) to keep the price of food 
artificially low. Thus Table 5.3(a), in giving a breakdown of the 
distribution of income among disaggregated groups, provides a more 
detailed overview. It is clear from this table that not all farmers
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are better off than urban manual workers. In reading the table, however,
the categories which should be isolated for comparison with the others
are unskilled (per capita income, Le425 per annum), skilled (per capita
income, LeS95 per annum), and clerical (per capita income, Le2,333 Per
annum). The vast majority of dockers belong to the unskilled category;
but, that aside, minimum wages obtaining at the port in '1976 (for
dockers eligible to join the union or who did not fall within grades
A-B of the Port Authority1s pay scale) stood at Le585 per annum (this
assumes 300 working days a year for casual dockers) and maximum wages 
X
stood at Lei,780. Moreover, these wages amounted in real terms to
about half their value in 1965. While nearly all groups must have 
suffered an erosion in the real value of their incomes as a result of 
the inflationary tendencies in the economy, particularly after 1973> 
this would appear to have been especially acute in the case of lower 
paid workers. Although the total incomes of such workers, certainly 
the dockers1, were supplemented by (often dishonest) claims for 
overtime payment and, as we shall see, by their involvement in 
secondary employment in the informal sector, this supplement was not 
at all comparable in (even relative) magnitude to the windfalls 
obtained by better place individuals (members of the elite) from 
political and bureaucratic corruption. While the availability of 
such monies to well placed individuals among the elite arguably 
accounts for the major proportions of their real incomes, this is 
certainly not the case for lower paid parastatal employees. The latter 
are therefore far from being the most direct or favoured beneficiaries 
of the system of patron-clientelism and corruption; and, in several 
respects, may be seen to suffer from it. The embezzlement of government
1 Gf. The Forster Report. Appendix 3, p.4-9.
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TABLE 5.2
Functional distribution of income, aggregated groups. 1975/76
GROUP AVERAGE
INCOME
PERCENTAGE . CUMULATIVE 
PERCENTAGE
VliHDJNEb
PER ANNUM) NUMBERS INCOME NUMBERS INCOME
Unskilled 125 6.1 3.2 6.1 3.2
Informal sector 125 18.3 9.5 21*1 12.7
Non agricultural 522 13.7 8.8 38.1 21.5
Semi-skilled 630 1.1 3.2 12.2 21.7
Farmers 610 18.8 38.1 91.0 63.1
Skilled 895 2.9 3.2 93.9 66.3
Clerical 1,870 2.3 5.2 96.2 71.5
Professional/
Managerial 6,500 0.9 7.2 97.1 78.7
Formal sector 
entrepreneurs 9,800 2.9 21.2 100.0 100.0
L
=656,000 =Le536M
SOURCE: The JASPA Report, p. 279
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TABLE 5.3(a)











NOS. ■'INCOME NOS. INCOME
Farmers I 48 8 171 7.3 1.5 7.3 1.5
Hawkers 45 10 300 6.9 1.9 14.2 3.4
Farmers II 93 37 399 14.2 6.9 28.4 10.3
Unskilled 40 17 425 6.1 3.2 34.5 13.5
Non
agricultural 90 47 522 13.7 . 8.8 48.2 22.3
Vendors 40 21 530 6.1 3.9 54.3 26.2
Artisans 35 20 566 5.3 3.7 59.6 29.9
Farmers III 70 43 619 10.7 8.1 70.3 38.0
Semi-skilled 27 17 630 4.1 3.2 74.4 41.2
Farmers IV 45 39 869 6.9 7.3 81.3 48.5
Skilled 19 17 895 2.9 3.2 84.2 51.7
Farmers V 51 58 1,131 7.8 10.8 92.0 62.5
Farmers VI 13 21 1,585 2.0 3.8 93.9 66.3
Clerical 15 35 2,333 2.3 5.2 96.3 71.5
Retailers 14 58 4,143 2.1 12.1 98.4 83.6
Managerial/
Professional 6 39 6,500 0.9 7.2 99.3 90.8
Formal sector 
entrepreneurs 5 49 9,800 0.8 9.1 100.0 100.0
TOTAL 656 536
1. .
SOURCE: The JASPA Report, p.282, 
Mo = Million, NOS. = Numbers
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or parastatal monies by these members of the elite* for example* 
clearly has an adverse effect on governments ability to finance wage 
increases for lower paid workers (at least without resort to simply 
printing money)
Furthermore* while there are immediate differences between low 
income rural groups and low income urban groups over such issues as 
the official level of food prices and* in particular, the importing 
and subsidising of rice, it is clear that these are really subsidiary 
to the major conflict between the political and administrative elite 
together with some capitalist business on the one hand* and the low 
income rural and urban workforce on the other.
Ghat there is very considerable inequality of incomes (and in the 
rate of capital accumulation) between the various socio-economic groups 
should be evident. Less than four per cent of the population receive 
a third of the national income. The highest income group receive 
almost sixty times as much as the lowest income groups. That income 
inequality in Sierra Leone is one of the highest in the world should 
be evident from Table 5.3(b), Comparison of the 1968 figures in this 
table with the 1975/76 figures in Table 5.3(a), however* suggests that 
the dimensions of the problem have improved, but not significantly.
These indices do not by themselves, however* provide a full 
picture. For instance* it is preferable to use the household of the 
dockers as the unit of income assessment since wives and other inmates
For an indication of the scale of elite corruption in the public 
sector* cf.* e.g., Sierra Leone, Report of the Auditor-General for 
the Years 1974-79. Freetown* 1980.
For an elaboration of this theme, cf. R, ;Bates* Markets and States
in Tropical Africa, esp. pp.30-44. The exbent to which official
agricultural policy has contributed to the discouragement of
farmers and to their low receipts has been discussed by Olu
Williams in 'Agro-Rural Development Strategies: Fast* Present and
Etttpre-1* paper presented at the 11th Annual Conference of the 
Agrxcultural Society of Sierra Leone* held at Njala University
P.T.O.
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contribute to family income typically via participation in the thriving 
informal economy. Some dockers themselves undertake secondary 
employment in this sector. The questionnaire survey was designed to 
probe these (and other aspects of their social and cultural as well as 
economic lives) more deeply.
The material environment of the dockers and aspects of their social life 
One consequence of the low incomes of the dockers and the resulting 
pressure to make ends meet is that some resort to secondary employment. 
There is clearly a demand for various types of service outside the 
formal sector of the economy where capital intensive methods are 
prevalent or formal contracts mandatory. Many therefore resort to 
informal contracts. 8.3% of the clerks, 20% of the skilled manuals, 
20.6% of the unskilled manuals, and 14*7% of the casuals in the sample 
reported having some form of secondary employment. Among the jobs 
listed were tailoring and secretarial work (including writing letters 
for a fee) by clerks; mechanical repairs, carpentry, and other building 
repairs mentioned by skilled manuals; night watching and woroko woroko 
(or load carrying) mentioned by casual and unskilled dockers (cf.
Table 5.4(a))*
The average annual household income of the dockers (including 
estimated earnings from secondary employment) is provided in Table 
5.4(b). It will be evident that these averages are considerably 
higher than the minimum and maximum wages obtaining at the port in 
1976. The range of incomes within each category of dockers, however, 
more clearly illustrates the importance of the contribution of 
secondary employment and of household members to family income. 
Household members were invariably petty traders, accounting for 66.17%
College, 24th-27th March 1982. I am grateful to Mr. Williams for 
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of the occupations of inmates of casual dockers* homes; 68.69% of 
unskilled manual dockers1; 66.66% of skilled manuals1; and 52.77% of 
clerical dockers' homes (cf. Table 5.4(c)). This predominance of
petty traders in the informal economy of Freetown has been noted by
1 2 David Fowler in his 1976 survey and by Katherine Mosely in her 1979
study of Safroko Limba migrants in Freetown. Both report a predominance
of women petty traders, typically hawking foodstuffs ranging from
cookery or home-produced meals to fruits and vegetables as well as
gara or tied-dyed cloth. Fowler notes that his trend is a consequence
of the '...stagnation in opportunities for wage employment expansion
of the urban economy; most job seekers face a choice of self employment
or indefinite unemployment.' The low capital input, flexible working
hours, and relative simplicity of petty trading, which can be
conveniently combined with other domestic chores such as looking after
young children, make this form of employment particularly attractive
to women. Accordingly, an inescapable spectacle on the streets of
Freetown is of women and their fannah markits (or tray of wares). The
1966-69 series of household surveys by the Central Statistics Office^
1 D. Fowler, op. Cit.
2 K* Moseley, op. cit; cf. also J.. Gugler and W. Flanagan,
Urbanisation and Social Change in West Africa, pp.138-141, for an
account of 'market mammies' on the sub-continent.
3 D. Fowler, ibid, p.4.
4 The results of these surveys have been published by the Central 
Statistics Office under the following titles: Household Survey of 
the Western Province; Economic and Expenditure, 1966-58;
Household Survey of the Northern Province; Economic and Expenditure, 
1966-68; Household Survey of the Eastern Province; Economic and 
Expenditure, 1966-68; Household Survey of the Southern province; 
Economic and Expenditure. 1966-68; Household Survey of the Western 
Province; Household Characteristics and Housing Conditions 1968-69;
. Household Survey of the Northern Province Urban Areas; Household 
Characteristics and Housing Conditions 1968-69; Household Survey 
of the Eastern Province Urban Areas: Household Characteristics and 
Housing Conditions 1968-69; Household Survey of the Southern- 
Province Urban Areas: Household Characteristics and Housing"
P.T.O.
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TABLE 5.4(a)
The incidence of secondary employment among categories of dockers




Total no. of dockers 
in category (N)
Clerks 8.33 36 432
Skilled Manuals 20.00 60 720
Unskilled
Manuals 20. 6S 29; 348
Casuals 14.70 68 6,528
TOTAL 193 8,028
(Figures are given in percentages and have not been rounded). Sample 
size and total numbers are also shown.
TABLE 5.4(b)
Household annual incomes (in Leones) among categories of dockers
CATEGORY MEAN RANGE
Clerks 1422.60 1080- 3360
Skilled Manuals 1910.52 744 - 3660
Unskilled Manuals 1022.88 660 - 1824
Casuals 633.48 45 - 1560
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significantly listed * sales work1 as among 1••*predominant occupations
in Freetown and other urban places1.^  More specifically, a full
quarter of the Freetown labour force at the end of 1967 was involved 
2in petty trading.
Apart from undertaking secondary employment, or having household 
members who are employed therein, most dockers1 households make 
purchases of their basic necessities in this sector. 98.5/5 of casual 
dockers reported that their households purchased more than half the 
items listed in the questionnaire in small quanitities (e.g. sugar by 
the spoonful) and consequently from this sector. All unskilled manual 
dockers, 58*3% of skilled manual dockers, and 52.8% of clerical dockers 
also reported making purchases of more than half of the items -Listed 
outside the formal economy (Table 5«4-(d) has the details).
In view of the widespread belief that the African extended family 
system has built into it some form of social security mechanism - 
with automatic redistribution from more affluent relatives to poorer 
ones - which cushions off lower paid workers from some of the 
hardships of urban life, the sample was specifically asked whether 
they had ever resorted to borrowing money at the end of the month (pay 
day) as a result of not being able to meet all commitments* No less 
than 63% of each of the four categories of dockers reported that they 
sometimes borrowed money at the end of the month (Table 5*5(a)). Of 
those replying that they sometimes borrowed, however, less than 20% 
of each of the four categories reported that they borrowed from well-off 
kinsmen and relatives (cf. Table 5-5(b) foi* the details). Most
Conditions 1968-69; Household Survey of the Rural Areas of the 
Provinces: Household Characteristics and Housing Conditions 1968- 
69* All titles are published in 1969 in Freetown.
1 Central Statistics Office, Household Survey of the Western Province: 
Economic and Expenditure, 1966-69. Final Report, p.ll.
2 Ibid. p.3.
-  212 -






Trader 52*77 66,66 68.69 66.17
Unskilled (Labourer, 
Domestic) 2.77 16.66 6.89 6.4-7
Skilled (Clerical, 
Artisan, etc*) 8.33 3.33 - -
Unemployed 5*55 - 17.24 20.00
Students 30.55 13.33 . 6.89 7.35
TOTAL 99.97 99.98 99.98
L _
99.99
TABLE 5.4(d) Percentages of occupational categories purchasing more 







rather borrowed from friends or neighbours or, in the case of unskilled 
workers especially, from professional money-lenders. The sample was 
then asked whether they were assisting any relative other than 
immediate family, financially or materially. No less than 56% of each 
of the categories replied that they were helping relatives (Table 5.5(c)). 
This confirmed the impression which had been formed during informal 
conversations with the dockers. Assistance may be given by more 
affluent relatives or kinsmen in finding jobs or at times of acute 
adversity, but there are no regular cash handouts.1 Moreover, the 
principle of reciprocity - an important cultural phenomenon in Sierra 
Leone as in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa - precludes many lower 
paid workers from seeking assistance from affluent relatives.
The proletarianisation of lower paid dockers can be further
illustrated by some indices of their standard of living. None of the
unskilled manuals, 5.9% of the casuals, 18.3% of the skilled manuals,
and 19.4% of the clerks were owner-occupiers of their homes (Table 5*6(a))
A very liberal index of six persons to one room en pariah (or one
bedroom and parlour/living room) was used to define overcrowding in
the households of the dockers. By this definition, 41»4% of unskilled
manuals, 38.2% of casuals, 18.3% of skilled manuals and 14% of clerks
o
lived in conditions of overcrowding (Table 5.6(b)). The type of 
material out of which the home is constructed and the degree of 
protection provided thereby from the elements is not only evidence of 
position in the class structure but is also an index of standard of 
living. More than two-thirds of the clerks and over half of the 
skilled manuals lived in cement houses. By contrast only 20.7% and 
26.5% of the unskilled manuals and the casuals respectively lived in
1 For similar conclusions in relation to southern Ghana, cf. Richard
Jeffries, Glass. Power and Ideology, p.182.
2 The problem of overcrowding must be apparent to the most superficial
P.T.O.
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such houses, with a greater proportion living in pan body homes (i.e.
houses constructed out of shanty-type corrugated tin; cf. Table 5.6(c)).
Over 80% of the clerks had both electricity and running water in
their homes. About half of the skilled manuals had electricity but
only a third had running water* On the other hand, less than 10% of
the unskilled and casuals had either electricity or running water in
their homes (cf. Table 5.6(d)). The sample was asked which of these
five luxury items they owned: ‘fridge, radio or tape, TV, car,
motorbike or bicycle. None had all five items. 5.6% of the clerks
owned four of the items. A further 8.3% of this category and 3.3% of
the skilled manuals owned three of the items (cf. Table 5.6(e)), but
the large majority of unskilled and casual workers owned none.
Various aspects of the social lives of the dockers were examined.
98% of the sample frequently attended a church or mosque* In Freetown
(as well as in other parts of Sierra Leone), churches and mosques tend
to cater for particular ethnic groups. Thus, for example, Christian
Mende dockers tend to worship in a Mende church while Temne Muslim
to belong to a Temne 
dockers tend to worship in a Temne mosque or .iamaat (or Muslim
burial s o c i e t y ) 63% of dockers not bom in Freetown were members
of a descendants1 association such as the Tonkolili District Descendants*
Association (TODDA) or the Moyamba District Descendants* Association
(MADDA) • Since the AFC came to power in 1968, and particularly since
the mid-seventies, these descendants* associations have proliferated.
They typically serve as the power base of important national
politicians, have undercut the influence of the chiefs in national
politics, and have clearly become channels for the dispensation of
observer of African cities. For a'discussion of this phenomenon, 
cf. J. Gugler and W. Flanagan, op. cit., pp.45-49.
1 Ethnicity and religious affiliation is discussed in some detail by 
Edward Fashole-Luke, 'Religion in Freetown', in Chris Fyfe and 
Eldred Jones (eds.), Freetown: A Symposium. Oxford, 1968.
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Clerks 92.30 - 7.69 -
Skilled
Manuals 62.50 12.50 10.41 14.58
Unskilled
Manuals 46.15 - 19.23 34.61
Casuals 75.47 - 11.32 13.20
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TABLE 5.5(c) Percentage of sample reporting helping relatives other 
than immediate family
CATEGORY RELATIVES FRIENDS NIL
Glerks 55.55 2.77 41.66
Skilled Manuals 61.66 11.66 26.66
Unskilled Manuals 65.51 3.44 31.03
Casuals 61.76 5.88 32.33
TABLE 5.6(a)







patronage and the mobilisation of support. The tribal headman system
in Freetown* which has always been closely related to religious
communities,'1' is by now all but fully integrated into descendantsx
associations* 58% of the sample also reported belonging to secret
societies such as the Gbangbani. the O.ieh. the Porroh* or the Hunting
Society* Membership is usually related to ethnicity* Thus, for
example, the Krios are found in the Hunting Societies while the Mendes
2
and Temnes are found in the Porroh.
TABLE 5*6(b)






1 Cf. B. Harrel-Bond et al* op. cit*. Ch. 9*
2 It should be noted that none of the dockers in the sample were
members of any of the masonic lodges. The membership of these
lodges has been restricted to the elite among Krios (cf. Abner
Cohen, op. cit.) but during the last fifteen years or so, has 
become increasingly open to the elites of other ethnic groups 
including the Asian mercantile community.
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TABLE 5.6(c)
Type of house lived in by dockers (by percentage)
CATEGORY PAN BODY BOARD CEMENT MUD
Clerks 11.11 5.5 83.33 -
Skilled 28.33 16.66 55.00 -
Unskilled 55.17 20.68 20.68 3.44
Casuals 60.29 19.29 26.47 2.94
TABLE 5.6(d)
Amenities en.joyed by dockers1 household (by percentage)







Luxury items owned by dockers (by percentage)
CATEGORY 0 1 2 3 4 5
Clerks 27.77 30.55 27.77 8.33 5.55 -
Skilled 31.66 50.00 15.00 3.33 - -
Unskilled 62.06 37.93 - - - -
Casuals 75.00 23.52 1.47 - - -
Outside the world of work, in their social and cultural activities, 
dock workers may therefore be said generally to belong to organisations 
which provide a certain degree of communal cohesion. This point will 
be taken up again below when political clientelism vis a vis 
recommendation for employment in the public sector is discussed.
Dock workers: some basic sociological characteristics
It is perhaps not surprising that all dockers undertaking manual 
tasks are male. It was estimated from the total enumeration of all 
dockers that some 28% of the clerical group (N = 4.33) were female.
The sample of the clerical group yielded 8 females or 22% (n = 36)*
The dockers are drawn from most of the ethnic groups in Sierra 
Leone and from all the main linguistic groups (Table 5.7(a), (b),
(c), and (d)). Among casual dockers (made up of stevedore and shore 
cargo handling labourers) it had been observed impressionistically 
that Kroo men were in the minority. This suggested (and was indeed 
confirmed during informal conversations) that the traditional 
dominance of this occupational category by the Kroos has over the
-  220 -
years been eroded. The sample yielded only 3% Kroos. Krio dockers,
having'been long exposed to formal education, dominate the clerical
grades, while Temne dockers dominate the manual grades as a result
1of their relative proximity to Freetown.
In his sociological study of Freetown, Banton suggests that a
2
multiplicity of factors influenced rural-urban migration. These 
included the imbalance of opportunities as between the provincial 
areas and Freetown, the desire to ’break out* of the restrictions 
(particularly for women) in rural society, and the pull of the ’bright* 
lights1. Some attempt was made by the present researcher to assess 
the extent to which dockers are migrants. Just over two-thirds of 
the sample were bom outside Freetown (cf. Table 5.8(a)), though less 
than half of the clerks - suggesting a correlation between birth in 
Freetown, good schooling, and clerical employment. Of those not 
bom in Freetown, 18.8% of the clerks said that they came to seek 
wage employment. 37.5% said they came for educational purposes, but 
a greater proportion, 4-3.8%, said they came for personal reasons such 
as to seek medical care or to live in the household of a relative. 
Among skilled manuals, a third came for personal reasons with the 
remaining two thirds coming for employment and education. A greater 
proportion of the casual and unskilled labourers, 61.5% and 73.6% 
respectively, reported coming solely for employment. None came for 
education (Table 5.8(b) has the details).
These dockers were also asked about their previous occupations 
before coining to live in Freetown. A clear pattern emerged. A small 
proportion of the clerks and the skilled manuals had been farmers,
1 Cf. J. I. Clarke, Sierra Leone in Mans. London, 1969, p.36.
2 Cf. Michael Banton, West African City, pp.48 ff.
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TABLE 5.7(a)
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(53)Casual Labourers' ' 77.94
TOTAL 128 ^ 66.32^
Numbers in parentheses are the actual numbers within each 
category of the sample,
(a) refers to the total number of dockers in sample not bom 
in Freetownj
(b) refers to the total number of dockers not bom in Freetown 
as a percentage of the whole sample
fishermen, or traders. On the other hand most of the unskilled manuals
and the casuals, 73.1% and 73*6% respectively, had been farmers (cf.
Table 5.8(c)). Table 5.8(d) provides data relating to the number of-
years dockers not bom in Freetown had lived there and Table 5.8(e)
gives a distribution of the ages of the dockers.
The educational attainment of dockers obviously varies with their
occupational roles, as will be evident from Table 5.9(a). Their
social background - using fathers1 occupation as the index - also
appears to be related to occupational roles. About 50% of the clerks
in the sample had fathers who had been professional, managerial,
clerical, or skilled manual workers in occupation. 28.3% of the 
skilled manual group had such fathers. 93.1% and 80.9% of unskilled
- 224. -
TABLE 5.8(b) Main reasons for coming to live in the capital (%)
REASON CLERKS SKILLED MANUALS UNSKILLED MANUALS CASUALS
Employment 18.75 45.45 61.53 73.58
Personal 43.75 33.33 38.46 26.37
Education 37.50 21.21 - -
TOTAL 99.95 99.99 99.99 99.95
TABLE 5.8(c) Previous occupation of dockers not bom in Freetown
OCCUPATION CLERKS SKILLED MANUALS UNSKILLED MANUALS CASUALS
Student 87.50 57.57 3.8 4 3.77
Farmer 12.50 21.a 73.09 73.58
Fisherman - 3.03 - 1,88
Same - 9.09 11.53 15.09
Unemployed - 3.03 - 1.88
Trader - 6.06 11.53 3.77
TOTAL 100.0 99.99 99.99 99.97
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TABLE 5.8(d)
Years of residence of dockers not born in Freetown (by percentage)
YEARS CLERKS SKILLED MANUAL UNSKILLED MANUAL CASUALS
1 - 5 - 9.09 11.53 1.88
6 - 1 0 12.50 12.12 - 3.77
11-15 12.50 3.03 7.69 3.77
16-20 12.50 21.21 23.07 16.98
21-25 18.75 21.21 15.38 7.54
26 - 30 18,75 9.09 11.53 13.20
31 - 35 - 3.03 3.84 13.20
36 - 50 - 3.03 7.69 22.64
41-45 25.00 18.18 19.23 16.98
TOTAL 100.00 99.99 99.87 99.96
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TABLE 5.8(e) Age of dockers (by percentage)
YEARS CLERKS SKILLED MANUAL UNSKILLED MANUAL CASUALS
Under 20 - 1.66 - -
20-29 25.00 30.00 - 11.76
30 - 39 55.55 33.33 20.68 26.47
40 - 49 lloll 13.33 13.79 11.76
50 - 59 5.55 6.66 20.68 22.05
Over 60 2.77 3.33 13.79 14.70
Don*t know - 11.66 31.03 13.23
TOTAL 99.98 99.97 99.97 99.97








Clerk 5.55 5.55 58.33 22.22 8.33 99.98
Skilled Manual 13.33 11.66 53.33 5.00 16.66 99.98
Unskilled Manual 3.44 - 3.44 - 93.10 99.98
Casual 10.29 4.41 8.23 - 76.44 99.37
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TABLE 5.9(b)
Fathers1 occupation (by percentage) among categories of dockers
SKILLED MANUALS % CLERKS %
Labourer & 
Domestic • • •
Trader . •
Farmer • • ♦
Clerk • • • •
6,66
Labourer . • .
Skilled Manual •






Skilled Manual • 15*00 Farmer • • .
Professional & 
Managerial • • 11,66
Clerical * • * 5.55
Don!t know • . 3*33
TOTAL « • • • 99*97 TOTAL . . . . 99.97
UNSKILLED MANUALS % CASUALS %
Farmer • • • Farmer • • ,
Fisherman • • . 3.44 Trader • • •
Trader • • . Skilled Manual « 
Clerical • ■ •
13.2 3 
1.47
TOTAL . . . . 99.98 TOTAL . . . . 99.99
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manual and the casual groups by contrast had fathers who had been 
peasant farmers (Table 5.9(b)), Such data of course suggests 
differences in the possibilities for intergenerational mobility among 
lower paid workers (which must be even more pronounced between the 
latter and the more elite groups). These inequalities are, moreover, 
not at all attenuated by a declining economy, the consequent 
contraction in employment opportunities, or by an official agricultural 
policy which discourages the small farmer and thereby encourages 
migration to the towns.
The survey also shows that the workforce at the port is 
fairly stable with a low incidence of job turnover. (This stability 
is, of course, in part a consequence of the lack of alternative and 
attractive opportunities either of or to urban employment). 75% of 
the clerks in the sample had been working at the port for more than 
five years. The corresponding figures for the other groups were 65% 
of the skilled manuals, 86.1% of the unskilled manuals, and 75% of 
the casuals (Table 5.10(a)). This stability may also be related to 
marital status and parenthood. Less than a fifth of each category of 
dockers reported that they had no children. More than two-thirds of 
each category were married (cf. Table 5.10(b)).
The sample was asked how they had obtained jobs at the port.
69.4% of the clerks reported that they got their jobs by direct 
application to the Port Authority or through the placement of the 
Freetown Labour Exchange. 66.5% of the skilled manuals, 20.7% of the 
unskilled manuals, and 39*7% of the casuals reported using these 
channels. The remaining proportions, 30.6% of the clerks, 33.3% 
skilled manuals, 79.3% unskilled manuals and 60.2% casuals (Table 5.11) 
gave replies which can best be summarised as by •recommendation1, a 
slightly euphemistic term for the working of the system of patron- 
clientelism in the public sector.
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TABLE 5.10(a)
Labour turnover among categories of dockers







Less than 1 year 5.55 16.66 - 2.94
1 - 2  years - 1.66 3.44 8.82
3 - 5  years 19.44- 16.66 10.34 10.29
6 - 8  years 22.22 15.00 31.03 11.76
9 - 1 0  years 22.22 15.00 6.89 8.82
11 - 14- years 11.11 16.66 20.68 7.35
15-20 years 19.44 10.00 20.68 17.64
More than 20 years - 8.33 6.89 29.41
DonTt know - - - 2.94
TOTAL 99.98 99.97 99.95 99.97
What has emerged so far is as follows: dock workers are 
predominantly male with a small proportion of females in the clerical 
group only. They come from all over the country but the largest 
ethnic groups, Temne and Mende, are somewhat over-represented relative 
to their national percentages among all categories of dockers. Krios 
are also over-represented among both clerical and skilled dockers.
It had been observed impressionistically that there was little sign 
of ethnic tensions among the dockers. This observation was borne out
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in the survey. Dockers were asked with which group of workers they 
particularly liked to •mix’; the alternative responses were deliberately 
standardised to include ‘workers from your ethnic group or region’
(cf. annexure, question 2,7), Without exception, the replies cut 
across the alternatives which had been isolated. It was perhaps 
significant here that one of the slogans of the Dock Workers1 Union 
was ‘One union, one (cooking) pot1. The heavy symbolism in this 
slogan must not be overlooked.
About two-thirds of the sample were not bom in Freetown. In 
most cases it appears that the various facilities available and the 
possibilities of realising a higher standard of living in the capital 
have been the main attractions and have contributed to the decision to 
continue living there. There is little evidence of inter-generational ' 
mobility. In relative terms, the social backgrounds of individual 
dockers are related to their educational attainment and, hence, 
occupational status. While clerks and other skilled workers are in 
this (and other) respects relatively privileged, their economic and 
social distance from the truly elite groups is quite vast. This was 
clearly evident from observation of their standard of living during 
visits to their homes. It is also evident in their cultural and 
recreational activities.
The frequently repeated assertion (and the basis, very largely 
of the Fanonist position) that most urban workers are very much better 
off than most rural farmers does not appear to be clearly supported 
by the evidence for Sierra Leone. It is clearly not the case that, 
according to official income figures at least, the majority of manual 
workers (who in turn constitute the majority of urban workers) are 
very much better off. On the other hand, this does not mean that the 
rural farmers are at all fairly treated; it is not to deny that they 
are exploited in order to finance the provision of public sector jobs
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TABLE 5.11 Means of obtaining employment among categories of 
dockers by percentage
CATEGORY BY RECOMMENDATION BY APPLICATION
Glerks 30.55 69.44
Skilled Manual 33.33 66.66
Unskilled Manual 79.31 20.68
Casual 60.29 39.70
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which, collectively speaking, are somewhat parasitic* The degree of 
parasitism, however, is highly unevenly distributed within this 
collective (class) situation as between not only individuals but also 
different categories of urban wage-employees. It is, to say the 
least, somewhat over-simple and misleading, therefore, to view the 
majority of lower paid workers as parasitic on the rural peasantry.
Secondly, it would seem that the rural-urban migrants are 
attracted not by any real improvement in the living standards of the 
majority of urban wage-employees but by the need to supplement a 
family rural income with a male member's urban cash income (or by the 
greater opportunities for social mobility in the urban areas) • Such 
opportunities are, the evidence would suggest, decidedly and 
increasingly limited* In so far as they exist, however, they would 
seem to hinge on two possible avenues of advancement: (1) via 
combination of employment in the formal sector with entrepreneurial 
success in the informal sector; (2) via cultivation of political 
patrons and of the opportunities presented by government or by para- 
statal employment for increased income through corruption. The 
second of these avenues is largely closed to lower paid manual workers 
and the reason why, once they have secured a job at the port, the great 
majority of dockers stick to it, is rather to be found in the 
increasingly high incidence of unemployment and severe underemployment.
Trade unionism and the world of work
The Port Authority is virtually a closed shop. All persons in 
the sample were members of the Dock Workers' Union with the exception 
of the stevedore casual labourers who accounted for 20.1% of the 
sample. (Stevedoring was only taken over by the Port Authority on 
November 1, 1978, and the Maritime and Waterfront Workers' Union 
continued to represent the stevedores. Casual shore cargo handling
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labourers, who have always been in the employ of the Port Authority 
and are members of the Dock Workers1 Union, accounted for 21.9% of 
the sample. Tie casuals will continue to be treated as a single 
group in this discussion of orientations to work and to trade unionism).
Lower paid workers at the Port Authority are subjected to very 
close supervision during the work process. It was also observed 
that the fringe benefits of employment at the Port Authority were 
distributed highly disproportionately among the workforce; while 
members of the senior staff and their families, for instance, were 
entitled to free medi-care at the well-equipped port health clinic, 
which was attended by two full-time doctors, a team of nurses and 
other para-medical staff, the families of lower paid dockers were 
prohibited from using the clinic.^ Moreover casual dockers could 
only use the clinic if they happened to fall ill on the day that they 
had actually been working. A particularly sore point among the dockers 
therefore was the spectacle of medical teams being rushed to attend 
foreign crews and their families on board visiting ships. A canteen 
was also maintained at the port for -the use of the workforce. It 
was observed that the canteen was divided into two lounges for the 
senior and junior staff. The former was by far the more comfortably 
furnished.
Another issue frequently mentioned by dockers when asked about 
the problems they experienced at work, was the infrequency of 
promotions. Because the port is so heavily overmanned, individual 
competitiveness and an achievement ethic are conspicuous by their 
absence. Accordingly, the management does not seem to have found it
1 During the first period of research in Freetown, officials of the 
Dock Workers' Union were negotiating a comprehensive medicare 
package with the port management.
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necessary to institute programmes of manpower development as distinct 
from literacy classes and some basic training among the junior members 
of the workforce.
The psychological ramifications of these aspects of the 
organisation of work at the port are conducive to adversarial 
industrial relations. When asked whether their work made them feel 
within their hearts that they were doing something worthwhile, more 
than two-thirds of each of the four categories gave an affirmative 
response. This may however be related to the lack of alternative 
employment opportunities in Freetown. When asked what they generally 
thought of trade unions, the dockers' most common reply was that 
'unions protect workers from being taken advantage of by management'. 
An accounts clerk wrote on his questionnaire that 'the only effective 
way workers can be powerful enough is through the union. It is the 
vehicle through which workers can be heard'. A welder (of the skilled 
manual group) wrote that 'unions are there to seek the interest of 
the workers and must also educate them'. Such manifestations of a 
developed trade union consciousness were rare in the sample as a 
whole, more especially amongst the unskilled workers. This suggests, 
however, that skilled workers (relatively well-off as they might be), 
far from being complacent about their position in the emerging class 
structure, are more likely to develop radical attitudes vis a vis 
their relative deprivation, in consequence of their possession of 
skills and generally higher level of educational attainment. The 
latter, also, no doubt, helps them to see through the facade of 
government claims to be pursuing the general interest in an impartial 
manner.
These differences within the sample as regards attitudes to 
trade unionism were also evident as regards attitudes to strike action 
When asked what they thought of strikes, just over half the sample
- 235 -
were ambivalent, a typical reply being, 'it is good to join trade 
unions but I do not favour strikes except when absolutely necessary'
(a cleaner of the unskilled manual group). The more educated workers 
in the sample gave replies which might be regarded as militant:
'Strokes are necessary when workers are dissatisfied with either the 
conditions of service or some other reason' (an electrician of the 
skilled manual group).
It was noticeable and impressive that each docker in the sample 
knew the name of the shop steward representing his/her section and the 
name of the union secretary or a senior official. When asked what 
they considered to be the qualities of a good trade union leader,
68.7% of the whole sample listed 'honesty' among their replies. Other 
frequent replies were that a union leader must be well informed (52.6%)^ 
approachable (42%), and articulate 'like a lawyer* (38%). 43% of the
whole sample had had some experience of strike action.
Ideology and consciousness
The ambivalence in the attitudes of the dockers to the 
inequalities in the society around them, and more especially towards 
elite corruption, had been noted during informal conversations. Some 
questions were deliberately written into the questionnaire to bring 
out these contradictions* The dockers were told that, in Sierra 
Leone, there are Big Men or 'gentry people', there are those who are 
'managing' and there are those who are poor. Dockers were then asked 
to which of the three groups they thought they belonged* 97.2% of 
the clerks, 61.7% of the skilled manuals, 75.7% of the casuals replied 
that they were 'managing' (cf. Table 5.12(a)). They typically 
reasoned that, since they were in good health, had a job, and every 
reason to be hopeful, to say that they were poor was being ungrateful 
to God or Allah. Dockers were then asked how and why they thought 
inequalities occurred in Sierra Leone society. 88.9% of the clerks,
- 236 -
61.1% of the skilled manuals, 89.6% of the unskilled manuals and 88.2% 
of the casuals gave some variant of the reply that people were unequal 
because it was the will of God. (In making this point during informal 
conversations, a docker would typically spread out all the fingers 
and say with impeccable logic that they were not all of the same size 
because God didn't want them that way). However, 41.7% of the clerks, 
4*6.7% of the skilled manuals, 31% of the unskilled manuals, and 33.8% 
of the casuals also gave replies suggesting that the personal situation 
of Idle individual (education, inheritance, etc.) could contribute to 
his position in society. 16.7% of the clerks, 48.3% of the skilled 
manuals, 30.8% of the unskilled manuals, and 29.4% of the casuals also 
listed political power, influence, and corruption as factors that 
could contribute to inequalities in society. (The details are 
provided in Table 5.12(b)).^
The ambivalence in such replies contrasted sharply with the 
replies given when dockers were asked, 'Compared with other people, 
do you think you and your family are getting a fair share or benefit 
for ilie work you do?' 52.8% of the clerks, 68.3% of the skilled 
manuals, 86.2% of idle unskilled manuals, and 82.4% of the casuals 
replied in the negative. When asked to explain, they typically drew 
attention to their low living standards, and frequently mentioned that 
prices were rising faster than wages. Similarly, when asked what 
their future intentions and aspirations were, the dockers were clear 
about their priorities. 58.3% of the clerks, 46.7% of the skilled 
manuals, 13.8% of the unskilled manuals, and 23.5% of the casuals 
wanted to further their education or to learn a skill. 16.7% of the
1 Cf. Peter Lloyd, Power and Independence: Urban Africans' Perception 
of Social Inequality, London, 1974, esp. p.184 ff. and Margaret 
Peil, Nigerian Politics; The People's View. London, 1976 for survey 
reports and. discussions of ambivalences among low income groups 
vis a vis inequalities in Nigerian-society.
- 237 -
TABLE 5.12(a)
Self-assessment of socio-economic position in percentages
CATEGORY POOR 'MANAGING' GENTRY
Clerk 2.77 97.20 -
Skilled 33.33 61.66 5.00
Unskilled 17.24 75.86 6.89
Casuals 19.11 80.88 -
TABLE 5.12(b)
4.






DON'T KNOW CORRUPTION 
POWER & INFLUENCE
Clerk 88.88 41.66 2.77 16. 66
Skilled 61.11 46.66 - 48.33
Unskilled 89.60 31.03 6.96 30.76
Casuals 88.23 33.82 7.35 29.41





















































































































Assessment of politicians and public servants (by percentage)
CATEGORY NEGATIVE POSITIVE DON'T KNOW
Clerks 66.66 30.55 2.77
Skilled 61.66 38.33 -
Unskilled 75.86 17.24 6.89
Casuals 82.35 16.17 1.47
TABLE 5.12(e)
Rural development as a national priority (by percentage)
CATEGORY POSITIVE NEGATIVE DON'T KNOW
Clerks 80.55 2.77 16.66
Skilled 90.00 1.66 8.33
Unskilled 75.86 17.24 6.89
Casuals 98.52 - 1.47
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clerks, 41*7% of the skilled manuals, 27*6$ of the unskilled manuals, 
and 23.6% of the casuals wanted to become involved in business or 
commerce. (38% of the unskilled manuals mentioned commercial farming). 
21% of the casuals intended investing in their childrens education 
(cf. Table 5«12(c)).
The sample was then asked to assess the country's politicians 
and top civil servants and, more specifically, to gauge whether 
politicians and public servants were setting an example by making a 
sacrifice or whether they were capable of improving the country's 
economic situation. 66.7% of the clerks, 61.7% of the skilled manuals, 
73.9% of the unskilled manuals, and 82.4% of "the casuals gave a 
negative response to either one or the other of the two propositions 
(Table 5.12(d)). The sample was also amenable to the idea that the 
government's priority ought to be rural development. (The survey 
was carried out some six weeks before Sierra Leone lavishly hosted 
an OAU summit conference - and at a time when the preparations in the 
capital were intense - at a reputed cost of Le20Q million). Table 
5.12(e) has the details.
Political clientelism and the world of the docker
About a third of the skilled dockers, and a much higher 
proportion of the unskilled report using informal channels to obtain 
employment. As we have seen in Chapter 4 (when documentary evidence 
from the port archive and tie report of the Forster Commission was 
cited), influential persons can exert pressure on the port management 
to place political supporters and kinsmen on the pay roll. The 
General Manager of the Port Authority claimed that the port 
bureaucracy as a whole was overmanned by at least a third.’*'
1 Interview with Ray Donker, 8 January 1980.
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TABLE 5*13





Total lower paid 8,028
+ It is useful to compare this table with Table 4*7 above
SOURCE: These figures are based on an enumeration of dockers
in each category by this researcher.
It has also been shown that, at the work place, the ethnic 
identity of the docker is submerged* Work mates from different ethnic 
groups ‘mix’ freely with each other quite easily. In their social 
and cultural lives outside the work place however, some degree of 
ethnic cohesion is maintained through their religious activities 
and through their membership of descendants1 associations. In their 
social and cultural activities therefore, dockers have the opportunity 
to lmix, with influential Big Men or Mammies. Favours such as 
assistance in finding a job may be requested and granted. Dockers 
were specifically asked in the survey whether there were ‘any groups 
who are helping you so that you can go before1 (or improve your 
situation in life). Just under a third of the whole sample replied 
in the affirmative that influential people could give assistance in 
finding jobs and on family occasions such as births, marriages and 
deaths. There were no suggestions, however, of regular cash
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hand-outs* Most dockers do recognise that they live in a political 
and economic world where patron-clientelism is the main answer to 
advancement - and many are prepared to use it. This helps explain 
their somewhat ambivalent attitudes.
Not all ‘Big Men* are cabinet ministers or important politicians. 
‘Big Men’ (or ‘Mammies’) are people with ‘connections’. They are 
influential and form the strands of thread in the intricate web-of 
patron-clientelism. They range from professionals, businessmen and 
party officials to trade union officials and even thugs and assorted 
hangers-on. This network of influential people is known to enjoy the 
confidence of the party and, in particular, its leader. It must not 
be assumed that ’Big Men’ can rely on the loyalty of dockers to whom 
they have been patrons* However poorly they express their consciousness 
of the inequalities in the society around them, dockers do resent some 
of the activities of this political and bureacratic kleptocracy* When 
specifically asked to assess the politicians and top civil servants 
(Table 5*12(d)),the dockers were overwhelmingly negative in their 
assessment. The chapter which follows continues this evaluation of 




A shop stewards1 movement; the internal dynamics of the Dock Workers’ 
Union 1963-79
Following the formation of the Dock Workers* Union in May 1963, 
a powerful shop stewards* movement - which has since become the 
’keeper of the conscience’ of the union - gradually emerged. Not 
originally provided for in the union constitution, and thereby having 
only an informal status, shop floor representation on the union 
executive via elected stewards descended directly from the system of 
workers’ representation on the discredited Works Committee. Being 
the driving force behind the formation of the union, these 
representatives continued to act in an informal capacity as the 
recruitment agents of the union in the sections they had represented 
at the Works Committee. Within a few years other functions evolved: 
shop stewards became the main channel of contact between the ordinary 
members and the full-time leadership. Grievances for transmission to 
the union secretary or his assistant were reported to stewards; the 
interpretation of agreements reached with management, the union 
constitution, and other documents and notices were undertaken by 
stewards. Two important considerations appear to have influenced 
this development in the role and status of shop floor representation 
within the union. First, most stewards were literate, articulate, or 
had the experience of the procedures of bargaining in a committee of 
workers and management* These ’qualifications’ were recognised and 
respected by their work mates* Second, the institution of an automatic 
check-off system shortly after the registration of the union meant 
that the leadership were in receipt of monies subscribed by the workers. 
The stewards made it their business to know how this money was being 
spent. In their attachment of some considerable importance to this
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issue, informal means of accountability became established within the
union* The term fshop steward1 appears not to have been in use at
the port before 1967 when the union constitution was revised, the
role formalised, and provisions made for annual elections* The year
before, shop floor representatives had provoked a crisis over a
proposal of the management to replace the overtime system with shift
work as part of the re-organisation of the public sector urged by
the IMF. The union secretary, a member of the Board of the Port
Authority, had acquiesced in the implementation of the proposals*
Urged on by floor representatives, dock workers resisted the
introduction of shift work until it had been properly negotiated
with the union* The dispute necessitated the setting up of a public
1
inquiry which published a report giving valuable insight into the 
union organisation during its early years* The report recommended 
the dismissal of the secretary who was by then thoroughly discredited. 
Four years after this dispute, in 1971% stewards forced the second 
secretary out of office on allegations of fraud and dishonesty. 
Throughout the Seventies, this tradition of union 1 watch dog* was 
maintained* In 1979» stewards again precipitated the dismissal of 
the third union secretary for misuse of union funds and instituted 
legal proceedings* In between leadership crises, floor representatives 
fully participated in the mapping of strategies to be adopted in 
bargaining with management, in securing the support of influential 
politicians on these occasions, and in the strategic use of such 
support* This chapter examines the internal dynamics of the Dock 
Workers1 Union by focusing particularly on the structure of 
accountability within the union. A second section examines the
1 Sierra leone, Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Docks 
Dispute» Freetown, 1967 (henceforth referred to as The Panda 
Report^.
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responses of dock workers to their employment by a parastatal 
organisation by focusing on the strategies adopted by the union in 
the process of bargaining.
The structure of accountability within the Dock Workers1 Union
The formation of the Dock Workers’ Union was a somewhat
acrimonious affair as two of the older unions operating at the port,
the Maritime and Waterfront Workers’ Union and the Railway Workers’
Union were determined to strangle the new organisation at birth.
The organisers were equally determined to resist these attempts. At
the Labour Department, where all trade unions were required to be
registered, they argued forcefully that to prevent dock workers from
forming their own organisation would be an infringement of international
labour codes of freedom of association. Attention was further drawn
to the practice in other countries where dockers are organised
separately.^- It was strongly believed by the organisers that ’our
interests will not be properly protected in a bigger union. Apart
from that, the railway union and the stevedore union were not
2
progressive unions’. Due to the success of the former representatives 
on the Works Committee in persuading their work mates to join the 
union, the Port Management Department became a virtual closed shop. 
Subscriptions were set at 6d. a month. The Works Committee itself 
became redundant* For the first year of its existence, the elected 
officials of the union - drawn mainly from the clerical and artisan
1 Interview with J. T. Kanu, founder member of the union and former 
union president, 26 February 1980. The same ground was covered in 
interviews of other founder members and in more informal 
conversations with dockers during the first and second periods of 
field research in I960 and 1932. Cf. also Labour Department, 
Annual Report* p.7*
2 Interview with Aziz Kassim, founder member, 6 March 1982.
3 Interview with J, T. Kanu, 26 February 1980.
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grades - were part-time; but in 1964 two clerks, J. I. Sandy and
Mi I, Mansaray, became the full-time secretary and assistant secretary
respectively. Both resigned their appointments with the Port
Management- Department.'*' Other members of the union executive in
1964 were M. M. Patoma, the union president, J* C. Solomon, vice-
president, M. A. Jalloh, treasurer, A* J* Johnson and P. J. Seibure,
2
internal auditors, H. B. Macauley and P. J. 0. Johnson, trustees*
These were part-time appointments. The decision to appoint two 
full-time officials was a product of the realisation among the 
membership of the practical difficulties facing the main individuals 
who were employees in the port organisation but also involved in
3
routine negotiations with the management on behalf of the union.
Since the union had accumulated some funds from membership 
subscriptions,^ it was felt that these ought to be used to employ 
two full-time officials at rates comparable to those obtaining for 
clerks at the port organisation. The union also leased office space 
at Fourah Bay Road in the vicinity of the port and employed office 
staff, a typist and a messenger. In order that these overheads would
c
be met, monthly subscriptions were increased to 15 cents in 1964, to
£
30 cents in 1965, and to 40 cents in 1966.
1 Ibid.
2 Interview with Aziz Kassim, 6 March 1982.
3 Ibid.
4 Assuming that each of the 2,649 members of the union paid their
subscriptions, monthly revenue of the union in 1963 would have 
been £55*1# 6d.
5 In August 1964, Sierra Leone changed over to the decimal system
and introduced new currency, Leones and cents.
6 Interview with Aziz Kassim, 6 March 1982.
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During these early years, however, a problem which was to become
perennial in the administration of the union emerged. This was the
use and control of union finances. It can be shown that about half
(at the maximum) of the union’s monthly revenue between 1964 and 1967
was 'used to meet overheads, leaving a healthy balance in reserve (see
Tables 6.1(a) and 6.1(b)). It is clear, however, from conversations
with dockers, and indeed from the evidence heard by the Panda Commission
in 1966/67, that a clique within the union executive converted monies
from these balances for their own personal use and the use of their
friends. Here, it is worth quoting Panda at some length.
’The finances of this union, if properly 
handled, would be a handy asset to. the union 
itself. The check-off system is in force in 
the port...and workers contract in to pay 
union dues which is forty cents (40c) a 
month...Apart from the auditing of the 
accounts by the professional auditors of 
the union, the union appointed Mr. F. J.
Seibure as internal auditor of the union, 
but evidence was led to the fact that 
notwithstanding this provision, Mr. Jalloh 
(the treasurer) flouted the authority of 
the internal auditor and submitted his 
accounts direct to the external auditors, 
thereby leaving himself open to suspicion 
by union members...Evidence was adduced 
that union funds were utilised in advancing 
loans to members and non-members of the 
union. Mr. Jalloh admitted in evidence that 
loans were given only to members of the 
union*..(but) evidence was given by several 
witnesses that loans were given only to 
members who were friends of the members of 
the executive...There are several amounts 
outstanding to the union and steps should 
be taken to recover these immediately. I 
find the executive...were in default in 
granting loans to members of the union under 
the guise of benefits. For trade union 
purposes, benefits may include relief in 
sickness, accident, and unemployment from 
victimisation in the furtherance of a trade 
dispute.’1
These allegations firmly placed the issue of accountability within
1 The Panda Report, p.2.
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the union on the agenda for debate among the entire membership. This
directly resulted in the re-organisation of the union structure in
ways more radical than even Panda had envisaged. The Panda report
recommended that the Labour Department, and specifically, the Registrar
of trade unions, should periodically examine the audited reports of
the union. ’The Registrar of Trade Unions should be required to review
the entire accounts of the union, and submit his report to the Ministry
of Lands, Mines, and L a b o u r . A t  the docks, however, where the laxity
of public service bureaucratic control was fully understood, a
consensus emerged that elected floor representatives from each section
of the port organisation should be made members of the executive. 'We
felt that we don’t have to wait for the Ministry to come and tell us
that our money has been stolen. It is our money which we pay for the
union to be organised to protect us. So it is we who should decide
2
how to use the money and to know if it is being stolen.’ At the union’s 
annual conference of March 1967 (in effect a mass meeting of the entire 
membership), the union constitution was amended to accommodate floor 
representatives, designated shop stewards, on the executive. Another 
amendment created the position of financial secretary whose function 
it was to maintain the financial records of the union and to approve
3
all transactions carried out by the treasurer. Elections to all 
executive positions wereheld, and in all cases, none of the former 
members of the old executive were returned. Jack Sandy, the first 
union secretary, having been thoroughly discredited, did not contest.
The former assistant secretary, M. I. Mansaray, was elected secretary.
1 Ibid.
2 Interview with Thema Conteh (former union shop steward), 5 March 
1982.
3 Interview with Aziz Kassim, 6 March 1982.
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TABLE 6,1(a)





1963/64 6d.(5c) £55.1.6d 
(Le 110.30c)
1964/6$ 15c Le 396.35c
1965/66 30 c Le 794.70c
1966/67 40c Lei,059.60c,
Basis of estimate: Union membership in 1963 
was 2,649 (cf. Labour Department, Annual Report 
1963* Table 15)# It is assumed that membership 
remained at this level (though it in fact 
increased over the period)* The bias is 
however in the right direction as it is not 
known whether each member paid the subsciption*
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TABLE 6.1(b)
Estimate of average union monthly expenditure 1963/64. - 1966/67
ITEM EXPENDITURE
Union Secretary*s salary Le 80
Union Assistant Secretary*s salary Le 60
Typist*s salary Le 30
Messenger’s salary Le 20
Other overheads (e.g. office lease, 
stationery, bills, etc.) Lel50
TOTAL Le34-0
N.B.: First full year of union expenditure on these 
items is 1964-/65
SOURCE: These estimates are based on figures provided 
by Aziz Kassim who was elected Union Financial 
Secretary in 1967 (interview with Aziz Kassim, 
6 March 19&2). Actual figures on union 
expenditure are available from 1971* These 
show that average monthly union expenditure 
was in the region of Le650 (Dock Workers1 
Union, minutes of Executive Meeting, 17 
February 1972). Assuming a gradual increase 
in union expenditure over the years, the 
1963/64. - 1966/67 estimates are realistic.
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These two positions continued to be full-time*^
It is clear the M. I. Mansaray was instrumental in bringing about 
these changes# At the end of 1964, Mansaray, then assistant secretary, 
was awarded a six months1 scholarship to study aspects of trade union 
organisation in the USSR# Sandy, as union secretary, having cultivated 
a personal relationship with the leaders of the ruling SLPF, had himself
attended a short course in industrial relations in Europe in 1964, and
2
has secured the scholarship for Mansaray# On Mansaray's return to 
Freetown in July 1965, he discovered the financial irregularities that 
were later investigated by the Panda inquiry. *1 was angered, because 
this was a young union, and within a year all these things were
3
happening. 1 Furthermore, Sandy had been appointed a member of the
Board of Directors of the Port Authority in January 1965, and Mansaray
on his return recognised that the former's position as union secretary
had, as a consequence, been hopelessly compromised# He decided to
undermine Sandy's position as union secretary among the membership
and, in particular, the' former representatives on the Works Committee#^
The Panda inquiry also heard evidence to this effect.
’•••allegations were preferred against Mr#
Mansaray to the effect that he had been 
engaged in moves aimed at bringing the good
1 Ibid#
2 Interview with M. I# Mansaray, 28 April 1980; it should be noted
that in Sierra Leone, an opportunity to travel abroad,
particularly to the industrialised countries, is regarded with 
considerable excitement# This is because the individual is in 
effect presented with an opportunity to bring back consumer 
durables produced in these countries, which are scarce and 
extremely expensive locally.
3 Interview with M. I. Mansaray, 3 April 1982.
4 Interview with M. I# Mansaray, 28 April 1980; the same point
was made during the 1982 interview.
name of the union to disrepute; that Mr.
Mansaray had been heard on several occasions 
telling groups of members of the Dock Workers’
Union that they were being exploited by 
Government because the union was very weak and 
was always taking sides with the employers* *^
A power struggle then ensued between Sandy and Mansaray, the
former drawing his support from the union executive, and the latter
from the union rank and file. In August 1965, the executive expelled
Mansaray from the union in circumstances which Panda found ’to be
not in accordance with the provisions of the constitution of the union*
Mansaray, ignoring the expulsion order, continued his campaign to
remove Sandy from the leadership of the union. The Panda Report noted
that ’from the time Mr. Mansaray was expelled...there existed a
3
complete rumpus within the union1. Sandy completely misjudged the 
mood of the membership and the influence of the former workers’ 
representatives. He compounded this error with other tactless actions. 
The 1965 annual union conference was held behind closed doors at- the 
V.I.P lounge of the Port Authority, Sandy being a director on the 
Board. The delegates to the conference were carefully hand-picked by 
Sandy, who was consequently able to secure a vote of confidence and a 
further term of office. Mansaray retaliated by organising an 
’alternative* mass union conference at which it was resolved that the 
following letter of protest be sent to the Labour Department:
’Dear Sir,
Resolution of fully paid-up members of the Sierra Leone Dock 
Workers’ Union at a meeting assembled at Cline Town on Tuesday 5th 
October, 1965, at 6.30 a.m. attended by approximately 1,600 fully
1 The Panda Report, p.3.
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paid-up members of the Sierra Leone Dock Workers' Union, the following
matters regarding the mal-administration of the union were discussed
and decided upon:-
(1) Illegally convening of a so-called Annual Conference for the 
election of officers at which only thirty members including the 
present officers attended at a Very Important Personalities 
lounge of the Sierra Leone Ports Authority, instead of at the 
union's registered office.
(2) Unsatisfactory and illegal use of union's fund.
(3) Summary dismissal of fully paid-up members without a charge 
being prepared against them.
(4) Contravening Rule 22 of the union's Rule regarding elections.
In view of the above we the undersigned fully paid-up members
unanimously resolve as follows:-
(1) That we have lost complete confidence of the executive body of 
the Sierra Leone Dock Workers' Union.
(2) That the Annual Conference held by the union is both undemocratic 
and illegal and we consider it null and void; that arrangements 
be made for fresh election of officers (Rule 22) of the union to 
be supervised by the Labour Department
(3) That an independent auditor be engaged to audit the union's 
finances
(4*) That the authorities concerned appoint an independent enquiry 
to probe into the matters complained of.
We remain to be Sir'
(signed) Members (Dock Workers' Union)
1 Paid-up members of the Dock Workers' Union to the Registrar of 
Trade Unions, Labour Department, 8th October 1965, quoted in 
The Panda Report, p.4*
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No immediate action was taken in response to the letter. Sandy,
however, attempted to consolidate his position by issuing a press
statement in which he declared the support of the Dock Workers1 Union
for the single-party state mooted by the ruling SLPP which was being
debated in parliament. This was regarded by Mansaray and others as
a very skilful move, as Sandy had succeeded in giving the dispute a
political dimension and could therefore count on the support of his
patrons in the SLPP.^ The Labour Department was eventually forced
to intervene as the rank and file were resolute in their determination
to make Sandy accountable:
lThe Commissioner of Labour in his evidence 
said that his Ministry had done everything 
to educated the leaders of the union. He 
had personally insisted that the union should 
be run in accordance with its constitution.
When he made efforts to reconcile the 
relationship between the General Secretary... 
and Mr. Mansaray.. .he received no cooperation 
from the former. It was after this that he 
was compelled to relax his efforts because 
the latter group had taken the matter to 
court to seek an injunction to restrain the 
executive from functioning.12
3The injunction was not granted because of a legal technicality.
The Mansaray faction, however, appealed to a higher court. While 
the case was being heard, the rank and file of the union took action 
over the introduction of a shift system which had been approved by 
Sandy at Board level, but which had not been negotiated with the 
union. It was in response to the continuing dispute within the 
union that the Labour Department advised the government to appoint 
a commission to examine those issues and the relations between the
1 Interview with M. I. Mansaray, 28 April 1980.
2 The Panda Report, p.5*
3 Interview with M. I. Mansaray, 28 April 1980.
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union and the Port Authority.'1’ Mansaray and others immediately
2
dropped their action.
The commission found the convening of the 1965 annual conference
of the union in the Y.I.P. lounge of the Port Authority to be
profoundly improper as this was meant to exclude the participation
of workers1 representatives in the deliberations and in the election
of union officers* Moreover, since membership of the Port Authority
Board had compromised the position of Sandy as union leader, the
commission felt that some person, other than the secretary, ought to
be appointed as the workers1 representative on the Board:
*The General Secretary of a trade union is 
the chief executive of that union* He runs 
the day to day business of the union under 
the guidance of the executive council. A 
union secretary may find himself in a very 
untenable position as member of the corporation.
There is no doubt that the present secretary,
Mr. Sandy, found himself in the position 
described, having acquiesced at a Board 
meeting held in June, 1965, in a decision 
to introduce the shift system at the port.
In order to give the workers effective 
representation and at the same time to avoid 
putting the union secretary in an embarrassing 
position, the Minister responsible for the 
appointment of members of the Board may 
consider appointing someone else outside the 
industry; for example a retired trade unionist 
of wide experience and knowledge of industrial 
relations in this country. The person so 
appointed may be appointed to the Staff Committee 
and the other organs of the Board. This would 
help to improve relations between the union and 
the Port Authority.*3
This recommendation has never been heeded inspite of its inherent
logic. As governments attempt to extend their influence in the
1 Ibid; Mansaray has since said that the government was willing 
to appoint a commission as Sandy had become an embarrassment 
(interview with M. I. Mansaray, 3 April 1982).
2 Interview with M. I. Mansaray, 28 April 1980.
3 The Panda Report, p.10.
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trade union movement, a paid directorship on the Board of the Port
Authority has always been offered as a carrot to the secretary of 
1the union*
The crisis within' the union, however, exposed the whole of the
membership to a learning process which resulted in a widespread
realisation of the importance of maintaining and fostering means of
accountability within the union* The measures taken at the union
conference of March 1967, and in particular the amendment of the
constitution to provide for floor representation on the executive,
were a natural consequence of this learning process* Moreover, in
becoming a part of the union folklore (as extended conversations
with dockers has revealed), these lessons are being constantly
reinforced. Mansaray*s own eventual dismissal during the second
leadership crisis of 1971, and indeed the third leadership crisis of
1979, can be related to the lessons which had been learnt.
One of Mansaray*s priorities as union secretary was to increase
the membership of the union, particularly among casual dockers.
*1 realised that casuals are very difficult to organise but they
2
needed union protection badly*. Of a total lower paid workforce of 
6,978 at the port in 1967, 5*678 dockers were casuals. (Almost the 
whole of the non-casual dockers were members of the union and it was 
in this sense a virtual closed shop.) During his secretaryship, 
Mansaray succeeded in increasing membership from *just below 3*000 
when I took over to about 4*200 when I left*.^ This was achieved
1 The point should also be made that the union leadership have been 
equally eager to grab the carrot and to enter into clientelist 
relations with politicians whose influence could be used in 
bargaining with management.
2 Interview with M. I* Mansaray 3 April 1982.
3 Labour Department Annual Report 1967; figure includes casual 
stevedore labourers; cf. Table 5.13 supra.
4 Interview with M. I* Mansaray* 3 April 1982.
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by extending membership of the union also to labourers employed by
the Produce Marketing Board engaged in the packing of produce for
export in the dine Town area close to the port* 'In a sense these
labourers are cargo handlers* They pack produce for export which
is sent to the port, where our own boys take over* I realised that
1these labourers needed union protection*1 Accordingly, Mansaray 
wrote to the General Manager of the Produce Marketing Board to inform 
him that over 200 labourers employed in his establishment had joined 
the Dock Workers' Union. The letter presented the issue as a fait 
accompli:
»I should inform you.•.that your workmen 
have expressly decided voluntarily, and 
have accordingly joined the Sierra Leone 
Dock Workers' Union'with effect from 
November ending 1967.**I am instructed 
by the executive of my union to repeat 
my information to you that you workers 
listed on the attached sheet have become 
members of the union and that henceforth 
represented by us'.2
The management of the Produce Marketing Board was initially reluctant
to accept this development, but, following several meetings and
exchanges of letters, the issue was eventually resolved* Two shop
stewards were elected by the workers from among their numbers to
represent them on the union executive.^
As union secretary, Mansaray supported the APG which came to
power in 1968 and its patronage. (Since the formation of the union,
1 Ibid*
2 Dock Workers' Union, M* I. Mansaray to the General Manager Sierra 
Leone Produce Marketing Board, 14 March 1968.
3 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of a meeting held on Thursday 12th 
June 1969 between the representatives of the Dock Workers' Union 
and the management of the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board.
4 Interview with M. I* Mansaray, 3 April 1982*
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it had been affiliated to the AFC-leaning national centre, the Council
of Labour)* In 1968, contrary to the recommendations of the Panda
Report, Mansaray was appointed to the Board of the Port Authority*
The following year, 0* B. Conteh, Mansaray's deputy, was sent to
Britain to pursue a course in industrial relations#"** Mansaray fs
appointment to the Board was viewed with some dismay by many of the
2
shop stewards and the union rank and file. He argued that his 
appointment would improve the union's intelligence network and that 
he would never enter into any agreement without the mandate of the 
executive. 'He kept to this promise and we never suspected him of 
selling out'.^ Mansaray himself has said he never betrayed' the union
5
and has insisted that he is very proud of his record as union leader. 
As a part-time director on the Board, he received Lei,080 a year in 
director's fees and was entitled to other perquisites.
During the absence of the assistant secretary in 1969-70 however, 
some irregularities in the use of monies voted for the administration 
of the union were discovered by the executive. The executive decided 
to bring this matter to a head at the 1^70 annual conference of the 
union* Mansaray attempted to pre-empt this by drawing up a programme 
for a one-day conference - even though it had become the established 
practice for conferences to be spread over three days - at which the 
elections of members of the executive was the main item. (Except for
1 Ibid.
2 Interview with Mark Luseni (shop steward), 18 February 1980.
3 Ibid.
4 Interview with Azi2 Kassim, 6 March 1982.
5 Interview with M. I. Mansaray, 3 April 1982.
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minor changes, the 1967 executive had been re-elected each year.)
G. T. Fatnelli, a shop steward in the accounts section, wrote to
Mansaray to insist upon a detailed programme spread over three days:
' A day for annual conference .is in my 
view too short for us.••Three days at least 
could be utilised for putting things straight.
You yourself as secretary-general of the 
union have been privileged to see the union 
run on democratic principles.* .This is one 
of the most essential times when fair play 
coupled with negotiation experience could 
be put into action, and your knowing that 
you are not dealing with uneducated people 
only, would suffice. The agenda as I see it 
calls for some re-arrangement and additional 
items.••
This agenda, supported by other members of the executive, was adopted.
At the conference, Mansaray drew attention to his successes in
negotiations with management at the Produce Marketing Board and at
the Port Authority. When the audit reports were discussed, it was
clear that he had fraudulently converted monies voted for the
administration of the union to his own use. 'The mood of the
conference was that he had done a good job, so we warned him, and
2
decided to increase our own vigilance*'
It is clear from union records that the vigilance of the stewards
was indeed increased after the conference. At an executive council
meeting in June, a steward, J. T. Mahoi (representing traffic and
claims section) was selected for the award of a scholarship to
undertake a course in trade union studies in Israel. It was proposed
that he should be given some spending money, a 'purse', to meet some
of his expenses. An interesting discussion ensued:
'On the union's recommendation of Comrade 
J. T. Mahoi for a four months' study" 
fellowship of Israel, the secretary-general
1 Dock Workers' Union, D. T* Fatnelli to Secretary-General, 20th 
January 1970.
2 Interview with Aziz Kassim, 6 March 1982.
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reported that the formal processes required 
by such missions have been completed and 
that from Israeli embassy sources the comrade 
could leave at any time between July and 
August or by September* In the circumstances, 
the Secretary-General' continued, it was 
advisable that the executive council consider 
voting a purse as has been the union's 
practice to members leaving on such missions**• 
should the comrade be called upon to leave 
at short notice* Comrade Foday Koroma 
(representing civil maintenance section) 
noted that as mu eh as the union has not yet 
been officially notified as to that, an 
emergency meeting could be summoned at any 
time such notification is received while 
other members cited one or two other 
instances in which purses have been voted for 
trips which have not yet materialised or 
held up* The Secretary-General noted that in 
the two cases, his and the assistant 
secretary's, it was due to "the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia,‘ the host country, that his 
trip was called off, but had since materialised 
last year*.*and the assistant secretary having 
been selected for the industrial relations 
course last year, in which he could have been 
called upon to leave at short notice for 
Britain*••after reconsidering the case in the 
light of the Secretary General's explanation, 
it was decided that the purse should be voted 
for, but should not be made payable to the 
comrade until notification for his departure 
to Israel is received.'1
Another instance of the vigilance of the executive is evident from
discussions on salary increases for the union secretary and his staff
at the union office:
'Comrade Patnelli (representing accounts 
section) expressed some reservations about 
the salary increase to the Secretary-General 
but supported all the other recommendations..♦
He pointed out that the Secretary-General was 
receiving a renumeration of Le90 monthly as 
a member of the Sierra Leone Port Authority 
Board which put together with his salary of 
LellQ from the union should be quite 
sufficient for him. He did not therefore 
consider a salary increase to the Secretary-
1 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, 17 June 
1970.
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General justifiable***Comrade Amadu Wilson 
(representing Marine Slipway section) reflected 
on the working conditions of members whose
4-0 cents dues is being so spent, and ended by
warning that careful thought should be 
exercised over the way spending is approved 
by the council* 'i
In the event, however, the meeting voted for a monthly increase of
2
LelO in the salary of the secretary* Aziz Kassim has explained
that Teach time the union gives the secretary more money, we have
to consider that he is trying to get us more money; so we should do
3
the same for him. Scratch my back and I will scratch your own.1
The records of the union show that, over the months, the executive
continued to exercise its role as the 'conscience* of the union*
When it was discovered the following year that monies voted for the 
administration of the union had been misappropriated, a stormy meeting 
took place:
'Comrade Santigie Sesay (representing casual 
tally clerks) wanted the Secretary-General 
relieved of his duties. He concluded by saying 
that he was tired to see the Secretary always 
falling short of expectations and precious 
time should have been otherwise spent discussing 
urgent issues wasted in repudiating the 
Secretary-General.*.Comrade Kadrie Kamara 
(representing Mechanical Plant Yard section) 
at this juncture moved that a disciplinary 
committee be set up to investigate the 
conduct and other activities of the Secretary- 
General, with powers to mete out any disciplinary 
measure it considered appropriate* Comrade 
C. N. John moved an amendment that such 
disciplinary action be taken by the executive 
council*..which was the body supreme over 
any other committee. This was carried by a 
vote of 25 for and 3 against.1\
1 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, 2nd 
July 1970.
2 Ibid.
3 Interview with Aziz Kassim, 6 March 1982.
4 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, 25th 
August 1971*
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It was eventually decided that Mansaray should be relieved of his
position.'*’ A mass meeting of all union members was convened to convey
and ratify the decision of the executives
‘The meeting was called to order by Comrade 
N. R. Sesay (representing Lighterage). He 
said that as the executive was the government 
of the union, we the members of the executive 
have sacked the Secretary-General Comrade 
M. I. Mansaray...Contributing to the issue,
Comrade Salifu Turay (representing Harbour 
Master's department) praised the workers and 
said that it is not a crime to be illiterate.
But that though some of them were illiterate, 
it was the workers who put comrade Mansaray 
in the position he found himself...In 
contributing, Comrade J, D. Saidu (representing 
coopers) said that we have all been disappointed 
at the action of the Secretary-General because 
all of us fought hard for him to become 
Secretary-General of this union...At this 
juncture, Comrade 0. B. Conteh (the assistant 
secretary) was asked to say something. In his 
speech, he said that he wanted to reserve his 
position...He swore to the almighty God that 
he was not a partner in the accusation against 
Comrade M. I. Mansaray. He said that if he 
wanted to fight Comrade Mansaray for his 
position as was rumoured, he will fight him 
constitutionally...He asked members to listen 
to the words of the executive who were 
prepared to set everything right...One of the
workers was asked to say something. In his
speech he asked for a short prayer; the 
Alfatia. He then addressed the executive.
He said that he has many things to say which 
if he wanted to say all, will talk endlessly.
He said there have been a number of thieves 
and crooks in this union. It began from Sandy's 
time...He said that as Comrade Mansaray had 
been suspended, let no man touch the union's 
money...He said that he was looking to the 
executive for appropriate action.'2
The meeting also resolved that the General Manager of the Port
Authority, the press, the Commissioner of Labour, the Minister of
1 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, 3rd 
October 1971.
2 Dock Workers' Union, Summary of Mass Meeting, 9 October 1971.
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Labour, and other important politicians should be informed of the
decision to terminate the services of M. I* Mansaray as union leader.^
0. B. Conteh was voted in as union secretary and J. T. Mahoi, a clerk
and shop steward representing the traffic and claims section, became
the assistant secretary.
Conteh having inherited Mansaray’s seat on the Board, it was
decided at the beginning of the former’s term that his director’s
fees should be paid into the union’s bank account1 ...in view of
the general feeling of workers always against the Secretary-General
being paid such fees by the Port Authority thereby weakening his
2
position on the Board...' But it was also decided to increase the 
secretary's salary by a ’...full Le90 (a month) bringing his fixed 
salary to Le210 with effect from the month ending January 1972 which
3
view was unanimously accepted and passed by the council...’ Thus 
the principle that director’s fees should be paid to the union was 
established and the secretary’s salary increased by the same amount 
he would have received from the Port Authority.
The balances from expenditure on the administration of the union, 
affiliation fees to local trade union centres and the International 
Transport Workers' Federation having accumulated over the years, It 
is evident that the union's financial position was extremely buoyant. 
The main financial assistance the union offered its members was a 
death benefit of Le20 paid to the relatives of a deceased docker. 
Salary advances for the purchase of consumer durables were offered to 
the union's small staff from time to time and ’purses’ were voted
1 Ibid.




for. union members attending courses of Conferences abroad* In April
1972 the executive voted Le7,0Q0 to be held in a fixed deposit bank
account. In 1974- Lei, 000 worth of shares were purchased as a
contribution to a consumer, cooperative venture sponsored by the 
o
Labour Congress* Two years later, the union purchased Le3,0QQ worth
o
of shares at Standard Bank (Sierra Leone) Limited. By August 1978,
the union's total bank balances was Lel8,015.58 cents.^ "
Throughout Conteh's leadership of the union, the records show
that the executive continued to monitor the unions' expenditure
carefully. Several instances of attempts to reinforce a system of
accountability within the union can be cited. In February 1972, a
few weeks after some new office equipment was brought, a steward
suggested that an inventory of the union's assets should be made:
'Comrade D. E. Samara suggested that it is necessary that an
inventory of the equipment at the secretariat with particular
reference to those recently brought...be drawn up and displayed for
the perusal of any interested member of the union...After further
exchange of views on the matter, the president ruled that an inventory...
be drawn up by the Secretary-General as this was the majority view..
After this, Comrade Salifu Turay appealed to members to try to forget
past occurences perpetrated by the previous and past administration
headed by Jack Sandy and M. I. Mansaray which he felt were perpetuating
5
these tendencies of mistrust among executive members.1
1 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting 13 •
April 1972.
2 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting 
Monday 5th August 1974*
3 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting 10 
May 1976.
4- Dock Workers* Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting 
Thursday 17th February 1978.
5 P.T.0.
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It is evident, however, that these tendencies of mistrust
continued to manifest themselves among executive members and could
be related to an apparent division of the executive into 'hawks1 and
'doves' over the question of union expenditure. The leading hawks
were Alfred Jackson, Kadrie Kamara, and J. T. King. The doves
included E. P. K. Ceisay, F. M. Abu, and the secretary himself. Some
sharp exchanges between these protagonists took place regularly at
executive council meetings. In March 1972, for example, it was
suggested that a 'purse' of Le600 be given to the secretary who was
about to leave for a conference in Geneva. A majority of the members
voted for this suggestion:
'After this, Gomrade J. T. King sounded a 
note of warning that members should always 
try to appreciate that the union's money was 
not just the asset of a few members as some 
members'felt, but owned generally by all the 
members; and that the Secretary-General was 
just going to be away for a few weeks. Next 
was Comrade R. M. Abu who reminded him and 
asked members to just take a quick mental 
stock of what the union has achieved just 
the past few months under the Secretary- 
General's leadership; and that members 
should be certain that when he is back from 
this very worthwhile course more will be 
achieved* *1
Another bitter exchange took place later that year over a suggestion 
by R. M. Abu and E. P. K. Ceisay that the union should host a dance 
in honour of some visiting port managers from other West African 
countries:
'Expressing his own view, Gomrade Alfred 
Jackson said that it was rather preposterous 
for the union to spend the poor labourer's 
money on a dance just to please the Sierra 
Leone Port Authority and their guests. The 
vice-president supported this view and added 
that the money will not only provide ugly
(5) Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting 
Thursday 17th February 1972.
1 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting 
Thursday 14-th March 1972.
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rumours but will also bring confusion in 
the union* Making his own contribution,
Comrade Kadrie Kamara said that the union 
should not take the entertainment of the 
Authority's guests on its head.
In the event, the suggestion was not accepted. In the absence of
clearly defined objectives to which the union's accumulating balances
were to be put, problems relating to the use of union funds obviously
emerged. It has been established that the funds were not being held
to provide assistance to members during any protracted strike action.
'We never thought of that...because we always reached agreement by
negotiation. But this is possible now...Yes, benefits to members were
virtually non-existent, but two years ago, the union started to give
(school) scholarships to the children of members...We have also made
2
some good investments.'
One of the individuals best placed to exploit this vacuum relating 
to the use of union funds was the secretary, 0. B. Conteh. In 
December 1972, he presented the union executive with an application 
for a Le2,500 loan for the purchase of a vehicle which was to be 
paid back over a two-year period. Although a majority of the members 
of the executive at the meeting voted for the application to be 
approved, it was clear that several other members resented this 
development. 'Comrade Aziz Kassim expressing his views maintained 
that all senior officers of the Sierra Leone Port Authority who took
3
loans are paying interest...', and insisted on interest at five per 
cent. 'Comrade Kadrie Kamara wanted to know the amount the Secretary- 
General will have to pay in the 4$ monthly instalments ...Comrade
1 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting, 
Thursday 17th February 1972.
2 Interview with Aziz Kassim, 6 March 1982; the same ground was 
covered in conversations with dock workers.
3 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, 
Thursday 21st December,1972.
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G. A. Browne told members that none of we executive members can tell 
what other members will feel when things like this comes to their 
hearing, and cited the fact that even though (a car) is so much 
essential and moreover in the nature of the work the secretary is 
confronting, he also reminded the secretary that it was him who is 
asking for a loan...Comrade Salifu Turay explained to members the 
good work which the Secretary-General have been doing all these time 
and appeal to members to consider over the issue and try to satisfy 
the secretary so as to keep.him happy in his job at all times.
The secretary did not in fact purchase a vehicle. He bought a
house and came back to the executive for a further loan of Le2,000
to complete the transaction. This application was also approved but
the secretary was required to write and inform the executive that
the original purpose of the loan had been changed. His discomfiture
is evident in his letter which was not, however, lacking in boldness:
'...I have no alternative but to honestly 
submit the fact that I cannot...discharge 
the understanding of buying means of transport 
...I am constrained, and for the discreet 
consideration and understanding of ,you all, 
to withdraw the understanding of my original 
application to buy means of transport in 
place of which I wish to offer my house and 
landed property brought at four thousand 
two hundred leones, situated at No. 26 Will 
Street as a safe guarantee towards the 
repayment of the salary advance of Le4»500 
which I have already started repaying at 
%  interest*12
Those members of the executive who resented these developments were 
not prepared to be 'discreet* or 'understanding' over this issue.
The hawks quickly spread the word among the union rank and file that
1 Ibid.
2 Dock Workers' Union, 0. B. Conteh to Executive Council, 16 March 
1973.
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the executive had approved a loan of such magnitude to the secretary#
At an executive council meeting in May, they were warned that discord
would be created within the union as a result of this 'gossiping1;
'Comrade E, P* K. Ceisay intimated members#.. 
to stop the way some of them have started to 
spoil the smooth running of this organisation 
by means of gossiping. He referred members to 
a resolution taken some time ago...that all 
decisions taken by the executive should be 
confidential, but yet still some members are 
fond of telling other people what the 
executive decides on each executive meeting 
held being held.,.Comrade Borboh Turay and 
Comrade Ibrahim Jalloh also contributed to 
the debate and also warned that members should 
stop gossiping.'1
The warning was directed particularly at J* T. King, Kadrie Kamara,
and Alfred Jackson. Ignoring the warnings, they convened a series
of meetings among dockers in the various sections of the Port Authority
in order to undermine confidence in the secretary and the executive.
0. B. Conteh himself interrupted one of these meetings after having
been informed that papers relating to the loan had been removed from
the union office;
'...the Secretary General first of all 
reported about how he was called down the 
Marine Slipway, Cline Town, in the early 
afternoon of the date of the meeting (August 
22) where he was handed a copy of the letter 
of his application regarding his salary 
advance loan with a copy of the draft
agreement said to have been seized from
Mr. J. T. King who he met concluding his 
address to workers against the Executive's 
decision granting the loan they had made to 
him. The papers in question he said were 
kept inside one of the drawers of his 
office desk and could not imagine that these 
. papers could ever have found their way out... 
this state of affairs the secretary concluded 
was one which the executive must view with 
all seriousness especially when it was now 
clear that the question of papers related to 
matters of a confidential nature were a
1 Dock Workers* Union, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, 29th 
May 1973.
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security risk; and finally urged the
executive to consider appropriate measures ^
to preserve confidentiality in the secretariat.1
The secretary also presented a resolution to the meeting purporting to
be a popular endorsement of the decision to grant him the loan:
•We the members of the constituent sections 
comprising the general membership of the 
Sierra Leone Dock Workers' Union having today 
been addressed at this meeting concerning 
unscrupulous allegations documented by three 
members of the executive, and also having 
heard a detailed factual account offered by 
our union Secretary-General supported by 
inspected authentic documents in relation to 
the Executive decision of having made a 
Le4,500 salary advance loan to the Secretary- 
General, do by this unanimous resolution 
endorse that decision of the executive council 
which we take to be very consistent with 
conducive conditions of employment...12
In retrospect, it is clear that confidence in Conteh's leadership 
of the union was badly shaken, and the events which were to eventually 
remove him from the leadership in 1977 may be said to have their 
origins in the divisions created within the union over this affair. 
Three sections of the union, Civil Maintenance, Marine Slipway, and 
Mechanical Plant lard, made up primarily of artisans, and represented 
on the executive by King, Jackson, and Kamara respectively, were 
determined to bring about a change in union leadership. Being a 
sensitive political animal, Conteh himself attempted to consolidate 
his position by creating a clientele among the unskilled workers, 
particularly the casual labourers, numerically the largest group within 
the union. 'He successfully created a personal following among the 
casuals...the strategy I would say was to remind them that he was 
doing his best to improve things for them and that they should ignore
1 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, 30th 
August 1973.
2 Ibid.
3 Interview with A2iz Kassim, 6 March 1982.
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the artisans, who as skilled workers did not have any problems and 
were secure in their jobs. It should also be remembered that what 
was at issue was not his suitability for being Secretary-General, for 
he was a shrewd negotiator who could deliver the goods, but his 
honesty and his tendency to behave like a dictator.It is a tribute 
to his skills that, having failed in an attempt to expel King, Jackson, 
and Kamara from the union, he was successful in having them voted off 
the executive. Conteh also attempted to consolidate his position
further by seeking office in the Labour Congress. At the end of 1974,
3he was elected first deputy secretary of Congress* It was from this
position of influence that he presented the executive with a request
for a 25% salary increase in March 1975* This time however, he was
careful in securing the approval of his 'constituency1 among the
casual labourers before bringing the matter to the executive. For
this he was warned by the union president to refrain from 'going over
their heads’ to the membership:
'The President, Comrade Amadu Wilson warned 
the Secretary-General that when ever he 
needs anything from the union, he should 
first of all inform the executive instead 
of the masses.'4
5
Again, he was awarded the increase, and by the time he left office in 
1979* Conteh had succeeded in increasing his salary by over 50%, from 
Le210 to Le333*33 cents. The artisan wing of the union had quietly
1 Ibid.
2 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting, 17. 
January 1974*
3 Dock Workers’ Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting,
Friday 23 December 1974; this was only a part-time appointment 
although Conteh did in fact act as Congress Secretary during the
absence from the country of the substantive holder.
4 Dock Workers’ Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting,
Wednesday 26 March 1975.
5 Ibid. 6. P.T.O.
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been securing changes in the membership of the executive. At the
1975 union conference, two of 0. B. Conteh*s strongest supporters,
E. P. K. Ceisay and R. M. Abu, were voted off the executive.1 The
following year, the artisans made their biggest gain when the assistant
secretary, J. T. Mahoi, was voted off and replaced by Alfred Conteh
(no relation of 0. B.). The position of 0. B. himself remained
impregnable due to his strong popularity among the unskilled workers,
but it is evident that he resented these developments, and in
particular the appointment of an assistant secretary with an independent
power base in the unions
•The Secretary-General reported that he 
intended having a mass meeting of all members 
on the matter of an assistant secretary as 
no one will impose someone on him, otherwise 
he would leave the job.’3
Conteh did in fact make an attempt to leave the job. In October 1977
he triumphantly informed the executive that he intended to present
himself as a candidate for the secretaryship of the Labour Congress.^
In the event Conteh did contest the elections, only to withdraw his
candidature at the very last minute when it was clear that J. B. Kabia
of the Mines Workers* Union commanded the support of a majority of
5
the delegates at the conference. *It was a humiliation from which
(6) Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting, 
Thursday 28th September 1978.
1 Interview with Aziz Kassim, 6 March 1982; interview with Alfred
Conteh, 23 February 1982; the same ground was covered in informal 
conversations with dockers.
2 Ibid.
3 Dock Workers1 Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting,
Monday 12th April 1976.
4. Dock Workers* Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting, 13
October 1977.
5 Interview with Aziz Kassim, 6 March 1982.
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he did not recover. Since we wanted to get rid of him, we gave him
support. But it was not fanatical support. ^
Although it is clear that a majority of the members of the union
executive were, by the end of 1977, firmly resolved that Conteh must
be relieved of the secretaryship, it has been established from
conversations with dockers that his negotiating skills and his ability
to create a network of contacts with important politicians continued
to be widely admired by the union rank and file* Conteh appears to
have been fully aware of the sources of his strengths and was
apparently determined to resist attempts to remove him from the union
leadership. He must also have been aware that his position as union
secretary was secure (for a year at the very least) as periodic Trade
Group Council negotiations for the review of wages and benefits in
public utility establishments (as was required under the 1971
Industrial Relations Act) were due in 1978. The executive was also
aware of this and indeed granted a 2 %  salary increase to Conteh while
the negotiations were in progress in September 1978. In November, the
secretary reported to the executive that negotiations had been concluded:
*In intimating members the cause of the 
meeting, the Secretary-General explained 
•that it was in connection with the Trade 
Group Council increases and that as he had 
convened a union general meeting for the 
following day, he thought it wise to also 
convene this meeting so as to give. Executive 
members a brief explanation on the purpose 
of the general meeting to enable them to 
explain some of these points to their 
respective sections...The Secretary-General 
then informed the meeting that after some 
hard bargaining the Trade Group Negotiating 
Council has awarded Xe96 per annum, and an 
increase to all junior employees earning 
up to Lei,780 per annum, and an increase of 
30 cents per diem to all casual workers.
Other conditions like free Saturdays and
1 Ibid.
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proper medical care will now be enjoyed by 
all workers immediately the agreement is 
signed.
Once these negotiations were over, Conteh*s position again became
vulnerable. The resentment, particularly of the skilled workers,
that the secretary was using his position to exploit the union again
surfaced. The old power struggle continued. At the union annual
conference in March 1979> where Conteh triumphantly reported his
successes in the previous year’s negotiations, the executive successfully
secured an amendment to the union’s constitution which had been
carefully designed to strengthen their position vis a vis the secretary.
This was that ’...the general membership which is the supreme authority
2
of the union shall call for elections after every three years’. The 
significance of this amendment was that executive members (but not 
the secretary or the assistant secretary) were no longer to be 
subject to annual election. Since a majority on the executive were 
critical of Conteh’s leadership, this meant that the secretary would 
be unable to undermine them for the ensuing three years at the very 
least.
In April, the internal auditors on the executive discovered that 
two separate incidences of fraud had been perpetrated on the union by 
the secretary and reported the matter to a meeting of the executive
3
council. The total amount involved was Lel3,200; Lei,200 having been 
voted for the secretary to attend a meeting in Ghana, which he did 
not attend, and Lel2,000, having been voted for the purchase of land 
at Newton, near Freetown, as an investment, for which there was no
1. Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, 
Thursday 30th November 1978.
2 Dock Workers’ Union, Report on Union Conference, Friday 23rd 
March 1979#
3 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, 26 
April 1979*
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receipt* Since the secretary could not offer a convincing explanation
to the meeting, it was decided to withdraw one of the allowances he
1
had been receiving from the union until he did so* The meeting also
decided to report the matter to the Minister of Labour, one of Conteh*s
many patrons in the APC. Conteh, meanwhile, presented the issue to
the union membership as being that ,*.*his enemies among the skilled
workers wanted to remove him as Secretary-i-General. He refused to work
with the executive and secured a court injunction to seal up the
2
office of the union until the matter was resolved*. In May the
exeoutive voted to remove him from the leadership* The deliberations
of the meeting are worth quoting at some length:
•Brother Luseni (representing, clerks of the 
Operations section)...moved a motion that 
the.Secretary-General be suspended from office 
indefinitely. • .Full Text of the Motion: * * *
Mr. Chairman and members, considering certain 
predominant factors which tend to disrupt the 
smooth running of this important and essential 
organisation, I am left with no alternative 
but to move a motion that the present Secretary- 
General be suspended from office and an interim 
committee be formed to manage the affairs of 
the union...Finally, I ask you Mr. Chairman 
and members to invoke the provision of Rule 
7*5 prescribed in the constitution of the 
Sierra Leone Dock Workers* Union for the 
suspension of Mr. 0. B, Conteh for gross 
inefficiency and insubordination in the 
execution of this official duties.••*3
After the meeting voted in favour of the motion:
•Brother Khalil Kamara (representing floating 
staff, Harbour Master*s department) moved 
that the Secretary-General's suspension should 
be made known immediately to the following:
1 Ibid.
2 Interview with Aziz Kassim, 6 March 1982; the same ground was 
covered in conversations with dockers.
3 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, 28 
May 1979*
- 275 -
(a) His Excellency the President (President 
Stevens)
(b) The Secretary-General APC
(c) The Honourable Minister of Labour 
(Mr, Formeh Kamara)
(d) The Honourable Minister of Transport and 
Communications (Mr. E, J, Kargbo)
(e) The General Manager Sierra Leone Ports 
Authority
(f) The Commissioner of Labour
(g) The Registrar of Trade Unions
(h) The Secretary-fGeneral Sierra Leone Labour 
Congress
(i) The Consultant Sierra Leone Fort Authority, etc. *^" 
The meeting also decided that '...court action be taken against the
2
Secretary-General on the points raised in the motion of suspension*. 
Conteh fought back* He organised a deputation of his supporters
among the unskilled workers to present the Minister of Labour, who
3
was also his kinsman, with a resolution expressing confidence in his 
leadership of the union. The Minister subsequently intervened in the 
dispute to persuade the executive to drop the court action against 
Conteh in view of the service he had given to the union since 1971, 
or else to convene a union conference to ratify the decisions they 
had taken. ^ Meanwhile a new secretary, Francis Brimah, formerly 
branch secretary of the Mines Workers* Union, was appointed after the 
executive had interviewed other nominees suggested by the Labour 
Congress. Congress, however, also required the executive to have its 
decisions ratified by a union conference:
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Interview with Aziz Kassim, 6 March 1982.
4 Dock Workers* Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting, 
30th August 1979.
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TBrother Alfred Sesay expressed the opinion 
that it was rather unfortunate that the Labour 
Congress had supported the Ministers proposal 
but that if even it was to be, the executive 
will surely win the conference. After a lengthy 
exchange on the matter, the president (D. F.
Kanu) advised that the date of the conference 
should be announced after the meeting. Brother 
Mark Luseni expressed the opinion that every 
shop representative now had an important role 
to play (in ensuring that the executive wins) 
but suggested that before ever the conference 
will be held, the Minister of Labour should 
agree and sign the following proposals by the 
executive for the safeguard:
(a) lhat the conference was only to show the 
popularity of Mr, Brimah
(b) That if Mr. Brimah wins, he will then 
become substantive holder to the post
(c) That whether Mr. Brimah wins or not the 
executive will remain in office until their 
term expires.
The president suggested that the proposals of 
the executive should be given to lawyer 
Campbell (the union solicitor) who will then 
write and forward them to the Minister for 
his approval before ever the conference will 
be held. This was unanimously agreed by all 
members present.*1
In the event, the executive did win the conference, albeit by 
2
a narrow majority. All the decisions of the executive were ratified
3
including the court action against the former secretary. Having . 
examined some of the more important aspects of the structure of 
accountability within the union during the sixteen years after its 
formation in 1963, the focus now shifts - before discussing the 
theoretical conclusions towards which this account points - to an 
appraisal of the strategies of bargaining adopted by the union over 
the same period.
1 Ibid.
2 Interview with Aziz Kassim, 6 March 1982; the same ground was also 
covered during informal conversations with dockers. (0. B. Conteh 
himself declined' to comment on these issues; interview with 0. B. 
Conteh, 21 April 1980.
3 Ibid: a letter from Mark Luseni of 25 August 1980 brought news
P.T.O.
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The Responses of Dock Workers to their employment by a parastatal 
organisation; the dynamics of bargaining
The main priority of the union -at the time of its formation was 
to secure the reversal of the illiberal employment policies of the 
port organisation* Where the colonial authorities had employed a 
host of measures to keep the costs incurred in the employment of 
lower paid workers fairly low, the Albert Margai regime was favourably 
disposed to an improvement in working conditions and benefits in the 
public sector in general* Indeed, at the first Board meeting of the 
Port Authority (at which Jack Sandy as secretary of the Dock Workers' 
Union was present), the Minister of Transport and Communications,
Kandeh Bureh, in his address to the directors as guest speaker, 
emphasised that it was government policy to ensure that acceptable 
terms of employment were maintained in the public sector*^ The 
nomination of the union secretary as a director by the minister .was 
not only a concrete manifestation of the policy, but was arguably 
a calculated attempt to increase the influence of the ruling party in 
•the labour movement which generally supported the opposition APC* In 
its attempts to reverse the illiberal employment policies at the 
port, the union was impressively successful* By 1967 a large proportion 
of daily wage workers had been absorbed into the permanent work force 
(cf. Table 4*7)• Reliable figures as to wage rates of dock workers 
are not available on a time-series basis for the 1960's* To the 
extent however that the wage indices for unskilled and skilled dockers 
were 126.3 and 95*2 respectively between 1965 and 1971, it would
that 0. B, had been found guilty by a Freetown High Court.
1 National Workshop Archive, Minutes of the Board of the Sierra 
Leone Port Authority, 12 January 1965*
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appear that the union was largely successful in maintaining the real
value of wages during this period at least (cf. Table 6*2). The fact
that there was a considerable increase in the number of dockers
employed at the port after 1962 while the total tonnage of cargo
handled at the port remained comparable to pre-1962 levels (Table 4*5)
suggests that the port was considerably overmanned throughout the
'sixties, a trend that was maintained during the 'seventies*
Successive leaders of the union have long recognised that much
could be achieved for the union membership through the personal
intervention of influential politicians* A former corporation secretary
of the Port Authority has explained that 'In the public sector in this
country, if the minister says this is what should happen, who are you
to refuse? Management can advise government, but at the end of the
day all decisions and requests, formal or informal, have to be 
1implemented'. Given this flexibility in the rules governing the 
management of public corporations, and the considerable scope for the 
exercise of power and influence, leaders of the union have naturally 
turned to politicians not only for support in bargaining with management, 
but also, as in 0. B. Conteh's case, for assistance in preventing his 
dismissal by the union executive. This is the background against 
which the responses of dock workers to their employment by the Port 
Authority and the dynamics of bargaining should be examined.
After the formation of the union, Sandy carefully cultivated the 
friendship of certain politicians, including the prime minister himself, 
Albert Margai. 'After Albert became prime minister (in Aprjll964), a , 
delegation of the executive went to congratulate him. Before we were
1 Interview with M. B. Bennett, 14 January 1980
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taken into the P.M.'s presence, Sandy told us that he will tell him
that they both come from Moyamba and are brothers. And' he did. He
also became close to Kandeh Bureh (Minister of Transport and
Communications, 1964-67)•' As union leader, Sandy was consulted
over the plans to establish the Port Authority as an autonomous public
corporation. He used the opportunity to secure the absorption of
daily paid workers and a good number of casual workers into the
permanent workforce, and to negotiate new wage rates which came into 
o
effect in 1965* Sandy appears to have been able to ’pull off’ these 
successes for three reasons. First, he flirted with the SLPP at a 
time when most trade union leaders supported the opposition APC. 
Second, as a southerner, he could claim affinity with the leadership 
of the SLPP most of whom were southerners. Third, the government 
itself was favourably disposed to an expansion of wage employment 
in the public sector and an improvement in its benefits. Sandy was 
therefore in a position to enjoy the patronage of the government.
He was nominated by the Labour Department for a short course in 
industrial relations in Europe in September/October 1964, and at the 
end of the year, M. I. Mansaray, then assistant secretary, was
3
nominated for a Soviet Union scholarship.
As a director on the Board, Sandy could take the demands of the 
union to the highest policy-making body of the Port Authority. In 
March 1965, he persuaded the Board to meet a part of the medi-care 
expenses of dockers and, subject to certain conditions, to give loans
1 Interview with M. I. Mansaray, 3 April 1982; it was established 
that Jack Sandy now lives in Liberia, and as such it was not 
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for the purchase of consumer durables. The management was also 
required to provide protective clothing for dock workers exposed to 
dirt and grease.^ Prior to the dispute within the union over misuse 
of funds and the introduction of shift work, it is clear that the 
union leadership had the upper hand over the management as a result 
of Sandy’s influential contacts. The Panda inquiry heard evidence 
to this effect:
'...it emerged from evidence that management 
allowed the union to have an unusual say in 
its affairs which to all intents and purposes 
made the union a very powerful weapon against 
management... and it was said during the 
inquiry that the union used its influence 
unduly in the matter of appointments, 
dismissals, and promotions. The general 
manager at the time was Mr. Rockett (an 
expatriate). This position obtained until 
his departure when Mr. Ross (another 
expatriate) was appointed acting general 
manager...Mr. Ross in his evidence said 
inter alia: "...The awkward situation at the 
port was a legacy left to me by my 
predecessor...The top men in the union had 
too much say in matters which were not their 
concern. I also discovered that Mr. Sandy 
was a member of the Board and the staff 
committee which had to discuss the question 
of my appointment. Naturally, one should 
expect that I would to an extent give in 
to this man. As the months went by I found 
that if I should get time to carry out the 
specific duties as general manager of the 
Port Authority, I would have to delegate 
powers to other heads of various departments 
in the port. When ever I complied with the 
union's demands, they would say I negotiated; 
but if I rejected their demands they would 
say that I did not negotiate...I would like 
to say that I am still prepared to negotiate 
with the union if they have proper ~
representation in their executive council." '
1 National Workshop Archive, Minutes of the Board of the Sierra Leone 
Port Authority, 4-th March 1965.
2 The Panda Report, p.8.
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The Panda inquiry also heard evidence that it was not until after a
new corporation secretary was appointed that the influence of the
union was challenged by management:
'The position remained the same until the 
appointment of Mr. Greenwood (an expatriate) 
to the post of secretary...on 29th May 1965.
Mr. Greenwood.. .no doubt took with him a 
'new broom* to sweep the relics of indiscipline 
in the port...On the other hand, the union's 
executive council alleged that the misunderstanding 
within the union was brought about by the 
activities of Mr. Greenwood. This statement 
was not confirmed by the rank and file who 
thought that Mr. Greenwood, on account of his 
vigilance in seeing that the affairs of the 
Port Authority were properly handled became 
an eyesore to the union's executive council.
By this time the influence of the executive 
council had dwindled because...Mr. Greenwood 
was no longer prepared to accept the demands 
which had hitherto been made on management.
He adopted the attitude that for every request... 
the appropriate organs of the Port Authority 
would have to take decisions, and it was only 
those decisions that he was prepared to 
implement. The effects of Mr. Greenwood's 
alleged intolerable actions...came to a head 
when he attempted to carry out decisions of 
the Board and the staff committee in regard 
to the operation of the shift system in the 
port. It would be unfair to say the least, 
to suggest that Mr. Greenwood was acting of 
his own volition...*1
In spite of Greenwood's attempts to reduce Sandy's influence, 
the latter felt obliged to support the proposals relating to the 
introduction of shift work* As a result of the IMF stabilisation 
programme which came into effect in mid-1966, public corporations 
were required to make substantial cuts in expenditure. Since 
redundancies would have been politically unacceptable, the overtime 
system, which was known to have been widely abused, was selected as 
the area to be subjected to economy at the Port Authority. The Panda 




earned over 200% of their salary as overtime** The Board decided 
to begin the introduction of shift work with the crane drivers as
there were already sufficient men employed to permit the introduction
2
of shift working without further recruitment or training of new staff1.
The workers involved refused to cooperate with the management:
'It is clear from the evidence that the 
question of the shift system for portal 
crane drivers was never discussed either 
by the executive of the union or with the 
workers concerned. It was only after 
management had given the green light to 
enforce the shift system, that Mr. Sandy 
discussed the question with the portal 
crane drivers and the leading hands* As 
it was to be expected, they were violently 
opposed to the proposal...Mr* Sandy 
realised that with the introduction of 
the shift system the total emoluments of 
employees in the industry would be reduced...
It is not -understood however why Mr. Sandy 
should have acquiesced earlier on in the 
decision of the Board to introduce the 
shift system.*3
It had also been decided at Board level (and with Sandy's agreement) 
that workers who refused to cooperate in the introduction of shift 
work should be subjected to disciplinary action. Recognising the 
unpopularity of shift work, over which the rank and file had begun 
to take unofficial action in the form of a work to rule, Sandy decided 
to make the action official and accordingly issued the management with 
a formal notice.^ However, the action of the rank and file was also a 
protest against the union secretary's leadership and, in particular, 
his initial agreement to the introduction of shift work without 
demanding any concessions in lieu. Management responded by 'spreading 
the word' throughout the port that it had been prepared to negotiate
1 Ibid. p.5«
2 Port Authority Archive, Matters leading up to and connected with 
the recent work to rule called by the Sierra Leone Dock Workers' 
Union, 22 November 1966.




but Sandy had not pressed for negotiations. Sandy, who was by then 
thoroughly discredited, informed the Minister of Transport and 
Communications that the Port Authority management, and Mr* Greenwood 
in particular, had presented the issue of the introduction of shift
2
work as not negotiable, and that accordingly he was calling a strike*
The rank and file however were satisfied with the assurances given
by the management that shift work would be negotiated* As it was
the union secretary who had failed to enter into proper negotiations
in the first instance, they were not prepared to go on strike merely
to Jsave his face*:
^..some members of the union advised*..
(the executive).**to withdraw the notice 
of work to rule and enter into negotiations 
with management* This request fell on deaf 
ears and it was at this juncture that a 
splinter group of the union emerged which 
later became vocal throughout the crisis*
By that time, the workers had resumed 
normal working time and with the work to 
rule being clearly flouted, the executive 
council proceeded to give a 21-day notice 
to go on strike. The serving of the notice 
was rejected by a majority of the workers**•
There was now a complete rift in the union 
and the workers had become frantic over 
the manner in which the executive***had 
controlled the affairs of the union and 
the unnecessary hazards to which they had 
been subj ected*13
By this time, Sandy had become an embarrassment to the government,
which appointed an inquiry to examine the dispute within the union
as well as between the union and the management, Sandyfs secretaryship
is still remembered, however, for its early achievements. It was
noted during conversations with dock workers that his method of
(4) Port Authority Archive, Matters leading up to and connected with 
the recent work to rule...
1 Ibid*
2 Ibid.
3 The Panda Report. p*7*
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cultivating the friendship of politicians, whose influence was used
to alter the balance of power between management and the union, was
regarded with approval. Dockers also spoke with regret of the fact
that the secretaries who succeeded Sandy had not been able to attain
the same degree of influence.
As union secretary, M. I* Mansaray negotiated the shift system
with the Port Authority management. Agreement was reached that a
special shift allowance would be paid. It was further agreed that
meetings between the management and the union to review differences
1would be held regularly* Over the years, these meetings became the 
main forum for aggressive bargaining between the union and the 
management. Issues discussed ranged from the provision of small 
increases in the wages of !workers who have passed a trade test in
p
their field of work...1 , to the provision of leave gratuity or
3
holiday bonus to workers entitled to paid holidays. It was testimony 
to the confidence of the union that, in December 1968, it put forward 
a proposal that the internal audit department of the Port Authority 
should be made completely independent of management.^ The thinking 
behind this proposal was to facilitate the access of the union 
leadership to documents which showed the correct financial position 
of the Port Authority, and which could be used in bargaining. Some 
of the union demands were accompanied with strike threats as a 
tactical means of maneuvre during the negotiations. Strike notices
1 Interview with M. I. Mansaray, 28 April 1980.
2 Port Authority Archive, ’Record of a meeting held on 25th June
1968 between Management and the Sierra Leone Dock Workers’ Union’.
3 Ibid.
4 Port Authority Archive, ’Record of a meeting held on 12th December
1968 between Management and the Sierra Leone Dock Workers’ Union*.
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were issued in May 1968 and in January 1969,1 but subsequently 
withdrawn. At the port JIG negotiations in September 1969, Mansaray 
was able to secure a per diem increase of ten cents for all categories 
of workers. Working hours were reduced from AS to 45 hours a week 
and a food allowance of 24 cents per shift (subject to a minimum of 
four hours being worked in each shift) was introduced for casual 
cargo handlers. Many dockers readily admit that Mansaray was effective 
in bargaining and could therefore deliver the goods. He was also 
fortunate that his period in office coincided with a period of buoyant 
revenue receipts at the port and the regime of a competent managerial 
team* In 1971, the year he was voted out of office, the port recorded 
a profit of over Lei million. It was after this period that the 
diversion of funds by senior port officials became an increasingly 
worrying and, from the point of view of lower paid workers, damaging 
trend.
After the military interregnum and the return to civilian rule 
Mansaray, like Sandy before him, cultivated the friendship of APG 
politicians and, in particular, D, F, Shears, the Minister of Transport 
and Communications (with responsibility to nominate the directors of 
the Port Authority), and C, A, Kamara-Taylor, Secretary-General of 
the APG, who as Minister of Lands, Mines and Labour was in charge of 
the Labour Department, In November 1968 Mansaray was nominated 
director of the Port Authority, In a lengthy interview, Mansaray 
was forthright in elucidating his reasons for cultivating the
1 Port Authority Archive, Secretary-General Dock Workers' Union to 
General Manager Sierra Leone Port Authority, 4th May 1968; ibid, 
6th January 1969,
2 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of the JIG for the Port Industry, 
Monday 8th September 1969,
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politicians;
!I went to see Shears and C. A. (Kamara-.
Taylor) after they were made ministers***
Even though the appointment of the Secretary- 
General (of the Dock Workers' Union) as 
director (of the Port Authority) was not 
popular with our members, I was convinced 
that to be effective, I should be on the 
Board, Also it had happened before (i*e*
Sandy had created the precedent). If I was 
not a director, it will look as if I don't 
have prestige and contacts. Management like 
to snob we union people and carry on as if 
they are the only people in this world with 
education. But as director, I sit on the 
Board whether they (management) like it or 
not and become an important personality as 
far as Port Authority is concerned, So I 
went to see Shears and C. A,,,,,(At each 
meeting) I told them that we have supported 
the APC from Opposition days. At '67 election 
I organise the workers (to vote) to remove 
Kandeh Bureh (former Minister of Transport 
and Communications whose constituency in 
the east end of Freetown covered the area 
on which the port is located) and vote 
solidly for APC, So I told them that now, 
the workers should have a voice on the Board 
where decisions on their interest are taken,,.
Shears and C. A, (each) said they will look 
into the matter. After some time Shears called 
me and told me that he will made me director 
but I should see to it that there is no 
trouble from the union at water quay.,*C. A, 
helped us at the JIC negotiations (in 1969) 
when we wanted to reduce working hours* The 
employers did not agree, so I went to see 
C. A., and he wrote to them that idle APC is 
for all sections in this country, including 
workers, and so they (the employers) should 
not be inflexible..,'!
It is in the nature of clientelist politics that prominent 
national politicians should, seek to renew and extend their network 
of clients. This was recognised by union leaders like Mansaray who 
were prepared to adopt tactics of aggressive bargaining to increase 
wages, improve conditions, and defend gains at the work place or at
1 Interview with M. I. Mansaray, 3 April 1982.
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the industry level, but were also willing to enter into clientelist 
relations in the political arena as another channel (and an effective 
channel) to reach the same objectives# Clientelist relationships 
are also attractive for the material rewards that are offered, such 
as the directorship in MansarayTs case, or the scholarship awarded 
to his assistant, 0. B. Conteh, in 1969, This strategy, however, was 
not without risks# At the very least, it compromised the independence 
of union leaders to criticise (and to encourage union members to 
criticise) the performance and the policies of the regime publicly#
This failure was (as we shall see in the next chapter) shared with 
other union leaders in the labour movement.
These strategies of bargaining continued to be adopted during 
0. B. Conteh*s secretaryship of the union. Having inherited Mansarayrs 
seat on the Board of the Port Authority, Conteh also cultivated the 
friendship of influential politicians and in particular the Minister 
of Transport and Communications (by then E. J. Kargbo) and the 
Minister of Labour (by then F. B. Turay).^ The most difficult 
challenge which faced Conteh, however, was the rapid increase in 
consumer prices during the 1970's and, more especially, after 1973 .
(cf. Table 6.3)• As the Sierra Leone economy entered into a recession 
(or a period of 1 stagflation * as Bank of Sierra Leone economic 
researchers described it), the real value of wages, as shown by the 
indices, declined to 84 for unskilled and 51 for skilled dockers 
respectively by the end of the decade (cf. Table 6.2)# Little wonder 
then, that the 'industrial peace' created out of the clientelist 
accommodation of trade union leaders with APC politicians was shattered
1 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting, 
Thursday 3rd February 1972.
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by the first general strike in the country's history which took place 
in August/September 1981, and in which dock workers played a leading 
role.
TABLE 6.3













SOURCE; Bank of Sierra Leone, Annual Report 1979#
In the face of an attempt in 1972 by the management of the 
Port Authority to introduce comprehensive terms of conditions of 
service for all workers in its employ, Conteh was resolutely 
determined to force the maximum number of concessions from the 
management. Given the absence of comprehensive terms of employment, 
the management had grown to believe that the union had exploited 
the resulting state of affairs by forcing concessions - often with 
threats of strike action - vis a vis working conditions. By setting 
out the conditions of service as part of the contract of employment
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of each worker, the management hoped that the union would become
limited to bargaining at the trade group council periodic wage
reviews.'*’ It was recognised by the union executive that comprehensive
terms of employment would greatly circumscribe the leverage which the
union had hitherto exercised. In October 1972, when Conteh was abroad
with another union official, the management issued the service booklets
to workers, who were requested to sign them. The assistant secretary
of the union, J. T. Mahoi, acting as secretary, wrote to the general
manager of the Port Authority:
1...the whole executive council of the union 
at its emergency meeting held yesterday, has 
authorised me to again convey the unions 
stand on the issue of these conditions of 
service. Accordingly, all union members in 
the Authority have been asked NOT to complete 
the forms accompanying the booklet containing 
the conditions of service until further notice.
A copy of the circular is attached. In the name 
of industrial peace and goodwill, the union is 
asking management to suspend the issuing of 
these booklets to employees until the President 
and Secretary-General (of the union) return 
from an overseas tour...We believe that by doing 
so an explosive situation could be avoided.'^
As it had always been the strategy of the union to acquaint
influential politicians with the details of difficulties with the
management, this letter was copied to the Minister of Transport and
Communications and to the Minister of Labour. The Management for
its part was insistent that:
«...there had never been any comprehensive 
conditions of service for employees of this 
Authority which is the bed-rock of contract 
whereby workers become acquainted with the 
terms and conditions governing their employment 
and safe-guarding their interests. It is 
therefore overdue for positive action to be
1 Interview with M. B. Bennett, 14. January 1980.
2 Port Authority Archive, Acting Secretary Dock Workers1 Union to 
General Manager Sierra Leone Port.Authority, 18 October 1972.
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taken in that direction as the present 
conditions of service provide these vital 
ingredients which are necessary in any 
industrial set up.
This letter was also copied to the ministers* On Conteh's return
from abroad, the matter was again taken up with management which was
insistent that the conditions could not be negotiated* The management
only relented when E. J, Kargbo, the Minister of Transport and
2
Communications, intervened. Conteh laid down no less than twenty-
3
six amendments. Most of these were eventually accepted and included 
as a supplement to the conditions.^ It is clear that shop stewards 
on the union executive fully supported the strategy of involving the
5
two ministers in the dispute*
Conteh's personal stature and influence within the labour 
movement had grown considerably since assuming office as union secretary. 
He represented the union on the executive of the Labour Congress and 
in October 1973> he was asked to act as secretary of Congress during 
the absence of the substantive secretary, George Palmer, from 20th 
November to 10th December. A year later, in December 1974* Conteh
7
was voted first deputy secretary of Congress.
1 Port Authority Archive, Personnel Manager, Sierra Leone Port
Authority to Acting Secretary Dock Workers' Union, 21 Oct. 1972*
2 Interview with 0. B. Conteh, 21 April 1980.
3 Port Authority Archive, Secretary Dock Workers' Union to General
Manager Port Authority, 21 February 1973.
4 Interview with 0. B. Conteh, 21 April 1980.
5 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, 17
October 1972.
6 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, Monday 
11 October 1973; according to the minutes, 1...joyous sentiments 
were expressed by the whole meeting which regarded this as a 
special distinction for dock workers.
7 Dock Workers' Union, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting, Friday 
13 December 1974*
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Another preoccupation of the union around this time was with 
the changing technology in cargo handling. During the.'seventies, 
shipping companies increasingly adopted the containerised method of 
cargo movement. Its many advantages include the reduction of the 
time a shbp spends at port since containers enable great quantities 
of cargo to be loaded or unloaded at the same time. Containerisation 
however reduces the demand for cargo handling labour since special 
cargo handling equipment is used to move containers. Throughout 
the 'seventies, Conteh expended considerable energy in persuading 
management to introduce a 'supplementation of earnings' scheme for 
casual labourers (his 'constituency' in the internal politics of the 
union) threatened with loss of earnings as a result of containerisation. 
This campaign did not meet with much success* The present management ■ 
of the Port Authority holds the view that '...since Sierra Leone is 
at the receiving end of the container revolution, there is not much 
that can be done to save jobs in the longer term'.'*' It has however 
been the strategy of management to generate more business at the port
2
by mating Freetown an important centre for the transhipment of cargo.
At the first meeting between union representatives and the British 
team of management consultants (to whom the management of the port 
was subcontracted following the financial collapse of the Port 
Authority, the publication of the Forster Commission report and the 
dissolution of the Board of Directors), Conteh was quick to make his 
anxieties over the new technology known:
1 Interview with Ray Donker of Waportman International, General 
Manager Port Authority, 8 January 1980,
2 Ibid.
- 293 -
'Mr. Osman Conteh, Secretary-General of the 
union introduced individually the entire body 
of representatives to management,..He pledged 
the cooperation of the executive to the new 
management from whom in return he expected 
the continued realisation of the basic 
conditions of service which workers should 
enjoy...and for workers who become unemployed 
through the application of advanced technology, 
the introduction of a supplementation of 
earnings scheme,,,He asked that these processes 
be not unduly delayed...These issues cannot 
wait if the union should give their whole 
hearted support to Waportman International 
which they now pledge...Mr* J. E. Hughes,
Chief Executive, replied, stating the 
international experience and composition of 
the Waportman Management Team which was 
founded in Switzerland and composed of British 
nationals with'wide and very long experience 
in West Africa*..He stated the levels at which 
they operate for inviting business and contracting 
with large shipping companies dealing in 
containers, transhipment, etc. The more business 
won the better it will be for the workers as 
more work will be created to use up the over- 
staffing existing at present.'1
ALthough Conteh failed in his attempt to become Secretary of
Congress at the end of 1977, he had become an important figure in
the labour movement in his own right. Dock workers have pointed out,
however, that his kinsman relationship with Formeh Kamara, Minister
of Transport and Communi cations from July 1973 to June 1978 when he .
became Minister of Labour, considerably 'helped along* his career in
the labour movement. Be that as it may, it is clear that Conteh was .
never impeded by a lack of self-confidence in his bargaining with
management. The Forster Commission was evidently impressed with his
resolute determination to defend the interest of dockers in bargaining 
2
with management* During the dispute between Conteh and the union 
executive however, the minister did intervene, initially to prevent
1 Port Authority Archive, Minutes of Management Union Meeting, 
Tuesday 30 May 1978.
2 The Forster Report, p.8.
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his dismissal, and later to insist that the union rank and file must 
ratify the decisions of the executive.
The internal dynamics of the Dock Workers1 Union: some theoretical 
conclusions
Two main conclusions may he drawn from this account of the responses 
of dockers to their employment by a parastatal organisation, and the 
structure of accountability within the union. First, dockers, through 
their union leadership are prepared to use the usual channels of 
management - union contact in bargaining, or in the frequent review of 
the multitude of problems inherent in any organisation with relatively 
large-scale employment, as well as the channels afforded by patron- 
clientelist accommodation of the union leadership by prominent national 
politicians. Individually or through their union leadership, and via 
patron-clientelist accommodation, dock workers have also been prepared 
to maintain and defend the many irregularities - tolerated in a • 
public enterprise - being practiced, such as dishonest claims for 
overtime payment, overmanning, low productivity, the use of material 
and equipment belonging to the Port Authority in private contracts 
in the informal sector, etc., as documented by the Forster Commission 
report (see Chapter 4)* These strategies and their substantive 
consequences circumscribed the extent to which the Port Authority 
operated as a typical capitalist enterprise.
Second, it is clear that the main conflicts within the union have 
centred on the effectiveness of its leadership in bargaining with 
management, defending gains, or on their 'honesty1. After extended 
conversations with dock workers, there should be no doubt that they 
resented and increasingly became paranoiac over the appointment of 
successive union-secretaries as directors on the Board of the Port 
Authority, even going to the extent, in 1972, of insisting that
- 295 -
directors1 fees must in principle be paid into the union account, and 
reimbursing the secretary with the same amount. But union leaders, 
generally having an inferior level of education than that of the 
management, correctly perceived that a directorship (or an appointment 
in the national union centre) can enhance their status, and hence 
their effectiveness in bargaining with management. In insisting 
however that the funds from the accumulating balances of the union 
must not be 'stolen1, skilled workers in particular have placed a 
high premium on the honesty of the leadership. To the extent that 
this became a problem, it reflects the absence of any commitment to 
radical political objectives of the rank and file and the leadership 
alike. Throughout the history of the union, it was never envisaged 
that the union's substantial balances could be used to sustain workers 
in a protracted strike action, or to further clearly defined political 
objectives. Trade unions in post-colonial Sierra Leone have (as we 
shall see) shown little evidence of political radicalism and appear 
to be oriented towards aggressive bargaining at the workplace, 
displaying a concern with more parochial issues, and an 'economism' 
so much derided by Lenin. It is clear that no union leader, Wallace- 
Johnson included, has been able to sustain the interest of workers 
in mobilising for the furtherance of radical political objectives.
It is significant that the two major strikes in the country's history 
(February 1955 and August/September 1981) occurred during periods when 
there had been an erosion in the value of real incomes and a shortage 
of rice, the nation's staple food. During negotiations to facilitate . 
the representation by the Dock Workers' Union of workers engaged in 
the handling of produce at the Produce Marketing Board, M. I* Mansaray 
clearly spelt out the orientation of the Union, and his ideology on 
trade union organisation:
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'Mr. Mansaray then addressed the meeting... 
he said' that the union had the same aims as 
the employers: These call for the maintenance 
of good discipline, promotion of better 
understanding between employers and employees 
leading to the maximisation of profits, and 
ultimately resulting in general prosperity, 
increased earnings, and better conditions for 
all concerned.
The 'accommodation* of lower paid workers in parastatal
organisations and their involvement in the various irregularities -
politically acceptable in public enterprises - does not necessarily
imply that they are unproductive and unexploited. At the Port Authority,
the productivity of dock workers is quite low (as a result of
overmanning and the widespread use of casual labour), but at the very
least, dock workers make a value-added contribution in the handling
of cargo and related activities. The requirement that the port
enterprise must be commercially viable has resulted in the
conceptualisation of wages as a 'cost of production*, and accordingly
subjected to measures of economy. Moreover, in the day-to-day
administration of the enterprise, the professional management employ
a variety of labour control systems designed to minimise their
perception of the adequacy of the worker in the performance of his
tasks, and in so doing, reduce the autonomy of the worker. The rise
of professional management in work organisations, the choice of
technology, the adoption of labour control strategies, have resulted
2
in what Braverman has called the 'degradation of work'.
Furthermore, in the pursuit of daily work activities at the
1 Dock Workers' Union, minutes of Meeting held on Thursday 12th 
June 1969 between representatives of the Produce Marketing Board 
and the Dock Workers' Union.
2 Cf. H. Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital. New York, 1974.
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port organisation, dockers encounter a managerial power structure 
which seeks to minimise the uncertainties arising out of the work 
process, and in so doing, subjects them to intense supervision as well 
as finding new ways to increase the rationalisation of work tasks. 
Moreover the rules which govern behaviour at the enterprise (such as 
the amount of time to be allowed for breaks) reflects the prevailing 
balance of power between management and lower paid workers. Dockers 
particularly resented the policy of the Port Authority which allowed 
supervisors and senior management and their families to use the 
medicare facilities at the port, but which denied them the same 
privilege. The power structure within the port organisation, as 
perceived by the docker, makes it clear to him that, in addition to 
his involvement in clientelist political relationships, he needs a 
trade union to protect his interests at the work place. When asked 
the purpose of joining the union, dockers frequently remarked that 
the union is 'like a lawyer'. During periodic wage reviews, or 
during the making of the rules of the work place, the union presents 
the workers' case. Indeed, this was the reasoning of the artisans 
and clerks who master-minded the formation of the Dock Workers' Union 
in 1963.
Tie absence of radical political pursuits in the actions and 
ideological orientations of the rank and file as well as the 
leadership of the union, does not necessarily suggest that dock 
workers constitute a 'labour aristocracy'* The poverty and squalor 
of their city life alone (as was shown in Chapter 5) ruled out the 
entertainment of such notions* Moreover, lower paid workers in Sierra 
Leone are not even the most direct beneficiaries of the appropriation 
of the resources of the state by the political kleptocracy. Indeed, 
there is evidence of an attitude of antipathy towards corrupt
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politicians and officials (and even towards their own union leadership) 
among lower paid workers, thus confirming the observation of Melson 
and Wolpe that the clientelist relationships inherent in communalism 
are essentially opportunistic. At the same time, however, it is clear 
that traditionally-held beliefs mediate the responses of such workers 
to their situation of relative poverty. For instance, when asked to 
explain the origins of inequality in Sierra Leone, dock workers often 
expressed a fatalism, couched in religious terminology, and best 




The responses of organised labour to politics in the post-colonial 
state
The union leadership of the dock workers has inevitably been 
constrained in its strategy and decisions by the policy and orientation 
of the trade union movement in Sierra Leone as a whole# Having located 
this study in its proper historical perspective, having argued and 
documented the thesis that the extent to which a public corporation 
in the post-colonial state operates as a typical capitalist enterprise 
is circumscribed by the system of political patronage, corruption and 
graft, and having assessed the responses of the dockers and the more 
general sociological characteristics they exhibit, this final chapter 
situates their trade union behaviour in the context of the nature and 
orientation of the labour movement in post-colonial Sierra Leone.
The discussion which follows therefore focuses on the political posture 
of the labour movement under various regimes and on its own internal 
dynamics during the two decades of independence*
Main trends in labour politics in the first decade of independence
With the SLPP as the party of government, Sierra Leone became 
an independent state within the British Commonwealth on April 27th, 
1961. In the period between the constitutional talks in London and, 
the first elections held on the basis of universal suffrage in Sierra 
Leone, i.e. between August I960 and May 1962, some spectacular 
political realignments occurred. These resulted in divisions within 
the labour movement as personalised by a rivalry for the leadership 
of organised labour between Marcus Grant and H. N. Georgestone. The 
realignments began with the formation of the All People's Congress 
(APC) by Siaka Stevens, who had broken ranks with the United National
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Front (UNF), the coalition of all parties formed under the leadership
of the SLPP to negotiate the administrative arrangements for the
transfer of power from the British.. Having lost his seat as an M.P.
following the 1957 elections, and having unsuccessfully advocated
ielections before independence1, Stevens left the UNF apparently over
concessions made to the British for the continued use of Freetown as
a naval base and other defence purposes* Refusing to sign the
constitutional and independence instruments, Stevens flew back to
Freetown and floated the idea of a populist political party in
opposition to the SLPP-dominated UNF. A former political associate
of Stevens who was also at the conference has written:
*Siaka Stevens*••stormed into Freetown.•.He 
proclaimed himself to be.«.inspired by the 
highest patriotic zeal. There were those, 
however, who believed that Siaka Stevens 
found the courage to assume this posture 
because he was fully aware that he stood 
little chance of personally deriving much 
advantage from the arrangements of the UNF.
The plum of a cabinet portfolio as he 
might have seen it was beyond his grasp... 
whatever his real motives, Siaka Stevens... 
announced in September I960...the creation 
of a new political party under his 
leadership, the APC.
In floating the idea of the formation of a new party with radical
pretensions, Stevens was fully alive to the possibilities of deriving
a solid base of support from various groups disenchanted with nine
years of SLPP rule. The leading APC organisers were three northerners,
S. I. Koroma, C. A. Kamara-Taylor, and M« 0. Bash-Taqi, none having
close family links with traditional chiefly families. Nor did they
2have high-status occupational backgrounds. The constituency to which
1 Gf. Gershon Collier, Sierra Leone; Experiment in Democracy. New 
York, 1970, p.32.
2 S. I. Koroma and M. 0. Bash-Taqi formerly ran small businesses and 
Kamara-Taylor was an ex-service man who had joined the clerical 
grades of the UAC after the war. The latter also had several friends 
in the labour movement, and in particular, George Palmer of The 
Clerical, Mercantile and General Workers1 Union, a former
P.T.0.
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they hoped to appeal included liberal intellectuals (and especially
faculty members of Fourah Bay College) who deplored the elitist nature
of the transfer of power and, more especially, the reliance of the
SLPP on a clientele of Big Men and chiefs throughout the country for
its power base; at the local level lower paid workers who, during the
early Sixties (see Table 7*1) registered their discontent in a series
of strikes; peasant farmers of the north, ever resentful of their
chiefs who, as APC organisers were quick to point out, had allowed
themselves to be incorporated into the southern-dominated SLPP; and
the people of Kono amongst whom a communally-based anti-elitist
political organisation had flourished for many years. This was
essentially the same constituency as that to which the UPP had appealed
in 1957 with some degree of success. By the end of 1961, however,
only five M.P.s considered themselves as part of the opposition in
parliament: two Kono M.P.s representing the KPM; two UPP M.P.s; and
Wallace-Johnson who had left the UPP to become the sole voice of the
APC in parliament. He was detained along with Stevens and other APC
1
organasers during the independence celebrations.
As was expected, several trade unionists supported the APC, the
most influential being H. N. Georgestone. He had been most impressed
with the rhetoric of APC organisers, and had recently been provoked
by the high-handed attitude of the government to the strike wave which
reached its peak in 1962 (see Table 7.1) and Sir Milton Margai’s open
2
contempt for the strikers whom he described as TlawlessT. Marcus
colleague at the UAC. (Interview with C. A. Wilton During, 13 
April 1982).
1 Cf. LaRay Denser, op. cit*. Ch. 7.
2 Interview with H. N* Georgestone, 23 January 1980.
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Grant, who was preparing his candidature as an ’independent’ in the
general elections of May 1962, did not express support for Stevens and
the APC. Recalling Stevens’ earlier career as a member of the Margai
ministry of 1951-57, and in particular their confrontation during the
1955 strike, he has argued:
’I cannot accept that the APG was the party
of the working class. Its leader came to
prominence through the trade union movement; 
it is not necessarily working class. And my 
views are shown to be correct by recent 
history*’1
Stevens himself now regards the formation of the APC as having been
motivated by nationalist aspirations, by the need to assert control
over the mining companies, and as an attempt to ’open up the country
2
and provide the leadership for the aspirations of the masses’. 
Wallace-Johnson shared this analysis and was until his death in 1965
3
a fully paid-up member and activist of the APG.
In the run-up to the elections of 1962, many union leaders openly 
campaigned for the APC, The United Mine Workers’ Union, whose founder 
was the APC leader, played a prominent role, campaigning for the APC 
in the mining centres of Lunsar-Pepel in the north, Moyamba in the 
south, and Kenema and Kono in the south-east. In the diamond-mining 
areas of Kenema and Kono, a significant proportion of the miners were 
of northern origin and had migrated in search of jobs. Indeed, 
throughout the union’s history, all but one of its general secretaries 
have been northerners or Konos (Table 7.2). Discussing the role of 
the union during the 1962 campaign, E. T. Kamara has said;
1 Interview with Marcus Grant, 16 January 1980.
2 Interview with President Siaka Stevens, 11 July 1980.
3 Ibid; see also LaRay Denzer, op. cit.. Ch. 7*
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TABLE 7,1
Industrial disputes, Sierra Leone* 1960-64
I960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Number of work stoppages 2 4 22 11 4
Workers involved 1,078 318 4,042 1,893 824
Man-days lost 9,614 1,447| 44,230 1,1851 6,480
DURATION OF WORK STOPPAGE 
Less than 1 day w 3 10 8 1
Less than 4 days 1 - 10 3 2
4 days but less than 1 week - - 1 - -
1 week but less than i month 1 1 1 - -
| month but less than 1 month - - - - - 1
CAUSES OF DISPUTES 
Wages or hours 2 5 5 2
Working conditions - - 6 3 1
Fringe rights or privileges - - 3 -
Personal relations between 
workers and management — 1 6 1 1
Disagreement over management 
policy not directly related 
to wages, hours, or working 
conditions - 3 2 2 -
SOURCE: Labour Department, Annual Report 1964* Table 14*
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’We of the United Mines Workers’ Union regarded
the APG as our own and so we felt that we must
support our founder...Our union is unique as 
we operate in each of the three provinces 
outside the capital, Freetown’.^
In Freetown itself, where most of the unions were concentrated, trade
union officials addressed APC rallies. Prominent among them were
H. N. Georgestone (the part-time secretary of the national centre, the
Council of Labour) and A. 0. Walker of the Transport and General Workers’
Union, Basco George and George Palmer of the Clerical, Mercantile and
General Workers’ Union, Abdul Wakheed Hassan of the Motor Drivers’
Union, A. Bai Conteh of the Artisans and Allied Workers’ Union,
P. S. Mammah of the Railway Workers’ Union, and Amos Sawyerr of the
2
Articled Seamen’s Union. It is significant that each of these union 
officials originated either from Freetown or from the north.
The results of the 1962 elections clearly revealed not only that 
the SLPP was faced with a formidable opposition for the first time, 
but also that the old Freetown-upcountry cleavage had been replaced 
by a new ethnic and regional cleavage between the Mende south and south­
east and the Temne north. The APC concentrated its campaign in the 
north and in the greater Freetown area. It won 12 of the 19 northern 
seats and 4 of the 12 seats in Freetown and its environs. It failed 
to win any seats in the south and south-east where it fielded only two 
candidates in 32 seats. The SLPP on the other hand won IS of these 
seats, five of the northern seats, and five seats in the Greater 
Freetown area. The Kono-based KPM (an ally of the APG won all four 
Kono seats). Reflecting on these results, Cartwright observes that
1 Interview with Egerton Tamba (E. T.) Kamara, 26 May 1982; E. T.
Kamara was secretary of the United Mine Workers’ Union from 1964
to 1969, and part-time secretary of the national centre, the Labour 
Congress from 1966 to 1969. He is now the administrative head at 
the APC national headquarters.
2 Interview with C. A. Wilton During, 13 April 1982.
3 This account of the 1962 elections has been taken from Cartwright
P.T.O.
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the APC combined an anti-chief appeal with a clear sectional base in 
the north:
’(Stevens apart)•••the APC leaders and 
members of parliament constituted a 'new 
class' entering the political elite for 
the first time. Relative to the SLPP 
oligarchy, the APC members came from lower 
status occupations, had more limited formal 
education, were younger, and had fewer 
links with traditional ruling families.
They did not articulate any coherent set 
of beliefs that could be called a radical 
ideology, but they did have rather strong 
feelings about the existing social structure, 
and in particular about the abuses they 
felt the chiefs were able to perpetrate 
against their people...this...served to 
some extent to innoculate them against the 
ever present temptation to move en masse 
to the government side..#'l
As can be seen from the presentation of the results in Table 7.3* 
the SLPP failed to win an overall majority, the balance being held by 
the independent M.P.s. These M.P.s, including Marcus Grant who won a 
seat in the Freetown Suburb of Waterloo, were induced to join the 
SLPP. Approaches were also made to APC M.P.s, two of whom ‘crossed 
the carpet’ to the SLPP side a few months after the elections. A 
young member of the APC national executive, Samura Sesay, was appointed 
a manager at the Sierra Leone Cement Works, a company in which the
2
government owned a majority of the shares, after joining the SLPP.
Three of the four Kono M.P.s declared themselves members of the SLPP 
in July 1963. The Kono movement was immediately re-organised and 
re-invigorated by the remaining M.P. by building upon the solid base 
of anti-government feeling.
op. cit.. Chapter 9. The same ground is also covered in Victor
King, 1 The Search for political stability in Sierra Leone 1960-72', 
Chapter 2.




Secretaries. United Mine Workers1 Union and their regional origins. 
1916 - 1972
SECRETARY DATES REGIONAL ORIGIN
Siaka Stevens 1946 - 1951 Northern Province
T. Lahai 1951 - 1954 Northern Province
B. E. D. Komba-Kono 1954 - 1961 Kono
J* S. Kamara 1961 - 1962 Northern Province
J. Ngegba 1962 - 1964 Southern Province
E. T. Kamara 1964 - 1969 Northern Province
S. S. Foday 1969 - 1972 Kono
J* B* Kabia 1972 - 1977 Northern Province
D. Gbenda 1977 - Kono
SOURCE: Interview E. T. Kamara, 25 May 1982.
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Marcus Grant’s ’defection* to the ranks of the SLPP, as it was
regarded by his colleagues in the labour movement, precipitated a
crisis. A large section of the rank and file of his union, the
Artisans and Allied Workers’ Union, were incensed by his decision and
proceeded to attempt to remove him from the leadership:
*Bai Conteh (the assistant secretary), the 
shop stewards and myself (regional secretary 
at Bo, southern province), could never 
understand why Pa Marcus did that. He knew 
that the rank and file were solidly for the 
AFC. He could have even remained independent.
It was a stab in the back, so it was decided 
that he should go. Some of the things which 
we had overlooked in his leadership were 
exposed.*1
At the national union centre, the Council of Labour, Georgestone
as secretary,convinced that Grant was motivated by personal ambition,
2
demanded his expulsion. Anticipating that this would be carried out,
Grant and two union secretaries who supported his decision to join
the SLPP resigned their affiliation to the Council and formed a rival
centre, the Sierra Leone Federation of Labour (SLFL). This increased
his difficulties within his own union.^ Marcus Grant himself has
explained that it was his electoral constituency which recommended
that he supported the SLPP in parliament:
’After the election, I called a meeting to 
find out which party to delare for. With 
R. G. 0. King (an SLPP M.P.) at Koya (the 
neighbouring constituency), because of the 
nearness and closeness of the relationship 
between the two constituencies, my constituency 
favoured me joining the SLPP.’5
1 Interview with Tejan Kassim, secretary, Artisans, Ministry of 
Works Employees’ Union (nee Artisans’ and Allied Workers’ Union),
26 March 1982.
2 Interview with H. N. Georgestone, 23 January 1980.
3 Interview with Marcus Grant, 16 January 1980; cf. Labour Department,
Annual Report 1962. p.8.
4 Interview with Tejan Kassim, 26 March 1982.




PARTY NO. OF 
CANDIDATES
NO. OF SEATS 





SLPP 59 28 34*7
APC (and Kono 
ally, SLPIM) 36 20 22.0
UPP 4- - 0.4
Independents 114. 14 42.6
TOTAL 213 62 99.7
SOURCE: J, Cartwright, op. cit., Chapter 9.
Grant and his supporters in his constituency presumably calculated
that they would receive the favourable consideration of applications
for development grants and other benefits that normally went with
support for the ruling regime. The Artisans' Union, however, demanded
his resignation, and for three years Grant resisted the attempt to
remove him from the union leadership. As an M.P* of the ruling party,
he was supported by influential cabinet ministers and a sympathetic
Labour Department.^ In 1965, however, following a long campaign
against him by union officials and the rank and file, Grant resigned:
'Allegations were made against me, even
though. I had been with them for 26 years
as founder and organiser of that union.
1 Interview with Tejan Kassim, 26 March 1982.
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Because of the pressure that was brought to
bear on me, in order not to lose my patience
and to keep the peace, I had no other 
alternative than to resign in 1965 after 
26 years.^
Bai Conteh, the union assistant secretary, was immediately elected 
secretary.^
The two union leaders who followed Marcus Grant out of the Council
of Labour were George Thomas and M. J. A. Coker, who had established
reputations as ’solid Labour Department men’. Thomas, the leader of
the stevedores1 union, the Maritime and Waterfront Workers1 Union,
had been vociferously opposed to the 1955 strike (cf. Chapter 2).
In 1963, he led a campaign to prevent dock workers in the employ of
the Port Management Department from setting up their own union
organisation (cf. Chapter 5)# Coker was leader of the Sherbro
Amalgamated Workers1 Union which operated in the SLPP stronghold of
Bonthe-Sherbro. During Thomas’s long illness in 1963/4-j Grant acted
as secretary of the Maritime and Waterfront Workers’ Union and, after
the former’s death in 1964-, he was elected secretary, a position he 
3
has since held.
The voting record of Grant reveals that he was a loyal SLPP M.P. 
who supported the government on all occasions. During the debate on 
the One Party State Bill, for instance, he intervened to correct 
Siaka Stevens, the leader of the Opposition (who had made a statement 
that only one trade union, the Dock Workers’ Union, was in favour of 
the Bill), that his Maritime and Waterfront Workers’ Union was also
1 Interview with Marcus Grant, 16 January 1980; vide Labour 
Department, Annual Report 1965. p.9#
2 Interview with Tejan Kassim, 26 March 1982.
3 Interview with Marcus Grant, 16 January 1980; cf. Labour
Department, Annual Report 1964. p.10.
in favour of the bill,"^
In 1963> four new unions, including the Dock Workers* Union,
joined the Council of Labour, bringing the total number of affiliated
members to 19,141 as compared with 11,191 in the SLFL (cf. Table 7*4-) •
Encouraged by the minister with responsibility for the department,
2
Labour officials attempted to bring the two sides back together.
This was for the obvious reason that SLPP leaders realised that it was
politically dangerous for a large section of the labour movement to
3
be so hostile to the government* Following Albert Margai’s assumption
of the premiership in 1964, he personally intervened to persuade Grant
as secretary of the Federation and Georgestone as secretary of the
Council to come together:
*It was Georgestone who was the stumbling 
block* It was difficult to entice him.
After this he was left alone.*4
The Brussels-based International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) was also concerned to bring about a settlement to the
dispute. From the point of view of ICFTU officials, the numerical
strength of the unions in Sierra Leone being relatively small, the
logical strategy for local trade unionists would be to remain united
in one strong national centre in order to consolidate their resources
5
and foster the development of trade unionism* Such reasoning, of 
course, did not take into account the realities of the local political 
environment* However, the ICFTU also found it expedient to concentrate
1 House of Representatives, Proceedings of 20 December 1965.
2 Labour Department, Annual Report 1963* p.7.
3 Interview with E. T. Kamara, 25 May 1982.
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its financial (and other) assistance on one strong union centre, 
rather than duplicate such hand-outs between small rival centres.
After much persuasion by ICFTU officials, the two factions finally 
came together in 1966. As E. T. Kamara has pointed out, however, this 
was only made possible by the fact that Marcus Grant had been ousted 
from the leadership of the Artisans’ Union. Although he had taken 
over the secretaryship of the Maritime and Waterfront Workers1 Union, 
the latter, with a membership of casual stevedore workers, was far 
less influential than the former union. The new national centre was 
named the Sierra Leone Labour Congress. Marcus Grant and Georgestone 
agreed to work under E. T. Kamara, who became the part-time secretary 
of Congress.'**
Regarding the tendency for the fragmentation of the labour
movement and the setting up of rival national centres, a Labour
Department official has perceptively commented:
* Splits (within the labour movement) always 
take the same pattern. One faction overtly 
support the government; another wants to 
hold back. They split...(but)...they all come 
back: to government to beg favours...To set 
up a national union centre was too easy in 
this country. 1. You print you letter heads.
2. You stick a sign on your office door.
3. You obtain a cable address. 4* You inform 
fraternal organisations the world over that 
you represent so many thousands (of workers).
That’s all. You don’t need to worry about 
salaries, organisation, and so on, because 
you are all part-time officials in the centre, 
and full-time in your union.’2
The four-year rift in the labour movement was as much a consequence
of disagreements over political strategy as of personality differences.
Georgestone and Grant both belonged to that generation of union
1 Ibid; cf. Labour Department, Annual Report 1966. p*7.
2 Conversation with L. E. Johnson, Labour Commissioner, 3 March 
1982.
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leaders who had spent their formative years in the Youth League, They 
had both been the standard bearers of the League during the period of 
decolonisation. While Grant appears to have reached an understanding 
of the realities of patronage and political influence in the post­
colonial state, however, Georgestone appears to have preferred to 
remain 1 uncontaminated1. Grant could not bring himself to believe, 
quite rightly as it turned out, that the APG could possibly become a 
radical political force. From his point of view, union leaders would 
be wise to seek some kind of accommodation with the party in power. 
Several union leaders in fact adopted this strategy while remaining 
affiliated to the Council of Labour. J. I. Sandy, the secretary of 
the Dock Workers’ Union, for instance, carefully cultivated the 
friendship of leading SLPP politicians and was ’rewarded’ with a 
directorship of the Port Authority which came into being in January 
1965 (see Chapter 5). Later that year, Sandy declared himself in 
favour of the One Party Bill. It has been established that even the 
Mine Workers’ Union exploited the patronage of the SLPP during disputes 
with the management of the raining companies and during wage 
negotiations.'*'
The attempt to introduce a one-party state stemmed from the
realisation by the SLPP hierarchy of the potential threat posed by
the APC. Significantly, when the Bill approving the principle of
a one-party state was voted on in parliament, Stevens and his group
of APC M.P.s abstained. Cartwright comments:
’The most striking feature of the debate was 
the lack of criticism by the AL1 People’s 
Congress of the principle of a one party 
system...In discussions after the debate, both
1 Interview with George Morten (former manager of the Sierra Leone 
Selection Trust in Kono, and presently a London-based director of 
Selection Trust Ltd.), 14 January 1981.
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TABLE 7.4-
Registered trade unions and affiliation, December 1963
Sierra Leone Council of Labour Sierra Leone Federation of Labour
UNION NO. OF 
MEMBERS
UNION NO. OF 
MEMBERS
Railway Workers1 Union 1,785 Artisans' and Allied 
Workers' Union 7,612
Mine Workers* Union 5,500 Maritime and Waterfront 
Workers' Union 5,600
Clerical, Mercantile, 




Transport and General 
Workers* Union 1,606
General Union of 
Construction Workers 800
Sierra Leone Articled 
Seamen’s Union 960
Motor Drivers' Union 1,500
Dock Workers' Union 2,64-9
TOTAL 19,441 14,191
SOURCE: Labour Department, Annual Report 1963, Table 15
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(M. 0, Bash-Taqi) and Stevens appeared quite 
willing to enter a coalition with the SLPP; 
neither showed much concern about the effect 
of eliminating all organised opposition to 
the government*••This failure of the APG 
leaders to argue for the desirability of an 
organised opposition was no momentary 
aberration. Nowhere in the columns of We 
Yone (the party newspaper) up to this time 
had there been a rejection on principle of 
the one party state; all its arguments had 
been concentrated on the unrepresentativeness 
of Sir Albert and the SLPP* Stevens himself 
some months earlier had said that it was only 
the SLPP’s weakness that disqualified it 
from seeking a one party system.>1
Georgestone, in his capacity as secretary of the Transport and General
Workers’ Union, joined other APC supporters in making a successful
application for a supreme court injunction to prevent the meeting of
a committee set up to work out the details of a constitution for the 
2
one party state. Georgestone therefore continued to uphold what he 
saw as the traditions of the Youth League, Younger labour leaders, 
on the other hand, displayed remarkably agile footwork in mobilising 
support for the APC, in exploiting the patronage of the SLPP, and at 
the same time in articulating the demands of their members, especially 
after 1966 when the stabilisation programme of the IMP imposed some 
considerable hardship on lower paid workers*
As before, the unions played a decisive role in the 1967 election campaign, 
addressing APC rallies and ensuring that workers and their families
3
turned up to vote on election day* The Mine Workers’ Union was 
particularly influential in mining constituencies where its officials ■ 
campaigned for the APC* In a few mining constituencies where the
1 J. Cartwright, op* cit., pp*216-217.
2 Interview with H.'N* Georgestone, 23 January 1980; vide
J. Cartwright, op. cit*. p.225*
3 Interview with M* I* Mansaray, 3 April 1982 (see Chapter 6);
interview with E. T* Kamara, 25 May 1982.
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party failed to win seats, its vote was still appreciably high,"*" The
APC narrowly won an election which revealed -the importance of the
growing regional cleavage as the basis of the division between the two
parties. The SLPP won only three seats outside its southern and
south-eastern strongholds: one in the north, and two in Kono, The APG
won all the remaining northern and Kono seats, and all seats in the
Western area of Freetown and its environs. It is clear that a
coalition of northern ethnic groups, supporters of the Kono movement,
the Krios, urban workers and the liberal intellectuals of Freetown,
swept the APC to electoral victory. The intervention of the army
2
prevented the party from taking office for a year.
This account of the history and dynamics of uni on-government 
relations should not obscure the fact that considerations of political' 
strategy were not the only concerns of the union leadership. Serious 
and genuine attempts were also being made to consolidate and develop 
trade unionism in the country. Once the two factions of the labour 
movement had been brought together, the ICFTU concentrated its 
assistance on the new Labour Congress. The priority area was to be 
trade union education: the training of shop stewards and union officials 
in bargaining procedures and trade union practices. E. T. Kamara was 
asked to assess training needs in Sierra Leone:
1 Interview with E, T. Kamara, 25th May 1982; full details on the 
election campaign, the results and subsequent events are provided 
in Cartwright, on. cit., pp. 24-9-255, and in V. King, op. cit., 
Chapter 3. In the south and south-east, six SLPP supporters or 
M.P.s who had grown dissatisfied with Sir Albert's leadership 
stood as 'independents' and were successful. For a detailed 
account of the cleavages within the SLPP in the south-east, cf.
V/. Barrows, Grassroots politics in an African State. New York, 
1976.
2 A comprehensive study of the intervention of the army has been 
undertaken by Thomas Cox, op. cit.
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'Trade union sponsored education programme 
for workers in Sierra Leone is comparatively 
recently gaining root. No educational 
programme was embarked upon either by the 
Sierra Leone Council of Labour or the Sierra 
Leone Federation of Labour until they were 
replaced by the Sierra Leone Labour Congress.*.
From this dry-as-dust background, the Congress 
is building up an educational programme in 
coordination with individual trade union 
programmes and the Sierra Leone Workers'
Educational Association,•,(which)...was 
formed in 1963 with the help of an International 
Labour Organisation expert.
In cooperation with the ICFTU and other interested parties, the Labour
Congress ran a series of courses in labour education from 1967 in the
main areas of large-scale employment throughout the country. Individual
unions also embarked on campaigns to increase membership; in the case
of the Dock Workers' Union, labourers at the Produce Marketing Board
were organised for the first time. Table 7.5 provides a list of the
unions and their officials as of March 1967.
The relationship between labour leaders and the military junta 
of 1967-68 was fundamentally different from the relationship with 
civilian politicians. Within a few days of taking office, Andrew 
Juxon-Smith, the Chairman of the National Reformation Council, made 
it clear that his mission was to rescue the country from political 
and moral decay. Political patronage as practiced by civilian 
politicians and 'corruption* in official circles were no longer to be 
tolerated. This meant that neither the union leaders nor the employers 
could seek the assistance of members of the government and other 
important officials to influence the outcome of bargaining as before.
All leading trade unionists were invited to meet .the chairman, who 
urged them to show restraint in wage demands. Marcus Grant, who lost 
his seat as an SLPP candidate in the elections, was a member of the
1 Labour Congress, E. T. Kamara to H. A. Tulatz, Assistant General 
Secretary ICFTU, 11 April 1967.
- 317 -
delegation, but Georgestone, who personally never recognised the
junta, declined the invitation.1 As part of its economic strategy,
the junta encouraged the newly created Employers1 Federation and the
Labour Gongress to sign a special ’code of conduct’ designed to reduce
the likelihood of strike action. The Gongress executive (made up of
officials of affiliated unions) used the opportunity to secure some
important trade-offs:
’Comrade (E. T.) Kamara said that his union 
accepted the document (the code) on the 
whole but that they were of the opinion 
that this document should serve as the base  ^
for future negotiations with the employers.’
In view of the drive to increase membership of the union, the clerical
union proposed that ’all affiliates to the Employers' Federation
3
implement the check-off system at all times’. The United Mine 
Workers’ Union proposed that the 'code of conduct' be re-titled ’code 
of conduct to ensure industrial peace’, in view of the authoritarian 
connotations of the former title.^ These suggestions were accepted* 
Inspite of the code, strike statistics for 1967 and 1968 show significant 
increases in man days lost and number of workers involved (cf. Table 
7.6).
The relationship between labour leaders and the junta was 
evidently strained by the IMF austerity measures which the NRG 
implemented with considerable enthusiasm. In his 1967 budget 
statement, Colonel Juxon-Smith went out of his way to dispel notions,
1 Interview with H. N. Georgestone, 23 January 1980.
2 Labour Congress, Minutes of the committee on the code of conduct 




especially current among labour leaders, that the IMF was running the
country or that it was a tool of the imperialist powers:
'I should like to record our sincere debt 
of gratitude to the IMF for coming to our 
rescue in time...I wish to reassure my 
countrymen that Fund visitation is neither 
a sign of national failure nor an abrogation 
of national sovereignty. Rather, it is a 
sign of our determination to seek and 
implement sound economic policies. It is 
an indication to interested observers that 
we recognise our difficulties and with 
international support we are resolved to 
overcome them.*1
The deflationary impact of the budget resulted in redundancies both
in the public and private sectors of the economy. The government
wages bill was reduced by a significant proportion:
'The total for personal emoluments for 
1967/68 is Le9,919,000 compared with 
LelO,555,500 in 1966/67, a decrease of 
6.03 per cent.
E* T. Kamara has described the reaction of labour leaders to the
NRC's economic policies:
'We challenged the NRG on these points.
They said that the outgoing SLPP government 
had ruined the economy and therefore there 
was no alternative but to reduce employment 
in the public sector. Employers (in the 
private sector) were also given a free hand 
to make redundancies. When a government 
practices redundancies as its policy, workers 
lose their rights. Trade unions become weak...
The NRG men were hypocrites. They made the „ 
rest of us suffer, but they were enjoying.'
Since the Labour Congress was represented on the largely civilian
NRG Advisory Committee, it was decided that a detailed memorandum,
stating the dissatisfaction of the labour movement with the regime's
economic policies, be forwarded to the committee. It is worth quoting
1 Statement on the Budget for 1967/68 broadcast by Col. A, T, Juxon- 
Smith, Chairman National Reformation Council on 30 June 1967, p.6.
2 Ibid, p,8.
3 Interview with E. T. Kamara, 25 May 1982.
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TABLE 7.5
Unions of the Sierra Leone Labour Gongress and their officials, March 
1967
UNION SECRETARY
Transport and General Workers' Union
Clerical Mercantile and General Workers' Union







Maritime and Waterfront Workers' Union 
Artisans' and Allied Workers' Union 
Sherbro Amalgamated Workers' Union
H. N. Georgestone 
G* E. E. Palmer 
H. D, Charles 
J. B. Mahoi 
P. S. Mammah 
Kekura Sanday 
M. I. Mansaray 
Amos Sawyerr 
E, T, Kamara 
Marcus Grant 
A. Bai Conteh 
J. A. Coker
SOURCE: Labour Congress, Affiliated Union, March 1967.
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this document at length:
’Unemployment is the present day problem... 
and the future does not look very bright due 
to probable redundancies in some corporations.
What can we do to ensure that unemployment 
does not rise?.••government must be made aware 
that increased (import) duties...raises the 
cost of living, and the cost of goods, and 
companies will again be cutting down staff... 
broadcast talks delivered from time to time 
by members of the NRG to workers, seem to 
lead to one and only one conclusion, i.e., 
that this'government in grappling with the 
economic situation is to resort to the 
retrenchment of labour...As a result of 
these policy statements...there is now going 
on in the private sector of the economy mass 
retrenchment. Without prejudice,..perhaps 
some employers see this as a golden opportunity 
to cut down running costs and add to their 
already huge balance of profits...No one is 
against these measures (the economic strategy) 
but those concerned, i.e., Employers’ Federation,
Labour Congress, and the Department of Labour 
should of necessity be consulted when it is 
proposed to take decisions on this matter of 
unemployment of such magnitude.'1
The statement also drew attention to government figures on employment,
7,294- in 1967, which were ’unreliable in view of the fact that most of
2the unemployed....are unregistered’.
One suspects that the suggestion for meetings of employers, labour 
leaders, and Labour Department officials, was an attempt to return to 
the status quo ante military intervention when labour leaders and 
employers could use informal means to influence the outcome of 
bargaining or government policy. Moreover, the NRC member with 
responsibility for the Labour Department, Mr. Alpha Kamara, a senior 
police officer, was known to be more flexible with regard to the 
economic strategy than some of the military members of the junta.
1 Labour Congress, Item for inclusion in the agenda for consideration 




The chairman of the NRC, who was in charge of financial and economic
matters, stuck to his guns. The budget proposals were implemented.
It was clear that the Chairman was not prepared to Accommodate1 union 
1leaders.
Indeed, the junta had no need to create a clientele either among 
labour leaders, the traditional chiefs, ’big men’ at the local level, 
or any other social groups. The basis of the NRC's power was its 
military might. It largely ignored the sullen resentment of the 
coalition which had provided the APC with electoral victory, though 
the various commissions of inquiry which were set up to investigate 
the activities of the Margai regime were popular among this group.
The economic policies to uhich the Chairman (with what must have been 
a sense of messianism) committed the junta, the documentation of the 
corrupt practices of the previous regime, was partly an attempt to 
justify the intervention of the NRC. In so far as the junta was to 
conduct this ’house cleaning* exercise for a limited period, it 
commanded the support of the rank and file of the security forces, 
and secured the grudging (or resigned) acceptance of the civilian 
population. However, when the NRC (and especially the Chairman) 
wavered over the question of the return to civilian rule, its support 
among the lower ranks of the military crumbled. In April 1968, junior 
officers of the army ejected the junta from power and installed Siaka 
Stevens and the APC in government.
It was with some considerable relief that the leaders of organised 
labour welcomed the new APC regime. Four days after Siaka Stevens’ 
appointment as prime minister, the Congress executive presented a
1 Interview with E. T. Kamara, 25 May 1982.
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TABLE 7.6
Industrial disputes. Sierra Leone, 1965-69
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Number of work stoppages 3 9 7 9 12 .
Workers involved 1,320 781 1,951 1,714 6,964
Man-days lost 3,245 542 1,163 2,574 14,659
Duration of Work Stoppage
Less than 1 day 1 5 4 5 -
1 day but less than 2 days 1 2 2 1 4
2 days but less than 4 days 1 2 1 3 5
4 days but less than 1 week - - - - 3
Cause of Dispute
Wages or hours 1 - - 1 -
Working conditions - 3 3 6 7
Fringe benefits or privileges 1 - - - -
Personal relations between 
workers or with management - 6 3 2 4
Disagreement over management 
policy not directly related 
to wages, hours, or working 
conditions 1 - 1 - 1
SOURCE; Labour Department, Annual Report 1969.. Table 14, Freetown 
1969.
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congratulatory message to him in which it was made clear that they
regarded the government as their own:
•In his address, Mr. Caramba-Coker (president 
of Congress) commented on Dr. Stevens' trade 
union links and former career as a trade 
unionist. "We, as workers' representatives", 
he declared, "are very much delighted at the 
thought that one of us, after going through 
the crucibles, could now be elevated to the 
enviable and responsible position of Prime 
Minister. Your patience and courage, your 
subtle intellect and winsome personality, 
have already endeared you to us, and we feel 
happy and proud beyond measure that we have 
our own man at the helm of affairs in this n 
country with whom we can confer and consult.'
The appointment by Stevens of C. A. Kamara-Taylor as Minister of
Lands, Mines, and Labour was welcomed by Congress. As a former
employee in the clerical grades of the UAC, Kamara-Taylor had
worked alongside George Palmer of the Clerical Union with whom he
had maintained a close friendship. It is evident that labour leaders
greeted the assumption of office by the APC with much euphoria and
great expectations. On May 24, 1968, 'thousands of workers and
trade unionists from all over the country defied torrential rain to
rally in honour of Prime Minister Stevens...(who) told them that
government would consider ways to provide more low cost housing for
low income workers and that measures to control the price of rice
would be announced shortly,..E. T. Kamara, Secretary General...of...
Congress assured the Prime Minister and Government of their cooperation
2
m  the tasks that lay ahead*. On July 7, Stevens was crowned 'chief 
motor driver' by the Motor Drivers' Union. At the ceremony, the 
secretary of the union asserted that they hoped to be government's
3
'comrade-in-arms against want, disease, oppression, and inequality'.
1 Cf. 12 years of Economic Achievement and Political Consolidation 




While the APC was formally committed to the reform of the
institution of chieftancy and to effect a re-distribution of income
through reformist social and economic policies, the logic of its
political strategy once in office - to reduce the numerical strength
of the opposition in parliament, to create, maintain, and extend its
own network of clientele via political patronage, and to reward
loyalty to the regime and in particular its leader - conflicted in
several respects with the higher ideals which had surrounded the
formation of the party and which had sustained it during the difficult
years in opposition. Indeed, the APG leadership had served notice
of this political strategy by its refusal to criticise the principle
of a one-party state. Labour leaders, and the leaders of the
coalition of interest groups which supported the APC in opposition,
failed to sustain an interest in, or to enter into a debate on, how
the principles of reform on which they had campaigned for the APC
could be translated into successful policies. Leaders of the interest
groups readily accepted the amoassadorships and other appointments
offered by the APC. Individual trade union leaders also reached
their own 'accommodation1 with the new regime. At the Port Authority,
M. I. Mansaray, the secretary of the Dock Workers' Union, was able
to persuade the Minister of Transport and Communications to make him
a director on the Board, contrary to the recommendations of The Panda
Report. In April 1969, E. T. Kamara, the secretary of the Mine Workers'
Union and part-time secretary of the Labour Congress, resigned from the
1Labour Movement to pursue a course in management studies in Britain, 
and was later to become head of administration at the APC national 
headquarters.
1 Interview with E. T. Kamara, 25 May 1982.
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In their concern with the more economistic and parochial issues 
relating to the practice of trade unionism (to effect marginal increases 
in wages and to secure marginal improvements in working conditions), 
labour leaders also failed to address the more important questions 
relating to the sources of inequality, or the nature of power and 
authority in the post-colonial state. It was not until an unprecedented 
bout of inflation had by the mid-1970's considerably eroded the real 
value of wages (and after the hopes raised by the coming to power of 
the APC had been dashed), that union leaders began to address 
themselves to these crucial issues* On the other hand, in view of 
the historical development of the practice of trade unionism in 
Sierra Leone, and in view of the political conditions associated 
with neo-patrimonal leadership, it is perhaps understandable (if not 
justifiable) that union leaders should have been concerned to reach 
an 1 accommodation' with the regime and to exploit the patronage of the 
politicians for personal advancement. It could also perhaps be 
argued that it was only through such an accommodation that it was 
possible to secure and defend gains at the work place. Apart from 
the adoption of these tactics of bargaining, some labour leaders did 
also demonstrate a genuine commitment to the development and 
consolidation of trade unionism. The success of these attempts to 
create a viable labour movement was invaluable during the confrontation 
with the APG regime in the late 1970 's. The kind of trade unionism 
consolidated during the early years of APC rule, however, did not 
involve any very strong or consistent assertion of the right and duty . 
of the labour movement leadership to criticise government policy and 
performance publicly. In a sense, the silence of these leaders was 
bought.
The main priorities, then, of union leaders at the beginning of
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APG rule were to strengthen the viability of the movement and to 
secure and defend gains at the work place. In November 1968,
E. T, Kamara proposed the centralisation of all trade unions into one 
single national union having a similar organisational structure to 
that of the Israeli Histradut. The reasoning behind the proposals 
was that individual unions had acquired (via members1 subscriptions) 
the economic resources to maintain viable organisations with full-time 
officials, office accommodation etc., while the national centre was 
poorly organised. By coming together into one national union, the 
resources of the union would now be concentrated in the national 
centre* It was envisaged that departments’ within the national union
centre would be in charge of the various areas of trade union activity,
2
such as the docks, the mines, clerical workers, artisans, etc. A
committee of Congress was eventually formed to examine the issue. In
its four-point recommendation, the committee ignored the idea of a
Histradut-like national centre, but made suggestions for the
strengthening of Congress;
’That Congress persuade small unions of 
like interest to merge and form one strong 
unit;*•••that Congress endeavours to get 
the check-off system on a national basis... 
and thirty per cent of all union dues collected 
at source be paid to Congress;...that,,.a 
full-time paid secretary be employed with two 
assistants and a clerk-typist;...that a 
campaign be launched for the following;- the 
setting up of an industrial relations charter...
1 Ibid; Labour Congress, E. T. Kamara to General Secretaries of all 
registered trade unions of Sierra Leone, 10 November 1968. It was 
this structural model that had also been adopted for the Trade 
Union Congress in Ghana under Nkrumah after 1958 with the 
consequences of rank and file opposition and government suppression 
of this which have been described by'Richard Jeffries in Class» 
Power and Ideology, Chapters 5 and 6.
2 Interview with E. T. Kamara, 25 May 1982.
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to serve as a modus operandi for the labour 
movement*..the encouragement of trade union 
education.11
In view of the rejection of the idea of one National Union, one is
led to suspect that individual union leaders wished to preserve their
autonomy within a strong national centre. These suggestions also
reflected the more urgent needs of the labour movement as perceived
by the committee. The suggestion for a new industrial relations
charter stemmed from a growing realisation among union leaders,
employers, and labour department officials alike, that the existing
institutions of collective bargaining, the wages boards and the JICs,
had become outmoded* One of the most notable features in employment
trends during the first decade of independence was the growth of the
manufacturing, commercial, and services (hotels, restaurants,
entertainment, etc.) sectors (cf. Table 7.7). Newer employers tended
to offer more favourable working conditions and fringe benefits than
2
employers in the traditional sectors. While four new JICs had been 
created in addition to the artisan and transport JICs to reflect the 
growing diversification of employment, most of the benefits offered 
by employers were negotiated and awarded outside the framework of JIG 
or Wages Board Agreements. Unlike the Dock Workers’ Union, which was 
essentially a ’house’ union, the Clerical Union, for instance, 
operated in several sectors and consequently there was considerable' 
heterogeneity in the range of benefits available to its members.
Indeed the increase in strike activity in 1968 and 1969 in terms of 
man-days lost and numbers of workers involved was directly related to ,
1 Artisans, Ministry of Works Employees' Union, Report of ad hoc 
committee on centralisation, 5 March 1969.
2 Interview with Uriah Davies, formerly Assistant Secretary of the 
Clerical Union, and currently Secretary of the Hotels, Food, 
Drinks, Tobacco, and Entertainment and Services Workers' Union,
19 June I98O. The same point was made with further elaboration in 
a second interview with Davies on 5 April 1982.
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attempts to reduce anomalies in working conditions and benefits offered 
by different employers (see Table 7,6).^
Following E. T. Kamara*s resignation from the labour movement in 
April 1969, George Palmer of the Clerical Union was elected Secretary 
of Congress* During the seven years of his leadership of Congress, 
Palmer was able to bring into fruition three of the four main 
recommendations contained in the report of the ad hoc committee of 
Congress of March 1969 - recommendation relating to mergers 
between unions being the most elusive objective to realise* Palmer 
faced little opposition in his bid for the secretaryship of Congress* 
Under his leadership, his union, the Clerical, Mercantile and General 
Workers’, had become one of the largest and most influential unions 
in the country. His friendship with C. A. Kamara-Taylor, the minister ■ 
in charge of the Labour Department, had been well publicised within 
the labour movement at the time of the latter’s appointment. He had 
been one of the leading campaigners for the reform of the JICs and 
Wages Boards and the adoption of a new industrial relations charter 
and, indeed, had proposed in December 1968 what was in effect an 
abandonment of these institutions. Marcus Grant, having been 
’isolated’ within the labour movement following his defeat as a SLPP 
candidate in the 1967 elections, did not contest* H. N. Georgestone,
1 According to the day-to-day record of the activities of Stevens 
and the APC leadership, on April 1, 1969, ’Dr. Stevens called a 
meeting with General Secretaries and executive members of all 
Sierra Leone’s trade unions...(and).appealed to.*,(them) to 
ensure that all other means had been exhausted before embarking 
on strike action, and emphasised that trade union rights should 
be exercised responsibly. Dr. Stevens reminded them that the 
country was theirs and that they should therefore pursue its best 
interests...The Prime Minister finally gave assurances that 
Government would take care of workers* grievances.’ (Cf. 12 Years 
of JEconomiG....Achievement and .Political Consolidation-under._Dr.
Siaka Stevens and the APC, p.39.)
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TABLE 7.7
Changing pattern of employment trends









Electricity, Water and 
Sanitary Services 993 1,857
Commerce 4,355 6,197
Transport, Storage and 
Communications 8,961 8,444
Services 14,012 20,564
All Industries 47,874 63,542
N.B, Figures are based on returns from employers of six 
or more persons.
SOURCE: Labour Department Reports I960 and 1969.
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a more serious contender, withdrew at the last moment when it became 
clear that his union, the Transport and General Workers', did not 
support him. The perennial problem of mal-administration and mis­
appropriation of funds had surfaced within his union, and the rank 
and file were demanding a public inquiry. Government appointed a 
commission of inquiry in October 1969.^ H. D. Charles of the 
Construction Union was elected assistant secretary, G. A. Caramba-
Coker of. the Artisans' Union continued in his position as Congress
2
president or chairman.
Shortly after becoming part-time secretary of Congress, Palmer
and his union executive council ran into difficulties with other unions
affiliated to the centre over the reform of the institutions of wage
bargaining. In December 1968, the clerical union had proposed that
JIC awards should not be made to apply to workers covered by separate
3
collective agreements between unions and employers. The Clerical 
Union was in effect suggesting that free bargaining should be allowed 
between employers and the unions. The basis of this suggestion was 
the realisation that better terms of employment could be negotiated 
directly with employers, and in particular, employers In new 
businesses. The raison d'etre of the JICs was to standardise awards 
throughout the sector covered by its agreements. Although the ability 
of employers to offer more favourable terms varied, there was 
nonetheless considerable pressure for JIC awards to be made at levels
1 Interview with H. N. Georgestone, 23 January 1980; cf. Labour
Department, Annual Report 1969.
2 Interview with Tejan Kassim, 26 March 1982.
3 Artisans, Ministry of Works Employees' Union, G. E. E. Palmer
to permanent Secretary Ministry of Lands, Mines, and Labour 
(copied to “the Hon. Prime Minister) 18 December 1968.
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acceptable to all employers within the sector. Since the Clerical
Union had a high proportion of skilled workers (who are not easily
replaceable) among its members, it had been highly successful in
securing more favourable terms and conditions than those offered by
the JICs, via threats of (and actual) strike action and other arm-
twisting tactics. Most of the other unions, with a high proportion
of unskilled workers, did not possess such bargaining strength and
were in fact protected by standardised JIC awards. One of E. T.
Kamara1s last actions as secretary of Congress was to inform the
Ministry of Labour about the reservations of most unions affiliated
to Congress vis a vis the Clerical Union’s proposals:
’...I have to inform you that Congress does
not support the amendment sought by the 
Clerical, Mercantile and General Workers’
Union at this moment...Congress has however 
considered that from the fact itself that 
the present wage machineries of the JICs 
have existed for a period of over 20 years 
now, and more so because these arrangements 
were concluded in a colonial regime, it is 
the general feeling that the need for 
reassessment is fully justified and we 
therefore recommend that a meeting be arranged... 
so that the whole question of wage negotiation 
machinery appropriate to present day 
circumstances be looked into thoroughly and 
amendments made where this is found necessary 
and acceptable in the interest of all 
concerned.’1
This was also the line of argument adopted by the Employers’
federation and other Congress affiliates at a meeting of the Joint
Consultative Committee which accepted the principle of the adoption
2
of a new industrial relations charter. The meeting also agreed that 
technical assistance should be sought from the ILO in the formulation 
of the charter.
1 Artisans, Ministry of Works Employees’ Union, E. T. Kamara to 
permanent secretary Ministry of Lands, Mines, and Labour (copied 
to the Hon* Prime Minister and to the Employers’ Federation), 17 
April 1969.
2 Labour Congress, Recommendations affecting wage negotiating
P.T.O.
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In February 1970, the ILO sent its Regional Adviser, Charles
Spencer-Cooke, to Sierra Leone to undertake the research relating to
the formulation of the industrial relations charter.'*' A month later
agreement was reached between the Employers’ Federation and the Labour
Congress on the principles and details of the new charter. Its main
provision was the establishment of Trade Group Negotiating Councils
2
to replace the JICs and Wages Boards. The economy was divided into 
fourteen sectors and the TGNC was to become the forum for negotiations 
on wages and other benefits in each sector designated viz: mining, 
building and construction, commercial and insurance, shipping and 
forwarding, industrial, oil (marketing and refining), public utilities, 
banking, hotels and entertainment, printing, transport, agriculture, 
municipal and local government, and air transport. Each TGNC was to 
be responsible for setting the minimum level of wages and benefits 
in each sector. As it was envisaged that these ’agreements’ would be 
given legal force, the level of wages and benefits reached at 
negotiations was to become the statutory minimum applicable in each 
sector. Negotiations at TGNGs were to be held biennially, but ’...it 
being understood that in extraordinary circumstances affecting the 
national economy it may within this period be reviewed at the petition 
of either party to such agreement’. Each TGNC was to be composed of 
an equal number of representatives drawn from employers and the unions 
in the sector concerned. Disputes were to be referred to the 
Commissioner of Labour (the senior industrial relations specialist
machinery made by the Joint Consultative Committee, n.d., circa 
May 1969.
1 Artisans, Ministry of Works Employees’ Union, Secretary-General 
Labour Congress to all secretaries of affiliated unions, 18 
February 1970.
2 Labour Congress, An agreement between the Sierra Leone Labour 
Congress and the Sierra Leone Employers’ Federation, 13 March 1970.
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at the Labour Department) for arbitration, and if agreement could not 
be reached, to an industrial court, the decision of which was to be 
final. Notices of strikes and lock outs were to be given at least 
fourteen days in advance of the action. The Clerical Union was 
apparently able to force through the concession for which George Palmer 
had been campaigning. It was also agreed that: ’Notwithstanding 
agreements reached by the Trade Group Negotiating Councils, employers 
will be at liberty - where they have the ability to do so and without 
prejudice to employers who adopt the terms and conditions to which 
these agreements refer - to offor.better wages, terms and conditions 
than are provided for in these agreements. ’ A Joint National Board 
was also proposed under the agreement. It was to be responsible for 
fixing national minimum rates of pay, maximum hours of work, the rates ' 
of pay applicable on national public holidays, and terms of employment 
of children or young persons, apprentices, and the disabled.
During conversations held by this researcher with Labour 
Department officials, the point was made that this ’formal’ model of 
industrial relations contained some of the more favoured prescriptions 
of the ILO (and in particular the recommendation that an industrial 
court should become the final arbiter of industrial disputes) so as 
to take ’politics’ out of industrial relations. Labour Department 
officials further perceived that it was unlikely that the formal model 
would work as envisaged in the agreement, in view of the pervasive 
tendency among union leaders and, indeed, employers, to use their 
clientelist relationships with important politicians to influence the 
outcome of bargaining. After eighteen months of study by government 
legal advisers, however, a Bill containing some of these recommendations 
was submitted to parliament in September 1971.
During this intervening period, some progress was made by Congress
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In bringing to fruition some of the priorities defined in the report
of the ad hoc committee of 3 March 1969- In an attempt to make
Congress financially viable, it was agreed that each affiliated union
should make a monthly per capita payment of ten cents and, as George
Palmer reminded union leaders, '...if Congress is to work effectively,
one of the most responsible factors is money* Please see that your
1
union pays her per capita monthly'* The formula adopted for the
financing of the national centre meant that the unions with the greater
number of members, such as the Mine Workers, the Transport Workers, the
Clerical Workers, the .Artisans, and the Dock Workers, contributed over
three-quarters of the revenue of Congress* Reliable figures relating
to these arrangements are not available until 1972 (by which time
Congress had been able to employ full-time officials with the assistance
of the African-American Labour Congress (AALC)), but it can be
estimated that total monthly receipts from affiliates was in the
region of Le2,500.^
Progress was also made in the field of trade union education* An
important area of patronage for a ruling party in Sierra Leone lies
in the distribution of government scholarships. The APC regime had
provided Congress with respresentation on the national scholarships
committee, and two scholarships were reserved on an annual basis for
3
the training of trade union officials* In October 1970, the national 
centre with ICFTU assistance ran a series of seminars for shop 
stewards.^ In accordance with its official policy of 'non-alignment',
1 Artisans, Ministry of Works Employees' Union, G. E. E, Palmer 
to secretaries of all affiliated unions, 9 April 1970*
2 This estimate is based on the assumption that the numerical
strength of the unions affiliated to Congress was about 25,000.
3 Artisans, Ministry of Works Employees' Union, E. T, Kamara to
all secretaries of Congress affiliates, 5 February 1969*
4 Artisans, Ministry of Works Employees' Union, G. E* E. Palmer to
P .T .0 ,
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Congress accepted scholarships for the training of workers’
representatives from trade union organisations in Eastern Europe as
well as in the Western Alliance and Israel. With regard to the
Arab-Israeli conflict, Congress defined its position in July 1970:
’The Sierra Leone Labour Congress has a very 
nice and cordial relationship with the workers 
of the Arab states and those of Israel and 
reaffirms its policy that the Big Powers should 
help bring about peace in the Middle East, 
since it is the working class that is suffering 
the most at this time.’1
Inspite of its neutrality in the Cold War and other conflicts
professed by Congress, it is clear that the relationship which had
been developed with workers’ organisations in the Western Alliance
(and in Israel) was greatly valued. Moreover, it is further clear
that labour leaders in Sierra Leone have preferred the ideologies
underlying the mildly reformist strategies of American trade unionists.
None of the Sierra Leonean trade unionists encountered by this
researcher professed a commitment to socialist or communist ideologies
prevalent among European trade unionists. When Congress was asked
by the ICFTU (which together with the AALC provided the national centre
with most of its external aid) not to send delegates to a conference
in Moscow held under the auspices of the Eastern bloc's World
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the principle of non-alignment
2
was not invoked. The advice was accepted. Assistance given to 
Congress to develop its educational and training programmes as well 
as for other purposes evidently compromised its professed neutrality 
in international political conflicts.
The content of educational programmes has been examined. These
all secretaries of Congress affiliates, 30 September 1970.
1 Artisans, Ministry of Works Employees’ Union, Press Release by
G. E. E. Palmer, 30 July 1970.
2 Labour Congress, Minutes of a special meeting, Thursday 2 September 
1971.
- 336 -
have been geared towards promoting literacy among union members, and
towards disseminating information on the purposes and functions of
trade union organisation. Regarding the latter type of courses,
booklets which are used in instruction are distributed among participants.
These contain slogans which are explained by a simple text and by
pictoral displays. For instance, the Congress Shop Steward Manual
admonishes floor representatives:
’When a worker comes to you with a grievance, 
get the facts, listen to the members, look 
at the job, talk to other workers, check past 
grievances*•.When presenting a grievance, 
find a precedent. Cite a similar case that 
has been settled the way you want it...Be 
sure to file the grievance on time. A late 
grievance is a lost grievance.*1
Shop stewards at the Port Authority have been asked to assess the
usefulness of Congress training programmes. Without exception, those
stewards who had attended courses maintained that the instruction
received was useful in their role as workers' representatives* Needless
to say, participants have not been introduced to debates concerned
with the political role of trade unions. The AALC representative in
Sierra Leone between 1977 and 1981 maintained that the content of
education training programmes was related to the experience of the
American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisations
(AFL-CIO). The motives for assisting trade unions in Sierra Leone were
allegedly based on altruistic considerations:
'It is a case of putting money where your 
mouth is...we are here on the invitation of 
Congress and will leave as soon as agreed 
programmes have been completed...We also give 
assistance in training managers of (Congress) 
cooperatives and in providing anti-malaria 
and other medical drugs.'2
1 Labour Congress, Shop Steward Manual (produced in conjunction with 
the AALC), n.d.
2 Interview with John Kilhefner, AALC representative in Sierra Leone, 
18 April 1980,
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Another area in which progress was made on the priorities of Congress 
as defined on 5 March 1969 was the proposal to construct a modem 
headquarters# This was facilitated by a grant of $4-7,000 from the 
AALC*^ * The government of Sierra Leone agreed to provide a site at 
Wallace-Johnson Street in central Freetown, and work commenced in 
mid-1972,^
By the end of the first decade of independence, the trends in 
national labour politics which had become established during the years 
of decolonisation continued to be manifested# During this period, 
trade union leaders also demonstrated a commitment to the strengthening 
of the organisational base of trade unions in Sierra Leone, albeit 
within political parameters that had been narrowly defined, and within 
the terms of a political cosmos which they accepted uncritically and 
indeed helped to sustain# Developments during the second dacade of 
independence initiated a reconsideration of the assumptions governing 
the political behaviour as well as the political values of labour 
leaders. The focus now shifts to a consideration of trends in 
national labour politics during this latter period.
3
Main trends in labour politics in the second decade of independence 
In March 1971, almost three years after coming to power, the 
APC was faced with its first major crisis. A corps of senior army
1 Artisans, Ministry of Works Employees’ Union, Minutes of Meeting
of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress held on 7 January 1971#
2 Labour Congress, Minutes of Meeting held on Wednesday 4-th
October 1972#
3 For an overview of trends in national politics during this period,
cf. the later chapters of Victor King, ’The Search for Political 
Stability in Sierra Leone’; Chris Clapham, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, and Chris Allen, ’Sierra Leone', in John' Dunn (ed#) West 
African States. 1979, pp.189-210#
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officers alleged to be associates of leaders of the United Democratic
Party (UDP) attempted to assassinate the prime minister, Siaka Stevens,
by raking his office and home with gun fire* The leaders of the UDP,
Dr* Mohammed Fornah, Dr* John Karefa-Smart, Dr* Sarif Easmon, and the
Bash-Taqi brothers (M. 0. and Ibrahim) had either been senior cabinet
ministers or leading supporters of the APG, and had resigned from the
party in protest at the harrassment of Opposition M.P.s and at
allegations of government complicity in the Great Diamond Robbery at
Hastings Airport near Freetown*'*' The formation of the UDP was a
serious threat to the ruling party as four of its leaders, Fornah,
Karefa-Smart, and the Bash-Taqi brothers were Temnes from the north*
Sarif Easmon symbolised the growing disenchantment of the Freetown
elite with the APG regime. The UDP leadership was also distinguished
from senior APC politicians by the fact that they were all highly
educated professionals or were relatively affluent in their own right.
Three of the senior UDP politicians were successful medical practitioners,
while Ibrahim Bash-Taqi had been a successful journalist. With the
exception of M. 0. Bash-Taqi, the others had joined the APC rather
late in the day and had been particularly identified with the liberal
2
intellectual supporters of the party. Thus the banning of the UDP, 
and the subsequent ascendancy of C. A. Kamara-Taylor and S. I. Koroma 
in the hierarchy of the party, may be described as the resurgence 
in political dominance of the original group of APC activists from 
lower status occupations as described by Cartwright, who were initially 
protesting against the elitism of the SLPP and the excesses of the 
chiefs, but who showed little concern with liberal values and whose
1 Chris Allen, op* cit.* loc. cit.* p.205; the theft of the diamonds
has been listed in the Guiness Book of Records as among the
greatest crimes of all time.
2 I am grateful to Abdul Salami Williams, a former aide of Ibrahim
Bash-Taqi, for bringing this to my attention.
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own political survival had replaced the reformist spirit in relevance 
and in importance. During this second decade of independence, the 
APC leadership consolidated its position by the adoption in April 1971 
of a Republican Constitution giving a wide range of powers to the 
presidency which Stevens himself assumed, by the ’incorporation’ of 
senior army officers, and by the adoption of a single party regime in 
June 1978. This the APG had been able to achieve not only by creating 
an efficient nation-wide organisation which was used to renew and 
extend its network of clientele, but also by creating a security unit, 
independent of the army, and loyal to the party leadership. It is 
against this background that the responses of organised labour to 
trends in national politics need to be assessed.
Most labour leaders came down firmly on the side of the APC in
relation to the cleavage which had given rise to the UDP and the
assassination attempt on the prime minister in March 1971. A few
days after the assassination attempt, a meeting of Congress was called
to discuss the situation, ’....a letter written to the Prime Minister
by the Secretary-General dated 25th March sympathising with him...was 
1
read’, A statement was presented to Stevens on 30th March and is
recorded in the official diary of the APG leadership:
’The Sierra Leone Labour Congress, representing 
the entire national workforce, condemned the 
actions of a small dissident army group in 
their attempts on the life of Prime Minister 
Siaka Stevens and pledged their support for 
the government under Dr. Stevens' leadership.
The Congress also called for a People’s 
Militia to replace the armed forces and 
declared support for government’s decision ? 
to invite Guinean troops into the country.'
1 Artisan, Ministry of Works Employees' Union, Minutes of extra- . 
ordinary meeting of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress held on 
Tuesday 26th. March 1971.
2 12 Xears of Economic Achievement and Political Consolidation under 
the ~APC and br. Siaka Stevens, p.S3.
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By August it was clear that this statement of support was not the
unanimous view of leaders of Congress affiliates. Before the events
leading up to the assassination attempt, H, U. Georgestone who -
following Marcus Grant's loss of credibility and influence after his
unsuccessful foray into national politics - was respectfully regarded
as the ’father' of trade unionism in Sierra Leone, had advocated
that Congress ought to re-assess its relationship with the APC.1
George Palmer, the Secretary of Congress, did not share this view.
According to Georgestone, 'sometime in 1970* he had even warned
Stevens that the growing authoritarianism of the APC was a betrayal
2
of the ideals of those who had supported it in opposition.
1 Interview with H. N. Georgestone, 23 January 1980. Around the 
time of Georgestone's public statements of reservation on trends
in the conduct of the APC, he was informed that his union, Transport 
and General Workers', was to be investigated by a public inquiry 
for corruption and other malpractices. There is evidence that some 
sections of the rank and file demanded the inquiry. Georgestone 
and other union officials were found guilty of mis-using union 
funds and other instances of mal-administration* (Cf. Report of 
the Faulkner Commission of Inquiry into the Finance and 
Administration of the Transport and General Workers' Union and 
Government Statement Thereon. Freetown, 1970, pp.74-77). The 
government, in its statement accepting the report, sounded an 
indignant note: 'Trade unionism is an important social institution, 
and those who set themselves up as leaders or are appointed 
leaders should realise that they have a moral obligation to 
perform the duties of their office with probity and integrity.
There should be no place in the trade union movement for weak, 
incompetent, negligent, and irresponsible leaders.•.Government 
will not allow the subscriptions paid from the sweat and toil of 
the ordinary masses to be manipulated and squandered by rascals 
who keep themselves in positions of authority when they have long 
passed their usefulness.1 (of. The Faulkner Report, p.i).
2 Interview with H. N. Georgestone, 23 January 1980;. Georgestone's 
reservations and his disagreement with George Palmer over this 
issue have been corroborated by Uriah Davies: 'Kamara-Taylor and 
Palmer were friends since they worked together at the UAG, It
was also a fact that Palmer was pro-APC'. (interview with U. 0. H. 
Davies, 5 April 1982).
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Matters came to a head in June 1971, when the Labour Department
nominated Palmer as the workers1 delegate to the annual. ILO meeting
in Geneva. Georgestone interpreted this as an unwarranted exercise
of government patronage and protested that, in principle, an invitation
should have been issued to Congress which should in turn have selected
a delegate (usually the secretary) as was the established practice.'*'
The Labour Department ruled that there were no procedural irregularities*
Georgestone and three other leaders of Congress affiliates issued a
2
statement of no confidence in the elected officers of Congress. At
a meeting of Congress in August, H. D. Charles and Georgestone 
insisted that this statement be discussed as a regular item on the 
agenda* When the chairman refused, Georgestone, Charles, and the 
representative of the Mine Workers* Union walked out* The meeting 
went on to discuss other issues including the Industrial Relations 
Bill which George Palmer was anxious to have enacted, not least
3
because of its provision for the statutory recognition of Congress.
After this episode, approaches were made to Georgestone, Charles, 
and S. S. Foday, the secretary of the Mine Workers’ Union (on whose 
behalf F. A. Brimah, regional secretary of the union at the Mokanji 
bauxite mines had signed the statement of no confidence) to have the 
issue resolved, Georgestone and Charles insisted that their criticisms 
of Congress officials were based on strongly held principles* They
1 Interview with U, 0, H. Davies, 5 April 1982.
2 Artisan, Ministry of Works Employees* Union, Statement signed on
behalf of the Transport and General Workers’ Union, the United 
Mine Workers’ Union, the General Construction Workers’ Union, and 
the Motor Drivers' Union by H. N. Georgestone, F. A* Brimah, H. D, 
Charles, and A. V/. Hassan respectively. The statement also referred 
to the Industrial Relations Bill based on the Agreement of March
1970, to draw attention to the fact that the government had decided 
to make Congress the statutory national labour centre,
3 Labour Congress, Minutes of Meeting held on Thursday 5th August
1971. (Four unions had initially signed the statement of no 
confidence, but the Motor Drivers’ Union dissociated itself from 
the.criticisms of Congress officials). Georgestone and Charles 
insisted on having the statement as a separate item on the agenda
P.T.O.
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resigned affiliation from Congress and established a rival-centre,
the Council of Labour.*^  Foday, however, agreed to dissociate the Mine
2Workers’ Union from the statement*
By the middle of September, it was clear that the split within
the national centre could not be easily resolved. A meeting was called
to review the situation and it transpired that representatives of
Congress affiliates (including the secretary of the Mine Workers1
Union who had expressed some reservations) were unanimous in the
belief that the rival centre should be ignored. There was no serious
attempt to debase the ’activities1 of Congress officials or the
’connotations’ of the Industrial Relations Bill, to which the statement
of no confidence had referred:
’...Comrade Pratt (Motor Drivers’ Union) 
pointed out among other things that the 
fight in the (national centre) had started 
since the time of the late Mr, Wallace- 
Johnson and this fight will never come to 
an end; so if Congress wanted to beg the
two dissident unions, they could do so;
if not, then Congress should forget about 
the unions concerned and continue with their 
normal activities.,.Comrade Marcus Grant 
(Maritime and Waterfront Workers’) remarked 
that he did not know of two centres but 
only one, and went further to state that 
the move taken by Congress to send letters 
of invitation to the dissdent unions was 
a good one...Comrade S. S. Foday (Mine 
Workers' Union) suggested that in order 
that Congress may get the sympathy of the 
public, a complete history in connection 
with recent happenings should be drawn up 
by the Secretary-General for publication 
and scrutinised by a committee of three 
before it is made public...The Secretary- 
General pointed out that it was not proper 
for any organisation to use the name of the 
Sierra Leone Council of Labour as it had
so that it could be debated. As correspondence, it might only 
have been ’noted’. It also transpired from the discussions at the 
meeting that Marcus Grant had been rehabilitated into the counsels 
of Congress.
1 Interview with U. 0. H. Davies, 5 April 1982,
2 Labour Congress, S. S. Foday to G. E. E. Palmer, 25 August 1971.
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long been dissolved and replaced by the 
Sierra Leone Labour Congress. For this reason, 
he felt that this should be brought to the 
notice of the Minister of Labour and the 
government for appropriate action, and that 
Congress should see to it that the government 
makes a press release re-affirming its 
official recognition of the Sierra Leone 
Labour Congress*..Comrade Hamilton (Railway 
Workers' Union) congratulated all other 
speakers who strongly criticised the behaviour 
of the two leaders of the seceded unions and 
appealed to all members for stronger support 
and cooperation in order to work not only 
for the benefit of self but for the benefit 
of the members we represent, and concluded 
that we make a statement to the outside 
world for them to know the facts.'1
These developments are significant for two reasons. First, the
anxiety of the representatives of Congress affiliates that the outside
world (including the ICFTU and the AALC, the major donors of aid)
should be informed of the 'real' facts (i.e. Congress's position) is
obvious. The logic underlying the provision of assistance by these
organisations is a genuine desire to help build a united labour
movement with a solid organisational base and with an ideological
orientation acceptable to western geo-political interests. Indeed,
during the earlier dispute between the Federation of Labour and the
Council of Labour under the Margai regime, the ICFTU had helped to
bring about a rapprochement between the two factions. It is
unfortunate that in wanting to create and maintain an influence in
third world labour movements, these international organisations
often fail to understand the trends In local national politics.
Throughout the dispute, the AALC and the ICFTU continued to provide
Congress with various types of assistance. From 1972, the AALC
actually paid the salaries of the full-time officials of Congress.
1 Labour Congress, Minutes of Extraordinary Meeting held on 23rd 
September 1971.
2 Labour Congress, AALC Budget Provision - 1972 to Sierra Leone
^^?^-u^$Ugress, 2 December 1972.. According to this document- the 
contribution of the AALC "Go salaries and other organisational
P.T.G.
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Second, the nature of the issues relating to the split within 
Congress posed some key questions centring on the choice, of the future 
political posture of the labour movement in Sierra Leone, The 
statement of no confidence referred to the 'activities' of Congress 
officials and to the 'connotations' of the Industrial Relations Bill,
As already noted, Congress made no serious attempt to discuss these 
issues, contributions to the debate of 23 September being mere 
homilies on the correctness of extending invitations to the 'dissident1 
unions to come back to the fold. In view of trends in national 
politics under the APC, Georgestone in particular, with great 
foresight, wanted Congress to re-assess its relationship with the 
ruling party. He had perceived that certain provisions in the 
Industrial Relations Bill were designed to bring the labour movement 
under the control of the party. In this regard, H. D. Charles of 
the Construction Workers' Union had brought back with him from Ghana 
(where he had been a union official in the early 'sixties) the 
experience of the Ghanaian Trade Union Congress under Ukrumah. 'Until 
he died (in 1978) Pa Charles always said that there are opportunities 
in cooperating (with the ruling party) but also dangers'.'*' The Issue, 
then, was not whether labour leaders should seek to enter into 
clientelist relations with politicians (the effectiveness of these 
informal channels was fully understood and not controversial as such), 
but whether the labour movement could preserve and maintain its 
independence especially to criticise those areas of government policy 
that were perceived not to be in the best interests of lower paid 
workers. The failure of Congress to debate the issue in these terms 
was tragic. On the other hand, however, the premium placed on the
expenditures of Congress was Lel5,7S6.80.
1 Interview with U. 0. H, Davies, 5 April 1982.
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loyalty to political patrons by those who enter into clientelist 
relations with them is high* Within the terms of such relationships, 
criticism or oppositional activities which are directed at the very 
nature of the political system (and in consequence, the very survival 
of the regime) cannot be accommodated* Having chosen on 23 September 
to (in effect) submerge their own particular interests beneath those 
of the ruling party, Congress however lost the tactical advantage 
to be accrued by remaining an independent interest group* That is 
to say, Congress lost its psychological advantage over the politicians 
who would otherwise have not been certain a priori of the political 
posture of the labour movement.
By the end of 1971, two conclusions with regard to APC-Congress 
relations could be drawn. First, the ruling party had achieved 
effective control over Congress via clientelist relationships and via 
industrial relations legislation, just as it had been able to reduce 
the significance of the SLPP Opposition via inducements to ’cross-the- 
carpet', harassment, and the adoption of the Republican Constitution* 
During the mid-*seventies, university students were to provide the 
most vocal opposition to the regime* Second, and crucially important 
to the situation of lower paid workers, the priorities of the APG 
were in the area of economic nationalism (reducing the shares of 
foreign businesses in the mining companies, the setting up of state- 
owned insurance, commercial bank, trading, and shipping companies - 
see Chapter 4 ~ all of which increase the scope for the exercise of 
patronage) and not in the area of reducing inequalities by the adoption, 
of policies of redistribution. These conclusions can be related, 
respectively, to the Industrial Relations Bill and to a government 
policy statement on industrial relations.
The provisions of the March 1971 agreement on the Industrial 
Charter were written into the Bill presented to parliament in
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September 1971, with some crucial modifications* The government 
increased the statutory period of strike notice required from fourteen 
days to twenty-one, and in the public utilities sector, prohibited 
strikes completely* The Employers1 Federation and the Labour Congress 
were given statutory recognition* Trade Group Negotiating Council 
Disputes were to be mediated by the Minister with responsibility for 
the Labour Department and not by the Commissioner of Labour before 
being presented to the Industrial Relations Court if agreement could 
not be reached. ' The check-off system was given legal recognition 
and employers who failed to pay minimum wage rates were to be 
subjected to stiff penalties.
In making the provision that the Minister of Labour should 
mediate disputes arising out of industry-wide bargaining, the Bill 
gave recognition to the existing practice whereby informal political 
channels are used to influence the outcome of bargaining by the 
unions and the employers alike.^ The most controversial aspect of 
the Bill, however, was the provision for the statutory recognition 
of Congress. This not only implied that such recognition could be 
withdrawn (and was therefore contingent on the relationship between 
the party and Congress) but also that unions which wished to operate 
out of the framework of Congress might not be able to do so. These 
were the 1 connotations1 (especially in view of national political 
trends) about which Georgestone had expressed reservations* This 
point was made by Salia Jusu-Sheriff, the Leader of the SLPP 
Opposition during the debate on the Bill in parliament:
1 It should be noted that the Industrial Relations Court has never 
been constituted in view of successful interventions of the 
minister, and indeed senior politicians (including the president) 
in settling"disputes*
- 347 -
’I want to know how those unions which are 
not members of Congress are going to go 
about their business...in view of the fact 
that by ILO convention, no government can 
force them into a secondary union.
The Attorney General, L. A. M. Breirah, replied on behalf of government;
*,..it is not Congress that has to decide 
how the Minister of Labour should act in 
recognising any group of people who form 
themselves into a union. The question that 
the honourable member is asking does not 
arise if these people form a union and do 
not want to join Congress to enjoy the 
facilities of Congress, whose fault?1^
At the end of 1971 the government issued an important policy statement
which clearly revealed for the first time the ideology of the APC on
industrial relations reform:
TWhen trade unionism started in Sierra Leone 
in the early 1940’s, the country was a 
dependent territory...Since independence, 
the position has completely changed* Terms 
and conditions of service of workers have 
improved much more than they were in the 
early years of trade unionism...It is the 
view of government that trade unions should 
now play a role consonant with the overall 
development of Republican Sierra Leone... 
Sierra Leone belongs to all of us and the 
time has come for all sections of the 
community to work for the general welfare 
and development of the nation. To meet 
this new challenge, trade union leaders 
now have a duty to inculcate in their 
members the habit of honest work, which 
should help to eliminate malingering, 
reduce unnecessary absenteeism and increase 
productivity on which the economy of the 
country depends. It should constantly be 
borne in mind that a strike in one section 
of industry invariably brings out a chain 
of repercussions on various spheres of our 
gross national product. Claims made on both 
the public and the private sectors should 
be realistic...New industries should be 
allowed to grow without unnecessary industrial




strife* In Republican Sierra Leone, trade 
unions should strive to ensure that their 
activities do not drive away investors or 
cause industries to stagnate...Government 
wishes to see a strong and united Labour 
Congress providing an'example of efficient 
trade union organisation. Splinter groups 
whose aim is merely to publicise the Importance 
of their leaders and to peddle patriotic 
sentiments for personal gain must not expect 
any support from government.*1
The Gouncil of Labour was allowed to function not only because it
posed no threat either to the regime or to the Labour Congress, but
also because to have banned it would have been an infringement of ILO
codes. The government however never recognised the Council. For
instance, when the Joint National Negotiating Board (JNNB) was convened
in May 1972 to fix minimum wages, Council was not invited to take
part in the deliberations. While Congress was officially invited to
give evidence at the Barthes-Wilson Commission on Prices in mid-1971,
this recognition was not accorded to Council. Congress also took
pains to present the Council as an ’insignificant- minority of
disgruntled elements’ to the international organisations to which the
2former was affiliated.
One of Congress's main preoccupations during the ’seventies was
with the rising trend in prices (cf. Table 6.3 above for the details
on the Consumer Price Index during the ’seventies). At the inaugural
meeting of the JNNB at which the Minister of Labour, representatives
of the Employers’ Federation and Labour Department officials were
-^present, Marcus Grant, as spokesman for Congress, made it clear that
the movement was concerned;
’The inflation of prices...needs looking 
into...I hope much will be done to solve 
this ever burning question.’3
1 Sierra Leone Employers' Federation, Newsletter No* 52 January/ 
February 1972. The statement was reproduced in full in the newsletter.
2 Labour Congress, Minutes of Meeting held on 8th January 1972.
3 Labour Congress, Minutes of the inaugural meeting of the Joint
P.T.O.
- 349 -
It is at least a tribute to Congress’s influence that government 
responded by using that familiar instrument of public administration 
to show that it was also concerned, A commission of Inquiry under 
J, Barthes-Wilson, a senior cabinet minister, was set up to inquire 
into the inflationary tendencies in the economy. Congress representatives 
gave evidence at the commission and, shortly before the publication of 
its report, Congress presented the government with a detailed 
memorandum on the inflationary situation:
(Congress) notes with grave concern the 
persistent increases in the cost of food, 
clothing, drinks, rent and all necessaries 
which have no bearing on adequate economic 
factors to justify the increase...The cost 
of pharmaceutical products are unnecessarily 
high, and realises the predicament of the 
common man,,,and therefore appeals to 
government to take immediate steps by 
compelling the dealers to drastically 
reduce their profit mar gin... C-overnment 
to take action to withdraw the monopoly 
of the National Trading Company on (imported) 
commodities which is chiefly responsible 
for the present high cost of living.,.and 
for a National Price and Income Committee 
comprising of substantial numbers of 
workers’ representatives to consider ways 
and means of effectively controlling the 
level of prices of commodities from time 
to time.*1
When the Commission reported in May 1974* it pointed out that the
inflationary tendencies in the economy were imported, but recommended
the review of the Trading Company’s monopoly and increased vigilance
2
of Price Inspectors of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The 
monopoly of the Trading Company was withdrawn but price control has 
been a notorious failure. From 1973, government had also been
3
subsidising certain essential commodities including petroleum products,
National Negotiating Board, 15th May 1972.
1 Labour Cpngress, Resolutions adopted on Tuesday 2nd April 1974 on
the persistent inflationary trend m  the economy of Sierra Leone.
2 Cf. President’s Annual Address to Parliament^ June 21 1974




but the deterioration in the relationship between Congress and the 
regime from 1977 onwards can be related to the considerable erosion 
of living standards since the early 'seventies.
Towards the end of 1972, the question of the centralisation of 
Congress affiliates into one trade union was again considered. Part 
of the problem of the looseness of the organisation of the national 
centre resided in the fact that individual unions were fairly 
effective in achieving their objectives as perceived by their 
executive councils or union officials. Affiliation to Congress 
afforded contact with foreign labour organisations and provided the 
means of coordinating the activities of the affiliates as for instance, 
in the expression of concern over the inflationary tendencies in the 
economy. Congress of itself, however, existed outside the bargaining • 
framework of its affiliates, and was in this sense remote from the 
rank and file of unions affiliated to it.
In mid-1972, the Council of Labour lost the Transport Workers' 
Union which rejoined Congress following Georgestone1s resignation 
as union secretary in consequence of continuing internal dissension. 
Over the next twelve months, however, the Construction Workers'
Union was joined in the Council by two new unions, the Printing and 
Allied Workers', and the Municipal and Local Government Employees'
The late Emerson Davies of the Printers' Union became part-time 
secretary of Council while H, D, Charles of the Construction Workers' 
became president. In March 1975> another new union, the Hotels, Food, 
Drinks, Tobacco, Entertainments and Services Union, joined the Council.
(3) Cf. Budget Speech delivered to Parliament by the Hon. Minister of 
Finance, C. A. Kamara-Taylor, June 29 1973 (reproduced in ibid,
pp.200-210).
1 Interview with U. 0, H. Davies, 5 April 1982.
2 Ibid.
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Between 1972 and 1975 however, four new unions joined Congress# These
were the Teachers’ Union, the Provincial and General Workers’ Union,
the Public Utilities’ Employees’ Union, and the Electricity Corporation 
1Employees’ Union# The proliferation of new unions not only increased
the significance of the Gouncil of Labour vis a vis Congress, but also
increased the difficulties relating to centralisation. There is
evidence that the AALC encouraged a rapprochement between Congress and
the Council, even suggesting that centralisation of Sierra Leone trade
unions would enable Congress to become self-sufficient. A. W. Hassan,
of the Motor Drivers’ Union, reported to Congress in October 1973* the
results of discussions held in the United States with Patrick 0'Farrell,
2
a senior AALC official.
■It had been decided within Congress that a merger with the
3
Gouncil would be sought as a prelude to centralisation. Approaches
made to the Council, however, were rebuffed.^ It was not until after
a new Minister of Labour was appointed following a cabinet re-shuffle
in November 1974- that some progress was made* According to James
Kabia (later to become Secretary of Congress):
’Gobio (George Gobio Lamin, the new minister) 
was a diplomat. He understood the situation#
When we went to acquaint him with our 
difficulties, he agreed to use his good 
offices to bring about a solution*’5
1 Ibid.
2 Labour Congress, Report on AFL-CIO Convention, October 1973, by 
A. V/. Hass an.
3 Interview with J. B. Kabia, Secretary of Congress November 1976 -




The minister assumed office with one major advantage; he had not
been involved in the formulation of the Industrial Relations Act or
associated with the policy of the Labour Department to ’isolate’ the
Council. 'He was careful to let us know that he had inherited a
1situation which he did not create’. In February 1975> Congress and
the Council met at the office of the minister and agreed in principle
to come together to form one national centre. Over the next few
months a committee of Congress and Council representatives deliberated
the issues related to the merger. Towards the end of the year, the
committee prepared a report for the consideration of the affiliates
to the two centres. (Having achieved the merger, there is evidence
that attempts were made to consolidate the resources of the national
centre. While the AALC was committed to continuing its financial
2
assistance to Congress, there was an understanding that this was to 
be matched by contributions of affiliated unions).^  It recommended 
that ’...a national centre be created and called Sierra Leone Labour 
Congress*..;...that the constitution of Congress be reviewed and 
fresh elections of the new body be a r r a n g e d . t h a t  mergers 
between existing unions be encouraged in the immediate future to 
make them viable and strong1 Other recommendations were the 
adoption of standard rates of union subscription, the creation of a 
research department of Congress, and with regard to the proliferation 
of unions, the adoption of recognised spheres of influence of
1 Interview with U. 0. H. Davies, 5 April 1982.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
U Labour Congress, Report of the IS Man Committee of the Sierra 
Leone Labour Congress and the Sierra Leone Council of Labour to 
seek ways and means for the merger of the two organisations, 
circa December 1975*
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existing registered trade unions*.*’1
During the early months of 1976, the report was deliberated by
2
affiliates of the two centres and eventually adopted. In September
3
the new centre was formally inaugurated by President Stevens.
Elections of officers to serve in the new centre were held prior to 
the inauguration ceremony and it seems evident that the outcome had 
been pre-arranged as all candidates were unanimously elected, George 
Palmer retained the full-time secretaryship of Congress while
H. D. Charles became part-time president. James Kabia of the Mine 
Workers’ was elected (part-time) first deputy secretary and 0. B.
Conteh of the Dock Workers’ Union (part-time) second deputy secretary. 
Details of Congress officials elected are provided in Table 7.S.
In the months preceding the formal inauguration of the new centre, 
the future political posture of Congress had been vague. The merger 
committee, for instance, made- no reference to national political 
trends. During the early months of 1977, however, it became evident 
that Congress had adopted a critical political posture. This was 
partly facilitated by the change of personnel In the hierarchy of 
Congress. On January 29 1977, students of Fourah Bay College, 
protesting at the deteriorating economic situation, allegations of 
official corruption, infringements of civil liberties, etc., staged 
demonstrations during a ceremony of -the conferment of degrees by 
President Stevens in his role as Chancellor of the University of Sierra 
Leone. The vehemence of the demonstrations brought the ceremony to
1 Ibid.
2 Interview with J, B. Kabia, 26 February 1982.
3 Report of the Acting Secretary-General, J. B. Kabia, to Delegates
Conference," 28 October 1977.
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TABLE 7*8
Congress Executive Committee 1976-77
President (Part-time) H. D. Charles (Construction Workers’ 
Union)
Vice President (Part-time) (1) T, E, Yambasu (Teachers1 Union)
(2) A. W. Hassan (Motor Drivers1 Union)
Secretary-General 
(Full-time) G. E* E. Palmer (Clerical Union)
1st Deputy Secretary-General 
(Part-time) J. B* Kabia (Mine Workers' Union)
2nd Deputy Secretary-General 
(Part-time) 0. B. Conteh (Dock Workers’ Union)
Treasurer (Part-time) T. A. Kassim (Artisans’ Union)
Deputy Treasurer (Part-time) J. E. Davies (Teachers’ Union)
Trustees (Part-time) (1) I. Langley (Artisans’ Union)
(2) C. A. W* During (Clerical Union)
Auditors (Part-time) (1) M. K. Kargbo (Municipal Employees’
Union)
(2) A. A. Savage (Teachers’ Union)
(3) D. Din Gabisi (Transport Workers’
Union)
Director of Trade Union 
Education (Part-time) M* A. Bailor (Teachers’ Union)
Administrative Officer 
(Full-time) Marcus Grant (Maritime Workers’ Union)
SOURCE: Labour Congress, Election of Officers, Wednesday 15 September
1976.
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a premature conclusion. The president and his entourage left the
campus of the University. Hours later, thugs ’invaded’- the campus.
Several students were severely beaten and raped. The leaders of
1
the demonstrations were arrested and detained.
The action taken by the students occurred after a four-year 
absence of public criticisms of the ruling party or other oppositional 
activity. Following widespread incidences of violence and intimidation 
at the 1973 elections, in which APC candidates were returned ’unopposed* 
in more than half the parliamentary seats, the opposition SLPF withdrew 
from the contest in protest. Voting actually took place in only five 
constituencies in four of which APC candidates were successful; the 
fifth constituency, Freetown Vest III, was won by an independent 
candidate with strong local support. He declared for the APC and was 
appointed Foreign Minister. Between 1973 and 1977, therefore, Sierra 
Leone was de facto a single party state. This period coincided with 
severe economic decline, unprecedented levels of inflation, and 
considerable erosion in mass living standards. In the absence of 
an opposition in parliament, or of a critical press, and in view of 
the cooperative posture (or, at least, unwillingness openly to 
criticise political trends) of the major pressure groups such as 
professional organisations, religious organisations and the Labour 
Congress (to which a majority of the unions were affiliated during 
this period), the protest action of the students was an indication 
of popular discontent that had for long been tightly bottled up.
Indeed, the subsequent attack on the students and the detention of
1 Interviews with Pios Foray and Samuel Tumoi (two of the leaders
of the students) 14 June 1980; cf. Pios Foray, ’The Students’
Crisis of January 1977’, B.A. dissertation, Fourah Bay College, 
University of Sierra Leone, 1977.
2 Cf. Chris Clapham, Liberia and Sierra Leone. p.94«
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their leaders provoked demonstrations throughout the capital city 
which was brought to a standstill. On the third day of the students’ 
crisis, a press release signed by James Kabia as acting secretary, 
(following George Palmer’s resignation from the movement in November 
1976 to take up an ILO appointment in East Africa), and H. D. Charles 
as president, was issued. This threatened action in support of the 
students if the harassment and victimisation of their leaders 
continued:
’The executive council of the Sierra Leone 
Labour Congress, meeting at a special emergency 
session at Congress’ secretariat today*.• 
reviewed the incident at Fourah Bay College... 
the executive regrets the incident all the 
more in that it involved the head of state 
and chancellor of the university...Congress 
would have imagined however, that a democratic 
government headed by no less a personality 
than a veteran trade unionist of no mean 
order, the government would have exercised 
restraint*..in the interest of national 
peace, the Sierra Leone Labour Congress calls 
upon government to secure the release of all 
students detained. The Sierra Leone Labour 
Gongress wishes it to be understood that if 
no immediate action is taken to release the 
students already detained, it will sympathise 
with them.
A few hours later, however, a second statement signed by Kabia and
Charles, as well as S. I. Koroma the Vice-President and C. A. Kamara-
Taylor the Prime Minister, withdrawing the earlier statement, was 
2
released. It transpired that, after the first statement was issued,
representatives of Congress affiliates were invited to meet senior
APC politicians:
’Appeals were made to us that any action 
taken by us would only lead to national 
chaos. It was agreed that the students would 
be released...that they should apologise
1 Labour Congress, first Press Release, 31st January 1977*
2 Labour Congress, Press Release, 31st January 1977.
- 357 -
to his excellency the president and agree 
to call off the demonstrations. We were 
invited to send our grievances to government 
and assured that action would be taken.
Government also said that it was prepared 
to call elections within three months to 
seek a fresh mandate. ‘1
The students for their part regarded the action of Congress as a
sell-out and have argued that, if Congress had called a general strike,
2
’...a revolution would have taken place1. Be that as it may, it was
evident that the national centre had adopted a critical (if not
militant) posture vis a vis the regime, A few days after the crisis
had subsided, Congress for instance challenged a news item broadcast
over national radio and'.television:
'The attention of..,Congress has been dram 
to a broadcast...over SLBS/TV in which the 
following, statement was attributed to the 
Hon. George Gobio Lamin, Minister of Labour, 
at a meeting held recently in Kono:- ‘The 
Minister said that the executive of the Mine 
Workers' Union had pledged their support 
and loyalty to the President and the Government. •
He assured them of the support of all trade 
unions in the country for the APC‘...Gongress 
wishes it to be known that at no time did it 
agree to, nor did it mandate anyone to issue 
such a statement.•,all affiliated unions 
have expressed grave concern over the second 
part of the statement quoted above, as it was 
pointed out that none of the unions, either 
jointly or severally, ever issued or mandated 
the issuing of such a statement*..Congress 
therefore wishes it to be known that it 
totally dissociates itself from the statement 
complained of as it has no foundation.
However...Congress as a matter of policy, 
has always and will continue to cooperate 
with the Government of the day in all matters 
appertaining to the common good of the nation.'^
Further evidence that the national centre had begun to question the
character and nature of the regime is provided by some proposals
1 Interview with J. B. Kabia, 26 February 1982,
2 Interviews, Pios Foray and Samuel Tumoi, 14 June 1980.
3 Labour Congress, Press Release, 24th February 1977. The release 
was signed by Kabia and Charles,
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issued in connection with the pending general elections:
'...Congress strongly appeals to Government 
that the pending general elections be conducted 
in a free and fair manner. To achieve this 
end, we hereby suggest the following
(a) that all registered political parties be 
allowed to put up candidates in all 
constituencies they may wish;
(b) that all eligible citizens wishing to 
contest the elections as independent 
candidates be allowed to do so...;
(c) that contesting political parties and 
independent candidates be allowed 
unrestricted use of the press, radio, 
and television...after the campaigning 
period is officially declared;
(d) that the present state of emergency and 
curfew be lifted very well in advance of 
the campaign period;
(e) that political parties and independent 
candidates be under strong obligation to 
publicly (sic) declare their opposition 
to, and non-condonement of all forms of 
violence and thuggery by their members, 
supporters, and sympathisers during the 
electioneering campaign and on nomination 
and polling day;...
(j) that the internal security unit (ISU) be 
disbanded and the personnel be absorbed 
into other areas of productive employment, 
because in Congress1 opinion, the continued 
retention of this unit is not in the best 
interest of the nation. Congress feels that 
the military and police forces can adequately 
cope with the nation's security problem.'1
Other proposals contained in the document specifically called for
economic reforms:
'(h) as an austerity measure to tide over the 
difficult financial and economic period, 
the Sierra Leone Labour Congress suggests 
that government cut down on the number of 
Sierra Leone foreign missions...
(k) that the number of ministries be reduced
to twelve.**'2
Elections were held in May, a full year before they were due, amid 
much violence and allegations by the SLPF Opposition of intimidation*
1 Labour Congress, Proposals of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress to 
Government in connection with the pending general elections...and 




APC M*P*s had been declared unopposed in more than a quarter of the
constituencies. The beleaguered SLPP Opposition - which had withdrawn
from the 1973 elections in protest at the violence - was determined
to fight the elections as there had been much discussion in APC
circles of legalising the de facto one party parliament.^ The SLPP
won 15 of the 85 parliamentary seats in the south, south-east, and
in Freetown. Its majority in the Freetown Central II constituency,
a former APC stronghold, was convincing. A few weeks after the
elections, on 30 May, a resolution on the adoption of a one party
system of government was passed at the APC national delegates
conference at Mahera, Lungi, in the northern province, and therefore
2
became party policy* In his speech before the conferences, President
1 At the APC national delegates conference in March 1974# President 
Stevens in his key note address discussed the concept of a one 
party system of government; 'Whenever I have been asked whether I 
favour a one party or a multi party system, I have always replied 
that if Sierra Leone is to become a one party state, then the 
process must be by evolution and not by revolution, and when at 
the 1973 general election the APC was able to sweep the polls, it 
was an indication that the majority of Sierra Leoneans are no 
longer willing to dissipate their meagre resources and energies 
in useless conflict. They are determined to get together and work 
for the national*..good. It is for us to study our own conditions 
and find the best ways and means of giving people an opportunity 
to have a real say in the direction of government, I don't say 
that all is evil in the political arena...but I do say with all 
the emphasis at my command that many of us are too ready to 
adopt ideas and methods without studying our own traditions and 
particular requirements*1 (Cf. Sierra Leone, The Path to One Party 
System of Government, Freetown, 1978, p.8.) The most obvious 
interpretation of this concept of a one party system of 
government is that the APC leadership recognised that the party of 
government in Sierra Leone presides over a spoils system. In 
electoral competition therefore, the stakes are exceedingly high; 
hence the large number of 'unopposed' candidates; hence the 
violence. 'Our own traditions and particular requirements’ is to 
recognise the facts of the situation and adopt a system of 
government that is consonant with them. The fallacy in this 
argument is the assumption that a one party system of government 
would eliminate 'useless conflict'. Not only do contenders for 
■ seats in parliament (and hence of positions of influence in the 
appropriation of the spoils) continue to compete violently, but 
as the general strike of 1981, the first in the nation's history, 
was to show, the growing number of lower paid workers perceive 
their interests as very different from those of their rulers.
2 P.T.O.
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Stevens repeated his thesis that a one party system of government
would minimise the violence of political competition:
•I urge members of the All People’s Congress 
national delegates conference to adopt a 
One Party System for Sierra Leone if the 
country is not to disintegrate into tribal 
factions.
During the next twelve months, the APC took the one party issue to 
the country, and stage-managed appeals from various social groups 
for its speedy implementation. In June 1978, one party government 
was formally adopted following a referendum which recorded a dubious
p
l^% majority in favour of the new system.'' While the Labour Congress
took part in the presentation of resolutions of support for the
single party state (as was done by other pressure and interest groups
such as the United Christian Council, the Council of Imams, the Freetown
City Council, the Senate of the University of Sierra Leone, APC Women,
3the Petty Traders Association, etc.), Congress affiliates had taken 
action aimed at distancing themselves from the regime. At the 
delegates conference of Congress in October 1977, where elections 
of officials were held to serve for the ensuing three years, two 
candidates closely identified with the regime were rejected.
A. W. Hassan of the Motor Drivers1 Union, who had been nominated by 
President Stevens as an M.P. in May,^ challenged H. D. Charles for
(2) Cf. The Path to One Party System of Government, p.14*
1 Ibid.
2 Cf. 12 Years of Economic Achievement and Political Consolidation.•.,
p.434 for the details relating to the organisation of the 
referendum and the results.
3 Cf. The Path to One Party System of Government, pp.28-32.
4 Cf. 12 Years of Economic Achievement and political Consolidation...,
p.378. Although Hassan was appointed to parliament to represent
the interests of labour, Congress was not consulted over his 
appointment. He had also been defeated at the elections having 
run on the APC ticket (interview with J. B. Kabia, 26 February 
1982).
- 361 -
the presidency of Congress while 0. B. Conteh of the Dock Workers*
Union (believed to have kinship relations with a senior, cabinet 
minister) challenged James Kabia for the secretaryship,'*' When the 
votes were taken;
*Pa Charles won by a huge majority, and 
0, B, (Conteh) after seeing that Hassan 
had been beaten withdrew at the last minute,
Kabia was then unanimously e l e c t e d , *2
Several union leaders have confirmed that Hassan and Conteh were
3
rejected because they advocated a close relationship with the regime.
Most union leaders had grown to believe that, while they should
cooperate with the government (and continue to use the informal
channels of bargaining), they should nonetheless maintain a distinct
identity. Indeed, the Teachers* Union had presented a paper to the
conference calling attention to (among other things) the *.,,undue
loyalty of union officials to employers and government for remunerative
jobs and other rewards*,^
Under the single party constitution, the secretary of Congress
is automatically a member of the Central Committee (the policy-making
body) of the only recognised party, the APC. James Kabia, however,
maintains that, although the constitution provides for representation
of a wide variety of interests on the Committee, meetings are not
held on a regular basis and key policy decisions are taken by senior
5
APC politicians at cabinet level. The decision to host the I960 OAU
1 Labour Congress, Delegates Conference, 28 October 1977.
2 Interview with Alhaji Savage, assistant secretary Sierra Leone
Teachers' Union, 26 March 1932.
3 Ibid; interviews with J, B. Kabia, 26 February 1982; F. A. Brimah, 
11 March 1982; and Tejan Kassim, 26 March 1982,
J+ Sierra Leone Teachers' Union, Suggested Topics of Discussions,
presented to the delegates conference, 28 October 1977,
5 Interview with J. B. Kabia, 26 February 1982.
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summit and ministerial conferences, for instance, widely believed to 
have cost the government some Le200 million, was taken by senior APC 
politicians, and not by the Central Committee, Although the 
preparations (construction of a conference centre, a luxurious hotel,
1
villas for the dignitaries, road works, etc.) created about 700 jobs,
the decision resulted in a further deterioration in Congress-govemment 
o
relations culminating in the general strike of September 1981.
The profligacy in public expenditure associated with the hosting 
of the conferences and the 'demonstration effect' of the luxurious 
way in which the delegates were feted (at a period of declining living 
standards in view of the inflationary trends in the economy) served 
as a catalyst to the manifestation of anti-pathetic attitudes (which 
had been latent) towards the kleptocratic elite among lower paid 
workers. Graffiti which appeared in various parts of the docks (and 
the capital) prominently displayed slogans such as 'QAU for you, IOU 
for we' (or we pay the debt for hosting the OAU), While there was 
much talk among the rank and file of the Dock Workers' Union about 
misplaced priorities, Congress leaders were resolved, however, to 
wait for the end of the round of negotiations on wage increases in 
the various TGNCs which were concluded by December 1980. Dock Workers 
were awarded 50 cents per diem for the lowest paid, and Lel56 per
1 Gf. Bank of Sierra Leone, Economic Review, January-June 1980, p. 13-
2 Informal conversations held by this researcher with the rank and 
file of the Dock Workers' Union and with Congress leaders during 
the months preceding the conference and during the conference 
itself. This account of the strike has also benefited by 
witnessing the proceedings of the Taju-Deen Commission of Inquiry 
(appointed to examine the issues leading up to the strike) in 
February and March 1982. Conversations with a Freetown correspondent
West Africa magazine were useful. I am very grateful to the 
correspondent for allowing me to study copies of despatches to the 
magazine on the strike. The records of Congress relating to this 
episode were destroyed when its offices were 'invaded' by thugs 
during the strike.
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annum (about 52 cents per diem) for those at the higher levels of the
wage scale. Even after these awards, wages were in real terms about
60% below their 1965 levels (cf. Table 7.9).1 In an interview with
West Africa magazine shortly before the strike, James Kabia described
the strategy which Congress decided to follow with regard to falling
living standards:
'Actually there have been two schools of 
thought...the first was to demand salary 
and wage increases to augment the rise in 
the cost of living. The second was to submit 
to government, Congress1 view on the economic 
situation in the country. This second school 
of thought carried the majority. A committee 
was appointed to work out the details.1^
While the work of the committee was in progress, Kabia informed the
Minister of Labour in May 1981 that Congress would shortly present
government with proposals for economic reform. He also warned the
minister that the labour leadership was resolved to call a national
3
strike if the proposals were not carried out. The report of the 
Congress committee was submitted to government in June in the form of 
a memorandum. It contained proposals for reducing the.number of 
staff in Sierra Leone's embassies around the world, reforming tax 
collection and foreign exchange control, reforming the import licensing 
system, the price control mechanism and the land tenure system, 
encouraging small businesses and setting up state farms. The 
memorandum also stated:
1 Since the wage rates of other lower paid workers, in Sierra Leone 
are comparable to those of the dockers, and since the 1980 awards , 
were also comparable, the decline in the real value of wages 
must also be comparable. The actual figures, however, have not 
been obtained and computed.
2 Despatches to West Africa magazine; cf. West Africa, 10 August 
1981, p.1822.
3 Notes taken by this researcher at the proceedings of the Taju-Deen 
Commission. The report of the Commission has not yet (August 1982) 
been published.
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’We do not believe that recourse to IMF 
loans is the answer.,.a look at some of 
the conditionalities that follow IMF loans 
such as devaluation of the domestic currency, 
restrictions in public expenditure and 
removal, of subsidies on items such as 
transport and food (which hit the poor 
hardest), restriction on bank lending, and 
encouragement to foreign investors are ^
all positive processes of underdevelopment.’
By August there had been no reply from the- government. Congress
therefore decided to publish the memorandum. Following demonstrations
and a nation-wide strike on 14 August, government responded by inviting
Congress to re-submit the proposals in order of priority. A
government statement also argued that the June memorandum of Congress
was not related to ’industrial1 but to ’political’ issues. The
legality of a general strike (vis a vis the 1971 Industrial Relations
Act) was also called into question. Congress had moreover published
the memorandum in a foreign newspaper (meaning West Africa) before
2the government could reply. In response to the invitation, a new 
memorandum dated 24 August was submitted by Congress to the government. 
This included proposals for price control, rent subsidies, improvement 
of medical facilities, and ’...a reduction in the exorbitant and
3
economically unjustifiable price of rice,..’ President Stevens 
immediately responded by announcing a new control price for rice.
When it was suggested to Congress that a committee of government 
advisers and Congress officials be formed to examine the other 
proposals, Congress replied that this would be construed by the 
workers as ’delaying tactics’ on the part of government. An indefinite 
general strike was called for the first of September.^ Negotiations
1 Despatches to West Africa magazine; cf. West Africa, 10 August 1981,
p.1821.
2 Despatches to West Africa magazine; cf. West Africa, 24 August 1981, 
p.1911 and p.1913*
3 Despatches to West Africa magazine; cf. West Africa. 7 September
1981, pp. 2030-203X1------ -----------
4 P.T.O.
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which were held between labour leaders, senior APC politicians _nnd 
government officials right up to the 31st of August could not find a 
solution to the impasse.
The strike brought business activity throughout the country to 
a standstill. The government responded by declaring a state of 
emergency. A broadcast by President Stevens also declared that 
workers who failed to turn up for work would not be paid and hinted 
that they might lose their jobs. Ministers were to be issued with 
hand guns to defend themselves should they be attacked. Labour 
leaders who had barricaded themselves in the offices of Congress on 
Wallace-Johnson Street in central Freetown were rounded up, arrested, 
and eventually detained for a month. The government had the 
situation under control within a week.'1'
In conversations with this researcher, dock workers have argued 
that the strike failed because they were faced with a government much 
stronger that the labour movement as a whole, Be that as it may, 
the strike (and the events leading up to it) is significant for two 
reasons. First, it illustrates the dynamising potential of a more 
truly expressive Gongress leadership as well as, of course, the 
limits of government tolerance. For much of the first and second 
decades of independence, labour leaders had been content with 
entering clientelist relations with politicians whose influence 
could be used to effect marginal improvements in wages and working 
conditions during collective bargaining, as well as, it must not be 
forgotten, for personal gain. Several years of APC authoritarianism, 
declining living standards and the ’demonstration effect’ of the
(4) Despatches to West Africa magazine; cf. West Africa, 31 August 
1981, pp.2019-25257
1 Despatches to West Africa magazine; cf. West Africa, 14 September 
1981, pp.2089-20951
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hosting of the OAU conferences created the conditions for a radical 
reformulation of the relationship between the labour leadership and 
the regime. Second, it is clear that some of the proposals of 
Congress for economic reform suggest an inherent conflict of interest 
between peasant farmers and lower paid workers in the urban centres. 
Pressure from the urban workforce on government to control the price 
of foodstuffs also means lower receipts for peasant farmers, who 
respond by growing less food. Government is then forced to import 
higher levels of food (cf. Table 7.10) resulting in a further 
discouragement of farmers. This of course underlines Bates’ argument 
that to the extent that there is a rationale underlying the development 
process in much of sub-Saharan Africa, it is political rather than 
economic. The other proposals of Congress such as reducing staff 
in the country’s embassies, reform of tax collection, foreign exchange 
control, etc., are laudable.. The role of the IMF (which should be 
one of the strongest allies of Congress in its struggle with the 
regime) is evidently misunderstood. The Fund has a long record of 
consistently warning successive post-colonial regimes about the 
damage inflicted on the country’s productive base by the adoption 
of policies which can only bring short-term political benefits or 
personal gain to the politicians and their clientele. Moreover, 
in the face of a 60% increase in the rate of inflation in the economy 
during 1980, devaluation, a reduction in public expenditure and a 
reduction in the levels of bank borrowing by the public sector are 
some of the hard headed policies that would help to resuscitate the 
economy. Furthermore, Sierra Leone has suffered not from too much 
foreign investment, but from too little foreign capital to assist 
the development of its productive base*"1" It is also curious that
1 The ideologies of the labour leadership in Sierra Leone vis a vis 
economic reform are similar to those of the Left in Ghana";' cf. 
Richard Jeffries’ ’Rawlings and the Political Economy of
P.T.O.
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Congress’s analysis of the economy and proposals for reform gave little 
prominence to the damaging effects of OPEC price increases on the 
economy of a non-oil producing country like Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, 
the labour leadership has demonstrated, even if belatedly, that it is 
fully alive to the nature of the political economy of Sierra Leone, 
though it has yet to come to terras with the contradictions in its 
ideas for economic reform. In its.identification of the political 
elite (and the other major beneficiaries of the appropriation of the 
resources of the state by this elite) as the ’exploiters1, however, 
the labour movement has correctly identified the ’enemy’ in the ’class 
struggle’ in contemporary Sierra Leone.
Underdevelopment in Ghana’, or the same author’s 'Revolution In 
Black Africa’ in C. Dodd and N. O'Sullivan (eds,), Revolutionary 
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CONCLUSIONS
In the introduction to this study, the theoretical problem was said 
to be that of * situating* lower paid' workers within the political 
economy of Sierra Leone when these are workers in a public corporation, 
which is in turn an integral part of a patron-clientelist political and 
economic system. Several important questions were raised. These 
relate to the rules of operation of a public corporation such as the 
SLPA and how they have been affected by the development of a system of 
political clientelism; to whether lower paid workers in the employ of 
the Port Authority could be said (in a Marxist sense) to be exploited; 
to the influence that is exerted on their political perceptions and 
behaviour by the role of patron-clientelism in labour recruitment and 
managerial structures of labour control; to the most notable features 
of their trade union organisation and action; confrontation with 
government over major policy issues. It was also hoped that in -the 
consideration of these issues some theoretical advance will be made.
These questions were subsequently and systematically examined in 
the three sections and seven chapters which make up this work. The 
conclusion toward which they point is that both of the familiar 
positions - workers as a labour aristocracy and workers as the most 
exploited and potentially revolutionary class in an ostensibly capitalist 
system - are inapplicable* Post-colonial regimes in Sierra Leone have 
used the surplus appropriated from mining, peasant production etc., to 
expand what is a largely parasitic public sector and thereby to provide 
i*jobsT for political clients. This has not been very clearly in the 
interest of the development of capitalism or any form of economic 
development. To this extent, the senior public salariat constitute a 
class exploitative of the peasants, mine workers, etc. To the extent 
that the more junior public sector employees benefit from this patron-
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clientelist system (e.g. through the recruitment system and through 
the creation of additional but largely artificial jobs), and to the 
extent that they benefit from policies designed to cheapen (artificially) 
the price of foodstuffs, they constitute a kind of labour aristocracy* 
However, this is only partially the case, and there is another side 
to the story. To the degree that they also labour in roles that 
contribute to production and that they are relatively poorly renumerated 
for such work; to the degree that they suffer from the corruption and 
inefficiency of the public sector managerial class, they are in a 
position of antagonism to the political-bureaucratic (kleptocratic) 
class. Hence, they are objectively in a distinct ambivalent class 
position, and their 1progressiveness* or otherwise depends on the line 
which they choose to take, e.g., the degree to which they actively 
oppose the ‘kleptocracy* and/or identify with the interests of the 
peasants and urban poor more generally.
The preceding chapters then illustrate, amongst other things, how 
the dock workers (and other lower paid workers), although their 
opposition to the elitism and corruption of the political and 
bureaucratic class has generally been conceived within fairly narrow 
limits of economic self-protection, have at least had some success in 
maintaining the accountability of their union organisation (and the 
labour movement) against clientelist incorporation. More recently 
especially (in view of their solidarity with other lower paid workers 
in Sierra Leone - the majority of whom are also employed in the public 
sector - in the 1981 general strike), the dockers have developed a 
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1*4 Marital Status/No. of children
1*5 Year/period bom
1*6 Where bom
1*7 IF RESPONDENT WAS NOT BORN IN FREETOWN: TOWN/CHIEFDOM/DISTRICT 
l*7a When did you come to live in Freetown?
1.7b What were you doing before that?
1.7c What made you decide to come to town?
1.8a Education (last level)
1.8b Other training
1.9a Number of siblings
1.9b Educational level of each sibling
1.9c Occupation of each sibling
1.9d Father’s education/occupation
1.9e Mother's education/occupation
1.10 What are your future intentions and aspirations?
2. WORK HISTORY AND WORK PLACE AND PRIVATE AFFILIATIONS
2.1 When did you first begin work at the quay?
2*2a How long did you have to wait to find work there?
2.2b How were you managing?
2.2c How did you find and get the work?
2.2d What are the different tasks you have done at the quay?
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2.2e Starting with first work experience, list all subsequent work, 
including periods of unemployment and returns upline
2.3 SECONDARY EMPLOYMENT: Do you have, at the moment, any other work 
that brings in money or provisions? Yes/No
(if yes, specify type of work/eamings/goods)
2.4 Can you list the main problems related to your work at the quay
2.5 Does your work make you feel within your heart that you are doing 
something worthwhile? Yes/No Why?
2.6 Do you use the port canteen? If yes, how often? If no, why?
2.7 Have you used the medicare facilities? If yes, what is your 
opinion of the facilities?
2.8 Do you interact with other workers outside working hours (but 
including the mid-day break)? If yes, which of these groups 
of workers do you like to mix with:
i Workers working in your department/section
ii Workers in your age group
iii Workers from your ethnic group/region
iv Workers living in your neighbourhood
v Cuts across the groups above 
vi Other (specify)
2.9 Do you have friends outside the port whom you mix with?
If yes, do they fall into any of the groups listed above?
2.10 Do you belong to any groups or associations, for instance
i Religious (e.g. Church, Mosque) 
ii Mutual Aid (burial societies, osusu)
iii Ethnic/Regional (e.g. Bo descendants, Limba Friendly Society) 
iv Social or sports club (e.g. East End Lions, Old Bo School
Boys)
v 'Societies' (Masons, Ojeh, Forroh, Hunting)
vi Other
2.10b If so, do you hold any special position in the group?
3* TRADE UNIONISM
3.1a In any of -the work you have had, did the workers or staff go out 
on strike? (If yes, specify)
3.1b Were there ever any trade unions to represent workers? (If yes, 
specify)
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3.1c In general, what do you think of unions?
3.Id What about strikes?
3.2a Do you belong to a trade union here?
3.2b If yes, i What is the name of the union?
ii How long have you been a member? 
iii How has the union helped you? 
iv What is the name of your shop steward?
v What is the name of your union secretary?
3.3 What do you consider to be the qualities of a good trade union 
leader?
3*4 Do you think the unions should do something about the
decasualisation of the shore casual labourers and the stevedores? 
If yes, what? If no, why?
4. HOUSEHOLD AND HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY
4*la At the place where you stay now, what other persona are living 
with you (starting with head of household). List all permanent 
residents sharing same dwelling unit
4.2 Do you have (other) children not staying with you now?
If yes, please give sex/schooling/occupation
4.3 Like anyone living in Freetown these days you must have alot of 
expenses (e.g. rent/rates, school fees, food, medicare, clothes). 
Do you have to take responsibility for all of these yourself, or 
do other persons (in the family) contribute?
4.4 Apart from your own children, family and household, are there
any persons you are helping? If yes, specify
4*5a At the end of the month, do you usually find that (Tick one)
You have to borrow just to make ends meet
You have just enough to get by
You are able to save a bit
4*5b (If borrows): Who is it that helps you?
4*5c (If saves): What do you plan to do with the money?
4*6 How does your household/family generally buy some of these
necessities (Tick)
i Rice: by cup/by bag 
ii Palm Oil; by pint/bottle or by gallon can
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iii Cooking Oil: by pint/bottle or by gallon can
iv. Sugar: by cubes/spoonfuls or by packet
v Coffee: by spoonfuls or by jar
vi Tea: by bag or by packet
vii Salt: by spoonfuls or by packet
viii Cigarettes: by sticks or by packet
ix Shoes: From Street Hawkers or from shops
x Household repairs: Done by local craftsmen through informal
arrangement or by contractor
4.7 Gompared with other people, do you think you and your family are 
getting a fair share or benefit for the work you do? Why?
4.8 In the place where you live now, (tick)
(a) Is the house pan body/cement/board/mud
(b) Is the pump inside/outside in the compound/street
(c) Electricity (les/No)
(d) How many rooms do you have for self/family?
(e) Do you rent or own?
(f) If own,
i Did you (or spouse/parent) purchase/inherit the land only/
the land and house together?
ii Are you renting any rooms or flats to other people?
iii If yes, how many units, at what rent?
iv (If house purchased or built), in what year? Approximate 
cost







5.1 In this country now, we can see that there are some *Big Men1 or 
Gentry People, and we can also see that there are those who are 
managing, and those who are poor. Thinking of people like 
yourself, to which of the groups do you belong? Why?
5-2a How do you think people come to be Gentry?







How do you think people come to be only Managing?
Apart from these differences between gentry, poor, and people 
who are managing do you know of any other difference between 
people which are important?
Do you think Sierra Leone’s politicians and senior civil servants 
are
(a) Setting an example by making a sacrifice?
(b) Capable of improving the country’s economic position?
Thinking of people like yourself, would you say that there are 
any people or groups that are helping people like you so that 
you can ’go before’? If yes, who, and how? If no, who is 
making your life more difficult, and how?
Do you agree that government’s first priority should be rural 
development?
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